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Memo on No. 71-1336 
In re Griffiths 
WCK 
January 9, 1972 
This memorandum will simply be a brief statement 
of my views. I dismiss out of a hand petitioner's 
arg•ument III, that the citizenship requirement 
violates the First Amendment and international law. 
Nor am I particularly impressed with petitioner 1 s argument 
II, that the citizenship requirement conflicts with 
a federal statutory policy in favor of attracting 
alien professionals, although if petitioner has a strong 
constitutional argument, that may support giving the 
federal statute considerable leeway. 
I turn, then, to the constitutional argument. Petitioner 
relies on two sets of cases, the alienage cases and the 
bar admission •cases-"she argues that the regulation 
is unconstitutional under either set of cases. I 
have just re-read Graham v. Richardson, 403 u.s. 365, 
and find it a little strange. Early in the discussion 
of of the case law, Justice Blackmun points out that 
"It has long been settled, and it is not disputed 
here, that the term 'person' in !the context of the 
Fourteenth Amendment] encompasses lawfully admitted 
resident aliens as well as citizens of the United 
States and entitles both citizens and aliens to 
the equal protection of the laws of the Statex in 
which they reside." 403 U.S. P at 371. 
The opinion then cites and distinguishes the rational 
basis cases with the commenta 
"But the Court's decisions h?ve established that 
classifications based on 1 7 ·,~II$ alienage, 
like those based on nationality or race, are 
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial 
scrutiny." 403 u.s., at 371 .. 372 • 
. . 
--2--
The close scrUi~ny is justified because resident aliens 
are peculiarly unable to •protect themselves througha 
the political process. More broadly, it is "right" 
to give them equal protection of the laws because they 
bear the responsibilities of our social system-"e.g., 
taxes and the draft ...... and contribute in important ways 
to the national wellbeing. While a political commljnity 
must have the right to define its membership, Congress 
has plenary power to do so at the border. 
Despite so flat a statement as the statement that 
alienage is a suspect classification, however, the 
Graham opinion goes on to discuss the federal social 
security act and to note that 
"We have no occasion to decide whther Congress, 
in the exercise of the immigration and naturalization 
.,. power, could itself enact a statute imposing on 
aliens a uniform nationwide residency requirement 
as a condition of federally funder welfare benefits." 
403 u.s., at 382. 
While this footnote wasH 22 1 tied to a discussion of 
Shapiro v. Thompson , it would seems to be a gratUtous 
reservation of judgment after the Court 0 s straightforward 
suspect classification discussion. 
In any event, _., •. -~e-illt a classification based 
on~ienage is subject to close scrutiny in cases where, 
as in Graham, the state is dividing a limited pie(welfare 
benefits). The case would seem to be even stronger 
where, as here, the pie is only speculatively limited-" 
that is, there can be an unlimited number of attorneys 
--3- .. 
admitted to the Connecticut bar, and the only loss 
suffered by dtizens is the possible loss of business 
on the part of citizen lawyers. And, as the state points 
out, "there are relatively few lawyers immigrating to 
the United States", Brief at 31, In short, the 
exclusion of resident aliens from the Connecticut bar 
penalizes those aliens without any immediate benefit 
to citizens. Compare Graham v. Richardson; Takahashi 
v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 u.s. 410(1948)(fishing rights). 
Of course, even though the classification is subject 
to close scrutiny, it may be upheld if the state can 
show a compelling state interest. At this point, the 
bar admission cases become relevant. As 1 read those 
cases, they stand for the proposition that the state 
bar is entitled to insist of competence and on a commitment 
to support the Constitliltion, but that it is not entitled 
to add objectionable requirements to be "doubly sure", 
As the Court stated in Baird v. State of Arizona, 401 u.s. 
1(1971), the bar may insist that an applicant has "the 
qualities of character and the professional competence 
requisite to the practice of law," 401 u.s., at 7. 
Petitioner admits that she must pass the bar exam(it 
is not clear whether she has done so already) and that 
she must take an oath to sqport the Constitution. 
The state seem to maintain that even though it has 
no reason to think that petitioner cannot conscientiously 
- .. 4--
take the oath, it may nevertheless presume that no resident 
alien can take it, As petitioner points out, however, 
resident aliens are permitted (indeed in some circumstances, 
required) to join the armed forces and take a stringent 
oath to support the Constitution. In sum, the 
requirement of citizenship would be in for tough 
sledding apart from the alienage cases- .. with them, 
I do not see how tre requirement can pass constitutional 
muster. 
According to the briefs, petitioner is eligible to 
become a citizen because she is married to a citizen, 
Professor John Griffiths of NYU law school. The fact 
that she has not dolle so should, in my view, make no 
difference in this case. Neither Takahashi nor Graham 
makes a distinction between those eleigible for citizenship 
and those not eligible, nor does eligibility for 
citizenship have any effect on the social obligations 
of the resident alien. Since one is required to 
renounce his former citizenship to obtain American 
citizenship, the step is a major one cutting oneself 
off from his family andbackground, Finally, I see 
no point in deciding more than one case on the que,stion 
whether a state may constitutionally bar resident 
aliens from admission to the bar, 
" . 
() 
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the political process. More broadly, it is "right" 
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bear the responsibilities of our social system--e.g,, 
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alien can take it, As petitioner points out, however, 
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~ex Appellant is a citizen of the Netherlands who is 
married to a U.S. citizen and has chosen to live in this 
tL ~ 
country as a re ident alien rather than KRRMN renouncing 




in all other respects qualified to take the Conn bar ex~ 
except that the state bar requires that all applicants be 
American citiznes. When her application to take the bar 
was refused on this grounds, she sought relief in the state 
courts. The state SC ultimately rejected her claim. She 
brings this direct appeal to the Court. 
She raises three grounds for her appeal. First, she 
-2-
argues that the state policy violates her rights under 
equal protection clause. The eqyel protection clause appl\es 
to pe~ns--aliens as well as citizens, and the~a~~ 1 
that any discrimination against aliens must be jsstified 
by a compelling state interest. The state interests asserted 
by the state are that lawyers are officers of the court, that 
in Conn, lawyers are commissioners of the Superior Court and 
can issue process, administer notes on the order of a NEKRXX 
notary public, and that lawyers must be loyal to the political 
system. Appellant argues xR•Rxx that th~~irst two are in no 
way related to citizenship and that she is willing to swear 
an oath, required of all applicants to the bar in Conn, to 
support and defend the RENXXNX Constitution. She notes that 
in a series of cases decided last year, particularly Law_ 
Students Research Concil v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, the Court 
struck down varioss restrictions on admission to the bar 
including a six-month residency requirement. It upheld a 
very narrow oath to support the Constitution. To all this, 
appellee can only repy with an assertion that the rule is 
resonable. It of course must be both reasonable and compelling. 
Second, appelleant argues that the Conn law is an 
infringement on the federal government's exclusive power to 
t XR~X~KXE regulate immigration and is hence void under the 
\ pre-emption doctrine based on federal supremacy. 5he notes 
that last year in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U,S. 365 (1971), 
the Court stuck down a restriction on giving welfare to aliens 
on this ground. If an alien could not obtain the basic support 
on which to live, assuming he could not find work, than he 
-3-
ENMXN might be discouraged from moving here, despite federal 
policy to the contrary. In this connection she notes that 
high on the x«xx list of preferences for aliens to be admitted 
to ~kx« this country as residents are certain professionals, 
including lawyers. If they cannot practice their profession 
once they areive, then the federal policy of encouraging them 
to immigrate will be effective frustrated by the state in 
violation of the federal government's exclusvie pol icy-I}l.aking 
role in this area. In response to all this, appellee can only 
say that there is no deinal of the right to travel, wx« which 
is ax not at all the issue. 
Finally, appellant argues that the state law is inviolation 
of the United Nations policy, which she says is xxx also 
reflected in the 1st amendment inx favor of permitting 
persons to freely choose their own nationality. ~sx~kxx 
For this, there is little precedential support, as app~llee 
~I 
notes. 
I think this case should be notedo This is a serious 
issue. It does not seem to me that xxx±xx that there is any 
compelling state interest in requireing all lawyers to be 
citizens if their is another way of requiring them to uphold 
the laws of this Es&HXX country. Such a rule is the kind of 
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January 12, 1973 
Re: No. 1336 In Re Application of Griffith• 
Dear Bill: 
As I did not speak to you after we adjoumed today, I write 
to confirm that I will be glad to do the opinion in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
lfp/ss 
. ' 
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WCK 
January 13, 1973 
1. B~ r admission casess 
Baird v. Arizona, 401 u.s. 1 
LSCRRC v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 
In re Stolar, 401 u.s. 23. 
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 u.s. 232i 
Konisberg v. State Bar, 353 u.s. 252.& 366 u.s. 36, 
Appl~cation of Park, 484 P.2d 690(1laska, 1971) 
Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 496 P,2d 1264 
(Cal. 1972) 
Spevack v. Kleim, 385 u.s, 511(1967) 
2. Alien casess 
Astrup v. INS, 402 U.S. 509(1971) 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U,Sj 365(1971) 
Yick Wo.v. Hopkins, 118 u.s. 356(1886) 
Truax v. Raich, 239 u.s. 33(1915) 
Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 u.s. 410(1948) 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 u.s. 698. 
3. Baird v. State ~ar of Arizona, 401 U.S•1 
BLACK, with whom Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall joined. 
opinion reviewd the bar admission case law--
in addition to those cited above, see In re Summers, 
325 u.s. 561(1945); In re Anastaplo, 366 u.s. 82. 
Mrs. Baird refused to answer the question whether she 
had ever been a member of the Communist Party or any 
orgainization "that advocate&!ls :ttim overthrow of tre 
United States Government by force or violence1" 
She refused to answer this question, and the bar 
committee refused to ~ process her application 
fut:ther, 
"The First Amendment's protection of association 
prohibits a State from excluding a person from a 
professuon or punishing him solely because he is 
a member of a particular pxolitical organization 
or because he holds certain beliefs. United States 
v. Robel, 389 u.s. 258, 266(1967); Ke~ishian 
v, RBDI!: Board of Regents, 385 u.s. 5 9, 607(1967)." at 6, 
"Of course Arizona has a legitimate interest in 
» determining whether petitioner has the qualities of 
character and the professional competence requisite 
to the practice of a law," at 7. 
STEWART, concurringx in the judgment. _ 
"It follows from these decisionsLRobel, LSCRRg_7 
that mere membership in an organization can never, by 
itself, be sufficient ground for a State's imposition 
of civil disabilities or criminal punishment. Such 
membership can be quite different from knowing member-
ship in an organization advocating the overthrow of 
the Government by force or violence, on the part of 
one sharing the specific intent to further the organizatiodsX 
illegal goals." at 9, 
WHITE dissenting(applies to Stolar as well) 
White takes the position, essentially, that the 
question is relevant even if a yes answer would not 
be enough to exclude the person from the bar. 
BLACKMUN, with whom the Chief, Harlan, and White join. 
--2--
4. In re Smtolar, 401 u.s. 23(1971) 
BLACK, for himself, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall 
"We conclude that Ohio may not require an apppli-
cant for admission to the Bar to state whether he 
has been or is a 'member of any organization 
whaich advocates the overthrow of the government 
of the Unite<dl States v. force.' As we noted above, 
the First Amendment prohibitis Ohio from penalizing 
a man solely because he is a member of a particular 
organization." at 30 
"He answered numerous prying question about personal 
affairs that could hardly have been necessary for 
a State interested only in whether he would make an 
hoanest lawyer faithful to his clients." at 30 
STEWART e concurred in the jddgment, 
Four justices dissented, 
5. LSCRRC v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154(1971) 
STEWART for the Court1 
"The three- judge District Court • • • was 
unanimous is finding no constitutional infirmity in 
New YOrk's statutory requirement that applicants for 
admission to its Bar must possess ' the character 
and gxeneral fitness requisite for an attornye and 
counsellor-at-law." We have no dlifficulty 
in affirming this holding. /citing cases/ 
Long usage in New yUrk and elsewhere has given well-
defined contours to this reqvirement, which the appellees 
have construed narrowly as encompassing no more thaxn 
0 dishonorable conduct relevant to the legal profession 
• • •• " at 159. 
petitioners 0 basic challenge was not to the standards for 
admission to the bar but to the methods used to determine 
whether a particular ~§applicant qualifies r under those 
standards. 
"As stated at the outset of this x opinion, 
New York has further standards of elegibility 
for admission to its Bar. An applicant must 
be a United States citizen and a New York resident 
of six months' standing. And before heR may 
be finally admitted to praxctice, an applicant 
must swear(or affirm) that he will support the 
Constitutions of the United States and od x the 
State of New York" at 161. 
"The appi:ellants do not take isssue with tl'Y:l 
citizenship and minimum-residence requirements, nor 
with the items on the questionnaires for applicants 
dealing with these requirements. Their constitutional 
attack is mounted against the requirement of belief 
8 in any form of' and loyalty to the Government of 
tije United States, and upon those parts of the 
questionnaires directed thereto." at 161. 
no challenge to the requirement of an oath 
»KXRx~KEiRX»XBBBX»RXXRBXKBXX»XXgmmsXXKEXXBRX~XxBR 
XXX-XB.JIJDI!XXID!ll 
The"in any form"rule upheld based on the construction 
given it by appellees. 
--3--
6. Spevack v, Klein, 385 u.s. 511(1967), 
a case invovling the privilege against compulsory self-incriination 
DOUGLAS FOR FOUR MEMBERS OF THE COURTY 
An attorney refused to honor a subpoena duces 
tecum served on him in the course of judicial proceedings. 
New York then disbarred him. 
"The threat of disbarment and the loss of professional 
standing, profesS.. anal reputation, and of livelihood 
are powerful forms of compulsion to make a lawyer 
relinquish the privilege." at 516 
F~AKS concurred in the judgment. 
HARtAM, for himself, Clark, ans Stewart, dissented. 
WHITE also dissented. 
7. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 u.s. 232, 
--4--
8. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 u.s. 356(1886), 
a municipal ordinance discriminatorily enforced 
against Cmineses laudries. Chinese operators were arrested. 
"The Fourteenth Amendmen to the Constitution is not 
confined to the protection of citizens. It says 
: 'Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or proerty without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws." These provisions are 
universal in their applbation, to all persons within 
the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to 
any differences of race, of color, or of naxtionality; 
and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of 
the protection of equal laws," at 369 
The Court also noted a treaty with China and, instersetingly, 
R.S. 1977, now 42 u.s.c. 1981 and 1982, 
citing the maxim that this is a government not of men 
but of laws, the Court indicated that the ordinance, 
though neutral on its face, gave the possibility 
for arbitrary exercise of power 
there, however, no need to "reason from the probable 
to the actual"because the record showed arbitrary 
application 
"It appears that both petitioners have complied with 
every requisite, deemed by the law or by the 
public officers harged with its administration, 
necessary for the protection of neighboring property 
from fie, or as a precaustion against injury to 
the public." at 374 
"And while this consent of the supervisors is 
withheld from them and from two hundred others k 
who have also petitioned, all of whom happen to 
be Chinese subjects, eighty others, not Chinese 
subjects, are permitted to carry on the same business 
under similar conditions." at 374. 
9. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 u.s. 698(1893) 
GRAY for the Court: 
The Court reasoned that the government has the inherent 
power to exclude aliens from the country. 
"The right of a nation to expel or deport 
foreigners, who have not been naturalized or taken 
any steps towards becoming citizens of the 
country, rests upon the same grounds, and is am 
as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit 
and prevent their entral!:nce into the country." 
at 707. 
"Chinese laborers, therefore, like all other 
alimens residing in the United States for a shorter 
or longer time, are entitled, so long as they are 
permitted by the government of the United States 
to remain in the country, to the safeguards of 
the Constitution, and to be protection of the laws, 
in regard to their rights of person and of property, 
and to their civil and criminal responsJtibility." 
at 724, 
petitioners had f:B led to obtain certificates and were 
being expelled--the Court held that this was not 
unconstitutional 
--5--
BREWER dissented, showing lis broad-mindednessa 
"It is true that this statute is directed only 
against the obnoxious Chinese; but if the power 
exists, who shall say it will not be exercised 
to-morrow against other classes and other people7" 
at 743 
colorful language at 744 
found the statute to be a denial of due process 
FIELD dissenteda 
noted that a laborerw must establish his right to 
remain in the country by the testimony of at least 
one credible white witness 
FULLLER, C,J. dissented 
10. Truax v. Raicij, 239 u.s. 33(1915) 
HUGHES FOR THE COURT 
person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 
includes aliens at 39 
Arizona statute which made it a crime for one who employs 
more than five workers to fail to employ 
eighty per cent"qualified electors or native-born citizens 
of the United States or some sub-division thereof." 
Petitioner was a resident alien from Austria(employed as a cook) 
"The discrimination defined by the act des not pertain 
to the regulations or disttribution of the public 
It domain, or of the common property or resources of 
the people of the State, the enjoyment of which may 
be limited to its citizens as against both aliens 
and the citizens of other States." at 39-40, 
citing cawses presumably later overruled 
"and it should be added that the act is not limited 
to persons who are engaged on public work or receive 
the benefit of public moneys." at 40, 
"But this admitted authority /the police power/ with 
the broad range of legislative discretion that it 
implies, does not go so far as to make it possible 
for the State to deny to lawful inhabitants, 
because of their race or nationality, the ordinary 
means of eartning a livelihood. It requires nox 
argument to show that the right to work for a living 
in the common occupations of the community is of the 
very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity 
that Xit was the prupose of the Amendment to secure." 
citing cases, including Yick Wo, 
"if this could be refused Ita solely upon the ground 
of race or nationality, the prohibition of the denia; 
to any person of the equal protection of the laws 
would be a barren form of words" at 40 
"The discrimination agaire t aliens in the wide range 
of employments to which the act relates is made an 
end in itself and thus the authority to a deny 
aliens, upon the mere /end of 41/ fact of their 
alienage, the right to obtain support in the ordinary 
fields of labor is necessarily involved." at 41-42. 
--6--
additionally, the Cart points out that exclusion of 
alien&s is a federal and not a state matter 
MC REYNOLDS dissented, 
j 1l,iakahashi v, Fish and Game Commission, 334 u.s. 410(1948) 
emu 
challenge to a California statute barring issuance 
of cemmercial fishing licenses to persons "ineligible 
to citizenship" 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 u.s. 214(expulsion 
of Japanese) 
BLACK for the Court 
emphasizes that Congress has more powers than the 
states--fact that Congress uses a classification 
does not entitle& a state to do so--power 
over citizenship a federal one 
quotes 1981 and 1982, stating that "The protection 
of this section has been held to extend to aliens 
as well as to citizens," at 419, citing 
Yick Wo and three other cases "Consequently the 
section Xk&xxkH and the Fourteenth Amaxe&ndment on 
which x it rests in part protect 'all pers ons 8 
against state legislxation bearing unequally 
upon them either because of alienage or color." 
at 420, 
"All of the foregoin emphasizes the tenuous-
ness of the state's claim that it has power to 
single out and ban its alwful alien inhabitants, 
and particularly certain racial and color groups 
within this class of inhabitants, from following 
a voation simply e because Congress has put some 
such groups in special classifications in exercise 
of its broad axnd wholly distinguishable powers over 
immigration and naturalization." at 420, 
distiguishes briefly the cases which have sustained 
state laws barring aliens ineligible to citizenship 
frm land ownership, stating that even assuming 
their continuing validity, they dealt with real 
property. 
MURPHY, with whom Rutledge joined, concurring 




12. Graham v. Richardson, 403 u.s. 365(1971) 
constitutionality of Arizona and Pennsylvania 
welfare 
"The classifications involved in the instant cases, 
on the other hand, are inherently suspect and are therefore 
subject to strict judicial scrutiny whether or not 
a fundamental right is impaired." at 376. 
Appellants' attempted reliance on Dandridge v. Williams, 
397 u.s. 471(1970), is also misplaced, since the 
classification involved in that 
AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
IN FRANCE 
21, Avenue George V 
Paris VIII 
January 26, 1973 
The Honorable Warren E. Burger 
Chief Justice of the United States 
United States Supreme Court 
Washington, D.C. 
Dear Mr. Chief Justice: 
In re Application of 
Fre Le Poole Griffiths, 
for Admission to the Bar 
No. 71-1336 
We understand that in the course of the oral argument 
for the above-captioned case on January 9, 1973, counsel for 
Appellant was asked from the bench about the number of foreign 
countries that allow United States citizens to practice law 
within their boundaries. The purpose of this letter is to provide 
1/ 
a further and more complete answer to that question.-
The American Chamber of Commerce in France is the leading 
American commercial and professional organization in France. The 
l/ Twenty additional copies of this letter are provided herewith, 
and copies have been sent by air mail today to all parties in the 
case. 
Mr. Justice Burger 2 January 26, 1973 
organization· was founded in 1894 and is affiliated with the United 
States Chamber of Commerce. At present, the American Chamber of 
Commerce in France has a total membership of nearly 2000 individuals 
and companies and counts among its members 92 American lawyers in 
active practice. The progress of this case has been closely fol-
lowed in France and other European countries, and the outcome of 
the case may significantly affect the continued right of American 
lawyers to practice in several of these jurisdictions. 
There are at least twenty foreign countries in which 
American lawyers are lawfully engaged in one or more categories 
of the practice of law. In none of these countries have American 
lawyers been required to trade their U.S. citizenship for that of 
2/ 
the foreign country as a pre-condition to lawful practice.-
~/ The admission to practice of foreign lawyers by these countries 
is undoubtedly grounded on a variety of policies, some of which may 
not be primarily based on a commitment to the principle of non-
discrimination. For example, some jurisdictions may authorize 
foreign lawyers to practice because such countries believe that 
this policy facilitates foreign trade and investment, and promotes 
the development of private international law. See Foreign Branches 
of Law Firms: The Development of Lawyers Equipped to Handle Inter-
national Practice, SO Harv. L. Rev. 1284 {1967); ~ also Busch, 
The Right of United States Lawyers to Practice Abroad, 3 Int'l 
Lawyer 297 (1969). 
Mr. Justice Burger 3 Jcn uary 26, 1973 
A~cording to the Foreign Section of the Martindale-
Hubbell Law Directory for 1972, American lawyers and law 



































firms- 22 lawyers 
4 lawyers 
1 la-.;,\ryer 
firm - 2 lawyers 
firms- 30 lawyers 
1 lawyer 
firms- 83 lawyers 
8 lawyers 
2 lawyers 
firms- 5 lawyers 
firms- 15 lawyers 
1 lawyer 




firms- 2 lawyers 
firms- 10 lawyers 
firms- 4 lawyers 
firm - 2 lawyers 
1/ 4 Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory 1241-1308 (1972). 
These figures are necessarily incomplete. On July 12, 
1972, the Ad Hoc Committee on Foreign Lawyer Regulation 
of the New York State, county and City Bar Associations 
estimated that there were, for example, as many as 15 
American law firms and 55 American lawyers in London. 
Mr. Justice Burger 4 January 26, 1973 
The nature of authorized legal practice by American 
lawyers varies from country to country. In some juris-
dictions, foreign lawyers are admitted to practice under 
the same conditions as local counsel. In other . foreign 
countries, where the practice of law is divided into two 
or more branches, United States citizens may be eligible 
to practice there in one branch, such as the giving of 
legal advice, while being ineligible for another branch, 
such as appearances before local courts. In still other 
countries, the subject matter of the foreign lawyer's 
. . . 4/ 
pract~ce may be c~rcumscr~bed.-
A recent survey by the two leading international lawyers' 
professional organizations, the Union Internationale des 
Avocats and the International Bar Association, shows that 
in nine countries an applicant for admission to practice 
as a lawyer need not be a national. 
51
This survey further 
A/ See Foreign Branches of Law Firms, supra note 1, at 1288. 
21 The nine countries are England (as a Barrister), Ireland 
(as a Barrister), Israel, Norway, Scotland, Singapore, Tanzania, 
Trinidad and Tobago,· and Zambia. Right of Establishment Abroad, 
An Analysis of the Present Position, April 1972, in proceedings 
of a joint meeting of the Union Internationale des Avocats and 
the International Bar Association in Estoril, Portugal, April 
15-16, 1972 (unpublished) • 
Mr. Justice Burger 5 January 26, 1973 
shows that a foreign resident lawyer is permitted to under-
take any type of legal or quasi-legal work (other than 
practicing before the courts) in 13 countries, and in 
eight other countries he is permitted to do so subject 
to certain restrictions. 
As an illustration, England authorizes American 
lawyers to become barristers, and as such they may 
practice before the English courts on the same terms as 
English barristers. Alternatively, American lawyers who 
do not become barristers are authorized to give legal 
advice within the scope of the regulations of the Law 
6/ 
Society.-
In France, American lawyers may be licensed as legal 
d . ( "1 . "d" ) 
71 h f . 1 1 d a v1sers conse1 s JUr1 1ques .- Sue ore1gn ega a -
visers have the same rights and are subject to the same 
restrictions as French conseils juridiques, ~, they may 
give legal advice but may not appear before the French courts. 
The French law is of particular significance to American 
6/ See Foreign Branches of Law Firms, supra note 1, at 1294. 
7_1 Law No. 71-1130 of Dec. 31, 1971, [1972] J.O. No. 72-2. 
Mr. Justice Burger 6 January 26, 1973 
lawyers, since it calls for a review of the right of foreign 
lawyers to continue to practice in France after five years 
(i.e., after December 31, 1976) if their countries of origin 
have not by that time granted reciprocal rights to French lawyers 
desiring to practice in such countries. The information available 
to us in Paris suggests, moreover, that the imposition of a 
reciprocity requirement on foreign lawyers is now being seriously 
considered by several other Western European countries. 
We hope that the above information may be of assista.nce 
to the court. 
Very truly yours, 




TO: Mr. William C. Kelly, Jr. 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: February 11, 1973 
FROM: 
I return herewith your draft of Griffiths, to which I have attached 
a few riders in addition to the textual changes noted in pen. 
I will comment first on the items listed by you as "omitted". 
1. I do think the California and Alaska cases should be cited " 
in a note. The California case - a unanimous decision - reflects a fairly 
thoughtful analysis of the problem. 
2. I do not think we need list the state laws which bar aliens. 
3. and 4. If you can document that aliens did practice before thbs 
Court in the 19th Century and that there is no present ruling barring them 
(provided they are members of a state bar), I do think this is noteworthy. 
5. I see no need to mention that citizenship was not challenged 
* * * * 
I suggest that you produce a second draft, embodying my suggestions 
(except where you wish to discuss them with me) and making such further 
changes as you think appDopriate. In doing this, I have a couple of 
questions of substance and a minor point or two of ver~, which I 





(a) You "tred softly" in your equal protection analysis. You did 
identify alienage as a "suspect" class (Graham), and that this required 
"strict judicial scrutiny". You did not emphasize, deliberately I assume, 
that this imposed the burden on the state to show a compelling interest, 
a burden which the state made little pretense of carrying. There is some 
language in the draft suggesting that the exclusion of aliens is an irrational 
classification, and thus would not meet the rational basis test. California 
so held in Raffaelli - although it went on to hold that the compelling interest 
test was applicable. 
As you know, I am more than a littile bit "nervious" with four 
equal protection opinions being written in our chambers at the same time 
and all involving the dichotomy between "rational" and "compelling" state , 
interest. I am inclined to think that you have been prudent in soft-
peddling this dialogue especially in view of divergent thinking among 
the Justices. Nevertheless, I do wish you would focus on whether we 
have said enough, and also on whether the terminology used in Griffiths ' 
can be identified with the same authorship of terminology used by 
Larry and Jay in the other cases we are writing. 
(b) Part m of the draft opinion is a little weak. I have tried, 
in the rider attached, to gtve it a little more muscle. I still think it 
can be strengthened - if pot by "authority" by more imaginative use 
... . , 
3. 
0 
"'-' of "mental muscle". 
(e) Now, a couple of verbiage points: (i) as a strong advocate 
of women's lib, I note that you use the feminine pronoun throughout the 
opinion. Where the reference is to the appellant, this is, of course, 
appropriate. But where we are generalizing, I would think the 
conventional male pronoun is more appropriate. This is in accord with 
' the way statutes are drafted and most opinions written. 
'> 
(ii) You use "attorney" rather than "lawyer", tiroughout the draft. 
I personally prefer lawyer, and would like to use this term unless the 
Connecticut statute and rules consistently use the word "attorney". 
* * * * 
If you will put this opinion through a second draft early next week, 
I will give it priority of review with the hope that it can be printed and 
circulated certainly before we go back on the bench. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
P. S. I neglected to say above that there are a couple of quotations in 
Seftvare v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.s. 232 that may merit inclusion 
lh our opinion, perhaps in notes. Although Justice Black's language is a · 
bit ''homey", I like his paragraph beginning at the bottom of page 38 and 
going down to the middle of page 239. I also like Frankfurther's description 
of the role of a lawyer, although perhaps it could be used against our 
present position. I would be inclined nevertheless to use in a footnote 
two or three of the sentences in the first paragraph Whis c oneurring 
opinion, especially the last sentence in the paragraph describing "moral 
character" p. 249. 
!; 
Memo to: William C. Kelly 
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. February 17, 1973 
No. 71-1336 Griffiths 
<J 
I have reviewed the draft of February :wJ, 1973, and return it to 
you herewith. 
As you commented when you delivered it to me, you wish to re-
examine it particularly with respect to its structure and arrangement. 
I am not satisfied with this either, especially if we leave in the draft 
the paragraph which purports to describe the consequences of a "suspect 
classification." Accordingly, I have: 
1. Revised page 4a in minor respects; 
2. Redictated all of Part IT. As you will see, this is fairly major 
surgery. I am satisfied that a major rewriting of Part II is necessary for 
the purpose of applying the analysis on page 4a (as to a suspect classification) 
to the facts in this case. Our draft of 2/8/73 was written without page 4a, 
and it simply doesn't fit. 
My redraft of Part II does not purport to be a finished product. I 
deliver it to you for such editing and revision as you think necessary. 
As you will see, I have not tried to coordinate the footnotes. 
-2-
I think your revision of Part III is excellent. 
* * * * * 
We have fallen behind schedule in circulating this opinion - for 
reasons quite understandable. When you have finished your cert notes, 
I hope you will give this priority and deliver a draft back to me, with 
the view to circulating during next week. 
LFP, Jr. :psf 
Attachment 
L. F. P., Jr. 
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~u.pum.e <!JUlttt qf tJre 1Jt:nit.eb' ~tates 
Jfas!ringfqn. BJ. <!J. 2ll,?J!.$ 
C HAMBE R S O F 
JUSTI C E WILLIAM 0 . D O UGLAS March 6, 1973 
Dear Lewis : 
Please join me in your excellent 
opinion in 71-1336, Application of Fre Le 
Poole Griffiths . 
~ 
Douglas 
Mr . Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
Mareh 6, 1973 
Dear Harry: 
Here is my first eireulatian of the Griffiths opinion. 
I have tried to write it narrowly to avoid foreclosing the isaue 
in No. 71-122~ ~garman v. Dougall. There is, however, inevitably 
some overlap. 
If you have any suggestions, after you have had an q)portunlty 
to review my draft, I will certainly be happy to consider them. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justtee Blackmun 
lfp/ss 
March 7, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1336 In re AppllcatlOD of Griffiths 
Dear Harry: 
I will, of course, be happy to hold Griffiths until you are ready 
to bring Su~rrnan down. 
stneerely, 
Mr. .Justice Blaekmun 
lfp/ss 
I of' ,. 
':HAMBERS OF 
j;u.vrtntt Qfllurl ltf t4t 'JilniUb- j;tatt.s 
'J)llrulfriugton. ~. <!f. 2llb!Jt~ J 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL March 7, 1973 
'• . 
Re: No. 71-1336 - In re Application of Griffiths 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 






JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.h:pum:t <!fourt ~ tqt ~tti:ttlt ~taftg 
._aslfittgbm. ~. <!f. 2!l,;tJt.~ 
March 7, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1336 - In Re Application of Griffiths 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you for your note of March 6. I still have a 
good bit of work to do on Sugarman, and it may be a few weeks 
before I complete it. I am inclined to think that the two cases 
should come down together and, if you would, I hope you do not 
mind waiting until Sugarman is finished. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
' ' 
CHAMBERS OF 
.ju;prtmt <!fomt of tlft ~ttittb .jtattg 
Jfa&frittghm, ~. <!f. 21lgtJl..;t 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
March 7, 1973 
71-1336, Application of Griffiths 
Dear Lewis, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
~lt.}lrtmt QI~tttrt ~f tfrt 'J!lttitt~ ~tatts 
'Jfagltingt~n. ~. ~· 20gt.l1~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JusTICE wM . J . BRENNAN. JR. March 8, 1973 
/ 
RE: No. 71-1336 In re Application of Fre Le 




Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
€>nprttne <ronrt l,f t11e l1niffb .§tab's 
WagJfingt~n. ]11. ~- :w;n;3 
CHAMBE:RS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
March 8, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1336 -Application of Griffiths 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to Conference 
,,:;.·· .. 
CHAMBERS OF' 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
j}ttprtmt <qcurt cf tqt 'Jllttittb j}tates 
'Jlins!yingtcn, ~. <q . . 2ll&l~.;l 
March 21, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1336 - In re Fre ·Le Poole Griffiths 
Dear Lewis: 
I voted in the minority at Conference, and plan to 
write a dissent. Since the issues in this case are 
relatively closely related to those in Sugarman v. Dougall, 
I would rather draft one dissent for both opinions. 
Therefore, unless it inconveniences you, I shall wait 
till Harry circulates a draft in Sugarman before preparing 
my joint dissent. 
Sincerely,~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.Snvrttttt <!fon.rt cf tltt ~nittb ~taitg 
~ag lfl::tt:gtcn. ~. <!f. 2.llbfJ!..;l 
..JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
March 22, 1973 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 71-1336 - In re Griffiths 
When Lewis circulated his opinion in this case, 
I called and suggested to him the desirability of having 
No. 71-1222, Sugarman v. Dougall, come down at the 
same time. Lewis indicated that this was perhaps 
desirable. Sugarman will be out in due course and I 
shall try not to delay it too long. 
;f{J,. ~ . 
''1 . 
arch 21, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1336 - In re Griffiths 
ear Harry and Bill: 
This refers to your notes circulated March 22 and 23, respectively, 
as to holding Griffiths until the Sugarman opinion is ready. 
I write to confirm that this is entirely agreeable. By all means 
take as much time as you wish. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE 
.Ju.pumt <!}ltltrl ltf tlrt ~b .Jtattg 
..-u£ri:nghtn. ~. <!}. 2ll.;t'!" 
April12, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1336- In reApplication of Fre Le Poole 
Griffiths for Admission to the Bar 
Dear Lewis: 
At Conference I had sufficient reservations 
on this that I recorded a tentative vote to affirm. I 
have done some further study and conceivably I may 
join on a limited basis. I will act soon. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
j 
CHAMBERS OF 
~ttttt <ijlmrl ltf tltt ~b .itat.ts 
JI'Mlfingt:Olt. ~. <ij. 2.ll~J!.$ 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
April 13, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1336 - In re Griffiths 
Dear Lewis: 
Your opinion is persuasive and I am pleased 
to join it. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
Dear Chief: 
June 21, 1973 
No. 7l-t336 4pplication of Fre I..e Poole Griffiths 
for ~\dmission to the Bar 
T have now reviewed your dissenting opinion, and do 
not think it calls for any changes in the Court opinion. 
l' lthough we differ as to the final results, I agree with -
and admire - your eloquent statement on the traditional role of 
the lawyer. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief .Justice 
LFP/gg 
L .. CP ./ 1. 
:>~ 
'#t;r Mr. Jueti oe n·oug!a.~ 
... 
~ ·:~ 
Mr. Justioe Brannam \ ·. :~ .:. 
Justice Stewart] \ Mb 
t.tr. Justice White 
l\t: Ju~tice Ka~shalD 
·Mr~ \3·uet1oe Blaokmun: 
-M:f~ <J1:1stio Pow l l....r' 
\W·. ~~et!~~ nQhnquis~ 
CC:ir¥Ct8.~itf(RF: . J UN_ 2 1 1973 
~~-m:· --==------
:] .  
I 






No. 71-1336- Application of Fre Le Poole Griffiths ~ 
for Admission to the Bar 
~~ 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting. 
I agree generally with Mr. Justice Rehnquist 1s dissent and add 
a few observations. 
In the rapidly shrinking "one world" we live in there are 
. 
numerous reasons why the states might appropriately consider relaxing 
some of the restraints on the practice of professions by aliens. The 
fundamental factor, however, is that the states reserved, among other 
powers, that of regulating the practice of professions within their own 
borders. If that concept has less validity now than in the 18th Century 
when it was made part of the "bargain" to create a federal union, it is 
nonetheless part of that compact. 
A large number of American nationals are admitted to the 
practice of law in more than a dozen countries; this will expand as 
world trade enlarges. But the question for the Court is not what is 
- 2 -
enlightened or sound policy but rather what the Constitution and its 
Amendments provide; I am unable to accord to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment the expansive reading the Court gives it. 
In recent years the Court, in a rather casual way, has articulated 
the code phrase "suspect classifications" as though it embraced a reasoned 
constitutional concept. Admittedly, it simplifies judicial work as do 
"per se" rules, but it tends to stop analysis while appearing to suggest 
an analytical process. 
Much as I agree with some aspects of the policy implicit in the 
Court's holding, I am bound -- if I apply the Constitution as its words 
and intent speak to me -- to reject the good policy the Court now adopts. 
I am unwilling to accept what seems to me a denigration of the 
posture and role of a lawyer as an "officer of the court." It is that role 
that a state is entitled to rely on as a basis for excluding aliens from 
the practice of law. By virtue of his admission a lawyer is granted what 
can fairly be called a monopoly of sorts; he is granted a license to appear 
and try cases; he can cause witnesses to drop their private affairs and 
be called for depositions and other pre-trial processes that, while subject 
to the ultimate control of the court, are conducted by lawyers outside 
courtrooms; the enormous power of cross-examination of witnesses is 
granted exclusively to lawyers. Inherent in these large powers is the 
ability to compel answers subject, of course, to such limiting restraints 
' ·~·rr: 
- 3 -
as the Fifth Amendment and rules of evidence. In most states a lawyer 
is authorized to issue subpoenas commanding the presence of persons 
and even the production of documents under certain circumstances. The 
broad monopoly granted to lawyers is the authority to practice a profession 
and by virtue of that to do things other citizens may not lawfully do. 
In the common law tradition the lawyer becomes the attorney -- the agent 
for a client only by virtue of his having been first invested with power 
by the state, usually by a court. The lawyer's obligations as an officer of 
the court permite the court to call on the lawyer to perform duties which 
no court could order citizens generally, including the obligation to 
observe codes of ethical conduct not binding on the public generally. 
The concept of a lawyer as an officer of the court and hence part 
of the official mechanism of justice in the sense of other court officers, 
including the judge, albeit with different duties, is not unique in our 
system but it is a significant feature of the lawyer's role in the common 
law. This concept has sustained some erosion over the years at the 
hands of cynics who view the lawyer much as the "hired gun" of the 
Old West. In less flamboyant terms the lawyer in this relation to the 
client came to be called a "mouth piece" in the gangland parlance of the 
1930's. Under this bleak view of the profession the lawyer, once engaged, 
does his client's bidding, lawful or not, ethical or not. 
. ' 
- 4 -
Whatever the erosion of the officer-of-the-court role, the 
overwhelming proportion of the legal profession rejects both the 
denigrated role of the advocate and counselor that renders him a lackey 
to the client and the alien idea that he is an agent of government. See 
American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function 
and the Defense Function, § 1. 1 (1970). 
The role o£ a lawyer as an officer of the court predates the 
Constitution; it was carried over from the English system and became 
firmly embedded in our tradition. It included the obligation of first duty 
to client. But that duty never was and is not today an absolute or un-
qualified duty. It is a first loyalty to serve the client's inte.rest but 
always within-- never outside --the law, thus placing a heavy personal 
and individual responsibility on the lawyer. That this ' is often unenforceable, 
that departures from it remain undetected, and that judges and bar 
associations have been singularly tolerant of misdeeds of their brethren, 
renders it no less important to a profession that is increasingly crucial 
to our way of life. The very independence of the lawyer from the 
government on the one hand and client on the other is what makes the 
law a profession, something apart from trades and vocations in which 
obligations of duty and conscience play a lesser part. It is as crucial 
to our system of justice as the independence of judges themselves. 
- 5 -
The history of the legal profession is filled with accounts of 
lawyers who risked careers by asserting their independent status in 
opposition to popular and govermnental attitudes, as John Adams did in 
Boston to defend the soldiers accused in what we know in our folklore as 
the "Boston Massacre." To that could be added the lawyers who defended 
John Peter Zenger and down to lawyers in modern times in cases such as 
JJ 
Johnson v. Zerbst. The crucial factor in all these cases is that the 
advocates performed their dual role -- officer of the court and advocate 
for a client -- strictly within and never in derogation of high ethical 
standards. There is thus a reasonable, rational basis for a state to 
conclude that persons owing first loyalty to this country will grasp these 
traditions and apply our concepts more than those who seek the benefits 
of American citizenship .while declining to accept the burdens of citizenship 
in this country. 
In some countries the legal system is so structured that all 
lawyers are literally agents of govermnent and as such bound to place 
the interests of govermnent over those of the client. That concept is 
so alien to our system with an independent bar that I find it difficult 
to see how nationals of such a country, incalcated with those ideas and 
Jj 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458. 
- 6 -
at the same time unwilling to accept American citizenship, could be 
properly integrated to our system. At the very least we ought not 
stretch the Fourteenth Amendment to force the states to accept any 
national of any country simply because of a recital of the required oath 
and passing of the bar examination. 
Since the Court now strikes down a power of the states accepted 
as fundamental since 1787, even if states sometimes elected not to 
exercise it, cf. Bradwell v. The State , 16 Wall. 130 (1872), 
the states may well move ·to adopt, by statute or rule of court, a 
reciprocal proviso, familiar in other contexts; under such a reciprocal 
treatment of applicants a state would admit to the practice of law the 
nationals of such other countries as admit American citizens to 
practice. I find nothing in the core holding of Zschering v. Miller, 
389 U.s. 429 (1967), to foreclose state adoption of such reciprocal 
provisions. See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503. 
,.._ .. ...-.. .,.,.. ... 
lfp/ss 6/22/73 
No. 71-1336 In re Griffiths 
This case comes to us on appeal from the Supreme Court 
of Connecticut. The question which it presents is whttther a state 
may refuse to admit resident aliens to the practice of law without 
violating the Equal Pr<teetion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Appellant, a citizen of the Netherlands, came to the United 
States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In 1967, she married aU. s. 
citizen and became a resident of Connecticut. After her graduation 
from law school in 1970, she applied for permissioo. to take the 
Bar Exam, and was found qualified in all respects except that she 
was not a citizen of the United States. For this reason, her 
application was denied. 
Our cases have established that any law which discriminates 
against resident alleDB must be scrutinized strictly to insure that 
the state's diseriminatioo. is supported by a strmg justification. 
In the present ease, there is no question as to Connecticut's 
substantial interest 1n assuring that its licensed lawyers possess 
the requisite professional and character quallficatloos. No 
.. 
' ' . 
2. 
question is raised as to appellant's possessing these 
qualifications. 
The sole issue is whether alienage alone is a valid grourd 
for discriminatory treatment. We conclude that it is not. There 
is no reason to believe that an alien lawyer validly residing in 
this country will be less mindful of his professional responsibilities 
to the courts and clients than other lawyers. All persons 
licensed to practice law in a state are subject to the same 
regulations and the same standards of Professional Conduct. 
We reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut. 
The Chief Justice filed a dissenting in which Mr. Justice 
Rehnquist joined. Mr. Justice Rehnquist :tlsdfiled a dissenting 
opinion. 
' ~ .. . 
< • 
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No. 71-1336 In re Griffiths 
This case comes to us on appeal from the Supreme Court 
of Connecticut. The question which it presents is whether a state 
may refuse to admit resident aliens to the practice of law without 
violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Appe,llant, a citizen of the Netherlands, came to the United 
States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In 1967, she married a U.S. 
citizen and became a resident of Connecticut. After her graduation 
from law school in 1970, she applied for permission to take the 
Bar Exam, and was found qualified in all respects except that she 
was not a citizen of the United States. For this reason, her 
application was denied. 
Our cases have established that any law which discriminates 
against resident aliens must be scrutinized strictly to insure that 
the state's discrimination is supported by a strong justification. 
In the present case, there is no question as to Connecticut's 
substantial interest in assuring that its licensed lawyers possess 
the requisite professional and character qualifications. No 
I 
question is raised as to appellant's possessing these 
qualifications. 
2. 
The sole issue is whether alienage alone is a valid grourd 
for discriminatory treatment. We conclude that it is not. There 
is no reason to believe that an alien lawyer validly residing in 
this country will be less mindful of his professional responsibilities 
to the courts and clients than other lawyers. All persons 
licensed to practice law in a state are subject to the same 
regulations and the same Standards of Professional Conduct. 
We reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut. 
The Chief Justice filed a dissenting in which Mr. Justice 
Rehnquist joined. Mr. Justice Rehnquist al lUf filed a dissenting 
opinion. 
·C+IAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLI A M H . REHNQUIST 
.:§u.puuu {!fo-url cf tqt 'Jttnittb .§tatt.\l 
'Jlas!rUtgton. ~. <!f. 20~'!.;1 
June 22, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1336 - Application of Fre Le Poole Griffiths 
for Admission to the Bar 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion in this case. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Jus t ice 
Copies to the Conference 
lfp/ss 6/22/73 
No. 71-1336 In re Griffiths 
I 
This case comes to us on appeal from the Supreme Court 
I 
may refuse 4 o admit resident aliens to the practice of la~without 
violating the Equal Protection Clause ,~-eent~ 
Ap¢.llant, a citizen of the Netherlands, came to the United 
States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In 1967, she married a U.S. 
I 
citizen and became a resident of Connecticut. After her graduation 
from law school in 1970, she applied for permission to take the 
Bar Exam, and was found!\~ in all respects except that she 
was not a citizen of the United States. For this reason, her 
application was denied. 
Our cases have establishecyfhat any law which discriminates 
against resident alieno/must be scrutinized strict10o insure that 
the state's discrimination is supported by a strong justification. 
In the present case, there is no question as to Connecticut's 
i 
substantial interest in assuring that its licensed lawyer possess 
the requisite professional and character qualifications. No 
2. 
question is raised as to appellant's possessing these 
qualifications. 
The sole issue/ is whether alienage alomy is a valid grourrl 
for discriminatory treatment. We conclude that it is not. There 
is no reason to believe that an alien lawyer/ validly residing in 
lh'-~ 
this countryJwm;: less mindful of his. professional responsibilities/ 
to the courts and client( than other lawyers. All persons 
licensed to practice law in a state are subject to the same 
regulations/and the same Standards of Professional Conduct. 
(},;.. --re~ a-/-o:f!iu'). J 
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the constraints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment on the qualifications 
which a State may require for admission to the 
bar. Appellant Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen 
of the Netherlands, came to the United States in 
1965, originally as a visitor. In 1967, she married 
a citizen of the United States and became a resident 
CD 
of Connecticut. After her graduation from law school, 
she applied in 1970 for permission to take the 
Connecticut bar examination. The bar association 
found her qualified in all respects save that she 
that acc .. ount refused to allow her to take the 
Jod(~,,;f 
examination. She then sought relief G SF SL: 
I\ -
JS on the ground that the regulation was 
unconstitutional. Her claim was rejected first 
by the Superior Court and .. ultimately by the 
Connecticut Supreme Court, I'- ~ Conn, '- 'f'l ) :J. 9 'I 1/. ;;J OZ.R j 
(197'J.), 
We noted probable jurisdiction, LfO 6 u.s. Cf 6' ( I 97 ~).1 
and now hold that the regulation unconstitutionally 
discriminates against resident aliens.~ 
Griffiths, page two. 
I. 
We begin by sketching the background against 
S'+cde ..Ct{ r Cxan:,n,;. Co ~~-r ,~i· 1fe~ a.pp•/~t!! iP,.&J 
;;: 
preclusion of aliens from the practice of law. 
It has long been established that a resida"-t 
alien is a "person" within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's directive that a state 
must not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws." E.g., Yick Wo 
v, Hopkins, 118 u.s. 356, 369(1886), While 
Congress has wide power to regulate immigration 
and naturalization, ~·, Fong Yue Ting v, United 
States, 149 u.s. 698(1893), a lawfully~admitted 
resident ~ien is in most respects a full member 
of our society and must, under the Constitution, 
be treated as such. Indeed, as the Court recently 
held, 
"classifications based on alienage, like those 
based on nationality or race, are inherently 
suspect and subject to strict judicial scruti~n." 




Griffiths, page three, 
The genera l principles regarding the rights 
of resident aliens under the Equal Protection Clause 
have found application in a number of cases invo~ing 
State laws interfer• ing with the efforts of res~ent 
aliens to earn a livelihood , In Y~k Wo v . Hopkins, 
supra, this Court invalidated a municipal ordinance 
regulating the operation of laundties, on the ground 
that the ordinance was discriminator~y enforced 
against Chinesea operators. Several decades later , 
the Court struck down an Arizona statute which 
emp laye r s 
d.!!!£ ICE 
7 
of +Ito.~ {)~e J 
I 7 I ·-· 
employ eighty per cent 
"qualified electors or native-born citiz• ens 
of the United States or some sub-divi• sion thereof," 
Truax v. Raich, 239 u.s. J·~llliiiiJ (1915). 
As state~the Court ... by Mr. Chief Justice 
Hughes: 
"It requires no' argument to show that the right 
to work for a living in the common occupations of 
the community is of the very essence of the 
personal freedom and opportunity that it was 
the purpose of the _Lrourteenthl Amendment 
to secure. lCitations omitteg]. If this 
could be refused solely upon the ground of 
race or nationality , the prohibition of the 
denial of equal protection of the laws would 
be a barren form of words," 239 u.s., at 41. 
Griffiths, page four. 
On similar reasoning, finally, the Courtr ruled 
unconstitutional a California statute barring issuance 
of commercial fishing licenses to persons "ineligible 
to citizenship", Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 
334 u.s. 410(1948), 
To be sure, the course of decisions protecting 
the employment rights of resident ali .s has not 
been an unbrokaen one, In Crane v. New York, 239 
u.s. 195(1915), a statute prohibiting the employment 
of aliens on p~ublic works projects was upheld 
over an equal protection challenge, apparently 
on the theory that the state might constitutionally 
favor citizens over aliens in the distribution of 
limited resources., in that case a limited number 
of job openings, As exp~ined in Graham v. Richardson, 
supra, 403 u.s., at 372-374, however, that 
theory was repudiated by implication in Takahashi 
v, Fish & Game Comm' 
to favor citizens in the allocation of emplo.yment 
~(no lo•lt!'r s_ert~e,U 
opportunit~ t ggp ~as an adequate jus~fication 
for discrimination against resident aliens, 
. . . 
• Gr•ffiths, page five. 
h St t triiiii-... IJ!ti!IIIIIB•••:IIkn.,. practice t e a e may no_;;] ~ -~
or mandate employ~ent discrimination against resident 
a..s e v:- e ro.( J~K o. -ft er: 
aliens, the special role of the attorney justifies 
excludin~from the practice of 1~~ .. .-~~ 
-fire:= ~M~tl~e 
In Connecticut, BiliW 7 3 a 11 pointS out, the 
maxim that an attorney is an "officer of the court" 
is given concrete meaning by a statute which makes 
every attorney admitted to prafctice a "commissioner 
of the Superior Court". As such, an attorney has authority 
to "sign writs, issue subpoenas, take recognizances, and 
administer oaths" 9 Conn. Gen. Stat • .§51-85 1 and, 
in so 
. \ +0/ 
do1ng, • • command the assistance of a 
11 , Gc". Si(d, §'J .;> - c;o , 1 
county sheriff or town constable, Because of 
these and other powersp 
Griffiths, page six. 
"The courts not only demand their loyalty, 
confidence and respect but also require them 
to function in a mannerfwhich will foster 
public ccnfidence in the profession and, consequently, 
the judicial system," I ' :2.. Conn,, at 2';1~;2~ 
-:lctlf lloJct o.r;;...g? . 
It is undisputed that Connect:::but "has a 
legitimate interest in determining whether [i.n 
applican~ has the qualities of character and 
professional competence requisite to the 
of law" {Baird v. gf ate Bar of A;: izona, 
practice 
401 u.s. 
1 , 7 ( 1971 ) (opinion of Black, J, ) , By the same token, 1-~ ''?A..J 
it is too late ••••IIJI to suggest that 
the standards for admission to the bar are not 
subject to constitutional constraints, ~~Y qual-
ification must have a rational connection with the 
applicant 0 s fitness or capacity to practice law", 
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 u.s. 232,239 
( 1957), and may not be "invidiously discriminatory". 
Id,, at 239, 
Griffiths, page seven, 
No claim is made that 11 51 resident aliens 
(llCJC j Fmrf 
as a class lack theAcompetence or ... _. ...... 
{Jr ..flt.e tr-ae--fr"Ce eotF locU. 
of distingulilshing betweef n citizens and resident 
aliens,~ras~the citizen's undivided 
comrnittment to this county with the resident alien°s 
possible conflict of Ill loyalties, From thi~t& .... _.,_.Gb~ 
.fire C~tfe~ 
•••••••••••••• concludes that a resident 
alien attorney might in the exercise of her 
functions ignore her responsibilities to the courts 
and her clients in favor of the interests of a foreign 
power. 
We find this dang~ a.-r;emote and unreal one. 
~ Co_,., .'f!e-<t/ 
' ad t 7 make.s no con•vincing demonstration 
that the practice of law offers meaningful opportunities 
(, ihf~re.s fs / 
adversely to affect the . g ;Ilk; of the United 
States, It in no way denigrates the attorney's 
high responsibilities to observe that the powers 
"to sign writs,•llll• issue s~bpoenas, take 
recognizances, and administer oaths" are il' •••• 
customary ...................... ll.a concomita~ts of 
the practice of law rather than matters of state, 
·. 
Griffiths, page eight. 
\. Cnw.mt-H e>t!:-/ 
Nor has the ~shown the relevance of citizenship 
to the likelihood that an attorney will protect faithfully 
\he .t./ 
the interests of -..r clients. 
\;;[flc:: CoTk~'ff~ were/ 
Even if~ontention~ treated 
as having demonstrated that some residert: aliens 
may be unsuited for the practice of law, • 
that would be no justification for a wholesale ban. 
({ l ~ C-,.,; 1f ee /
(FEZ? ~alls our attention to Pearl Assurance Co., 
Ltd. v. Harrington, 38 F,Supp. 411(D.Mass,), aff 0 d 
per curiam 313 u.s. 549(1941), which upheld the 
constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute barring 
aliens from positions as resident managers of alien 
insu•rance companies doing business in Massachusetts. 
While the Court's summary disposition in Pearl 
does not afford insight into the grounds of 
its decision, the affimtance was presumably based 
on an analysis most fully el~orated in Clarke v. 
Dekebach, 274 u.s. 392(1927). There, the Court was 
faced with a challenge to a city ordinance prohibiting 
the issuance to aliens of licenses to operate pool 
and billiard rooms. 
Griffiths, page nine. 
Characterizing the business as one having "harmful 
and vicious tendf\tcies", the Court found no constitu-
tional infirmity in the ordinances 
"It was d1\gpetent for the city to make such 
a choi• ce, n~ shown to be irrational, by excluding 
from the conduct of a dubious business an 
entire class rather than its objectioa nable 
• members selected by more empirical methods." 
274 u.s., at 397. 
This easily expandable proposition supported discrimination 
against resident aliens in a wide variety of 
occupations, 0 
Af least after Graham v. Richardson, supra, 
such reasoning is no longer sufficient to 
justify discrimination against aliens. It is of 
the essence of "strict judicial scrutiny", 403 
u.s., at 372, that a State must where possible 
use "empirical methods" rather than broad proscriptions 
to separate the qualified from the untqualified. 
Griffiths, page ten, 
In the present context, Connecticut has 
wide freedom to gauge on a case-by-case basis the 
fitness of an applicant to practice law, 
Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate 
training and familiarity with Connecticut law, 
Apart from such '8i£Wfia .Gz of competence, If-
tii•••~•·••rn~ requires Labi I 1 I 1 a 
new attorney to take both ana "attorney's oath" 
.. ._ .. ,_"~s .. .-........ ~ ... ,._.1_"_1 to perform her 
® 
functions faithfully and honestly and a "Commissbner's 
oath" to "support the/onstitution of the United 
States, and the fonstitution of Connecticut". 
•••• Appellant has indicated 
the 
and 7 
~ oAa,.tt c fe . 
may quite properly conduct nvestigation to 
insure in any given case 
"that an applicant is not one who 'swears to 
an oath pro forma while declaring or manifesting 
his disagreement with or indifference to the 
oath.' Bond v. Floyd, 385 u.s . 116, 132," Law 
Students Research Council v, Wadmond, •'li?il? ••• 
t 1l supra, 401 u.s., at 164. 
(!) 
Griffiths, page eleven. 
And once admitted to the bar, as the cases cited by 
the Committee ~ amply 
subject to di• scipline 
demonstrate, attorneys are 
of abuse of their powers. ~ 
a 2 2 t · I I 7 mr et 
In sum, the 6ommittee has simply not established 
that it must exclude all aliens from the practice of 
law in order to vi• ndicate its undoubted interest 
in high professional standards. 
Griffiths, page twelve. 
III. 
In its brief, the Examinrg Committee makes another, 
quite different argument in support of Section 
8(1). Appellee's arief, p. ID Its thrust is not 
that resident aliens lack the attributes necessary 
to maintaint high standards in the legal profession, 
but rather that attorneys must be citizens 
alm~st as a matter of definition. 
The argument builds upon the exclusion of 
aliens from the franchis in all fifty states 
and their disqualification under the Constitution 
from holding office as President, Art. 2, §1,cl, 4, 
or as a member of the Me ...... House of Representatives, 
Art, 1, ~2, cl, 2, or of the Senate, Art, 1,J3, cl, 3, 
These and constitutional 
provisions reflect, the Committee contends, a 
pervasive recognition that "participation in the 
government structure as voters axnd office holders", 
Appellee's Brief, p, 11, is in~pably an 
aspect of citizenship. 
W• hatever the merits of thxis view in other 
contexts, we are satisfied that the attorney does 
Griffiths, page thirteen. 
not occupy a position so close to the core of the 
political process as to warrant the exclusion of aliens. 
The attorney as attorney neither selects those who will 
set governmental policy no• r sets it herself. The 
practice of law does of course impinge upon the 
political process braadly conceived, but notwithstanding 
the powers conferred by custom and law, the attorney 
is prncipally the representative of her clients. 
Accordingly, we hold that Section 8(1) violates 
the Equal Protection Clause. The judgment of the 
Connecticut Supreme Court is reversed, and the case 
is ... remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsist.,ent with this opinion. 
FOOTNOTE TO GRIFFITHS, PAGE ONE. 
I Appellant is eligible for naturalization 
by reason of her marriage to a citizen of the United 
States and residence in the United States for 
more than three _. years, 8 u.s.c. ~1430(a), 
She has not filed a declaration of intent to become 
a citizen of the United States, 8 u.s.c. Sl44S(f), 
and has no present intention of doing so. r 5 
Appellant's Srief, ~ p. 4. 
In order to become a citizen, appellant would 
be required to renounce her J ' I citizenship 
of the Netherlands. 8 U.S .c.§ 1448(a). 
FOOTNOTE TO GRIFFITHS, PAGE ONE. 
~ The rule was first promulgated in 1879. 
~ Application of Griffiths, 162 Conn. 249,~3, 
294 A. 2d ;).81, ;;63 ( 1972). Before that time, 
-
admitted to practice on the same basis as citizens. 
FOOTNTE TO GRIFFITHS, PAGE ONE 
Because we find that the rule denies equal protection, 
we do not reach appellant's other claims. 
FOOTNOTE TO GRIFFITHS, PAGE FIVE, 
1 Appellant denies that this was \~~he 
State's purpose in .__.._~_.._ .. ~ .... --~ ...... 
ia s z· 7 2 
requiring citizenship for the practice of law, 
• noting citizenship is also required .-. 
........ of practic .. ioners in other fields, 
including haridressers and cosmeticians, Conn, 
Gen. Stat, §20-250, architects, Conn, Gen. Stat. 
~ 20-291, and sanitarians, Conn, Gen. Stat•.§ 20-361. 
Because we dispose of the case on other grounds, 
we do not consider this claim, 
FOOTNOTE TO GRIFFITHS , PAGE NINE . 
~ See cases collected at Note , Constitutionality 
of Restrictions on Aliens ' Rt ight to Work , 57 
Columbia Law Review 10112 , 1021 - 1023(1957)•( M~ ('~5 -!,;cltoiu 
.soft- df',"hks +o 
J~lrfh,'}l r(J t/,). 
in 1946 is shown by M• . Konvitz, The Alien and the 
Asiatic in American Law 190-211(1946). 
FOGrNOTE TO GRIFFITHS, PAGE TEN. 
/ ltext L 
~ The'- IIJf the ~ttO*rney's oath-fs as followsa 
J.s',App,, p, 44, 
You solemnly swear that you will do no falsehood, nor 
consent to any to be done in court, and, if you know of any 
to be done, you will give information thereof to the judges, 
or one of them, that it may be reformed; you will not wit-
tingly, or willingly promote, sue or cause to be sued, any 
false or unlawful suit, or give aid, or consent, to the same; 
you will delay no man for lucre or malice; but will exercise 
the office of attorney, within the court wherein you may 
practice, according to the best of your learning and discre-
tion, and with fidelity, as well to the court as to your client, 
so held you God. 
FOOTNOTE TO GRIFFITHS, PAGE TEN 
7 Because the /mmissioner 's oath is an oath 
to "support the constitution of the United States, 
and the constitution of .... M Connecticut, so long 
as you continue to be a citizen thereofl "e ,L'emphasis 
addec!7, appellant could not of course take the oath 
± sg· E ?Zt as prescribed, To the extent that the 
.................. ~~ ...... oath RP 7 · 
---~~~~~--• reiterates'f"k .!f 8(1 ) 's 
citizenship requirement, it shares the same 
constitutional defe~t~ \
f' "- 9Ut~eJ o-fl / 
when II 5 3 I 1 I r-""ProJ'spec i\!:ve 
members of the bar, 
FOOTNOTE TO GRIFFITHS, PAGE TEN. 
find no merit in the contention 
that only citizens can in good consc•i~nce take 
an • oath to support && ILL the Constitution. 
We note 
t ; ; I 
aliens, 
inducted into the 
(following 1 
to take the 4 M · 7'577'. oath•••••••-
"I, ---·········································' do solemnly swear (or 
affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution 
of the United States against all enemies, foreign and 
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to 
the same; and that I will obey the orders of the Presi-
dent of the United States and the orders of the officers 
appointed over me, according to regulations and the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God." 
i';)J I 5 •z: 
\aliens' 
If - t· ca ake this oath when the nation is 
10 u.s.c. 502 
making use of~ervices in the national defense, 
\resident alie~ applican;r 
1& ant l ££ 70 •• -for admission to the 
bar can surely •••••••• not W 2 n 2 1 1 a be 
olo ts 
an oath to support the Constitutio~~ 
~1t~ -I'J.., o•-IV 
on the theory they cannod& rin good faith. 
FOOTNOT. E TO Jll GRIFFITHS, PAGE ELEVEN 
I' Appellee's Brief, pp. 20-21(~ citing,~ 
Doolittle v. Clark, 47 Conn. 316(1879)), 
.. J 
No. 1336 - Griffiths 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents a novel question the constraints 
imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
on the qualifications which a State may require for admission to the 
~ 
bar. Appellant, Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen o~Netherlands, came 
to the United States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In 1967, she 
married a citizen of the United States and became a resident of 
1/ 
Connecticut. - Mter her graduation from law school, she applied in 
1970 for permission to take the Connecticut bar examination. The 
bar association found her qualified in all respects save that she was 
not a citizen of the United States , as required by Rule 8(1) of the 
2/ ~ 
Connecticut Practice Book (1963), - ._.on that account refused to 
A 
allow her to take the examination. She then sought judie ial relief. • J'( . ~ 
~~ 
-11111 Ills•••• that the regulation was unconstitutionaL Her claim was 
)\ 
rejected first by the Superior Court and ultimately by the Connecticut 
Supreme Court. 162 Conn. 249, 294 A. 2d 281 (1972). We noted 
probable jurisdiction, 406 U.S. 966 (1972), and now hold that the 
3/ 
regulation unconstitutionally discriminates against resident aliens.-
-
-).- I. 
We begin by sketching the background against which the State 
Bar Examing Committee, appellee here, attempts to justify the total 
~elusion of aliens from the practice of law r 
It has long been established that the national government has ''broad 
constitutional powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to 
-a 1 a./l.. -1-t:. · , ':iJ 
the United States, the period they may remain, regulation of their 
)... 
conduct before naturalization.. . " Takahashi v. Fish & Game Q 1 
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 
52, 66 (1941); fiJifl Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
But a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "person" within the 
meaning of the ••• Fourteenth Amendment's directive that a 
state must not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the g z 
equal protection of the laws." ~- ~·, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356, 369 (1886). Indeed, it is now settled law that a resident 
alien/ is in most respects a full member of our society subject to 
duties as well ·as being entitled to most of the rights of citizenship. 
· As noted in -Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971), 
aliens pay taxes, contribute to the economy, may serve 
:i:H 
in the armed forces, and may well be long-term residents. 
under the Equal Protection Clause have found application in a number 
- 3 -
of cases involving state laws interfering with the efforts of resident 
aliens to earn a livelihood. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra, this Court 
invalidated a municipal ordinance regulating the operation of laundries)-
on the ground that the ordinance was discriminatorily enforced against 
Chinese operators. Several decades later, the Court struck down an 
Arizona statute which required employers of more than five persons to 
employ eighty percent "qualified electors or native-born citizens of 
the United States or some sub-division thereof." Truax v. Raich, 
239 U.S. 33 (1915). As stated for the Court by Mr. Chief Justice 
Hughes: 
"It requires no argument to show that the right 
to work for a living in the common occupations 
of the community is of the very essence of the 
personal freedom and opportunity that it was 
the purpose of the LF"ourteenthJ Amendment 
to secure. /Citations omitted. 7 If this could - -
be refused solely upon the ground of race or 
nationality, the prohibition of the denial of 
equal protection of the laws would be a barren 
form of words." 239 U.S. , at 41. 
On similar reasoning ;..Q I gg ' the Court ruled unconstitutional a 
. v " 
California statute barring issuance of commercial fishing licenses to 
-4-
persons "ineligible to citizenship". Takahashi v. Fish 
and Game Comm'n, 334 u.s. 410(1948). 
Te be sure, the course of decisio~ protecting 
the employment rights of resident aliens has not been 
'+ an unswerving one. In Clarke v. Dekebach, 274 U.S. 392(1927), 
the Court was faced with a challenge to a city ordinance 
prohibiting the issuance to aliens of l - icenses to operate 
pool and billiard rooms. Characterizing the business 
as one having "harmful and vici•ous tendencies", the 
Court found no constitutional infirmity in the 
ordinance a 
"It was competent for the city to make such 
a choice, not shown to be irrational, by 
excluding from the conduct of a dubiousE 
business an entire class rather than its 
objectionable members ~ selected by 
more empirJIIit ical methods." 274 u.s., at 397. 
This easily expand~ble proposition supported 
discrimination against resident aliens in a wide 
range of occupations. 
But the doctrinal foundations of Clarke 
were undermined in Takahashi, where the Court stated 
that "the pofWer of a state to apply its laws 
exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class 
is confif ned within narrow limits." 334 u.s., at 420. 
moved even 
\{urthe~~ 
Indeed, subsequent decisions have .. ~r 
in requiring "empirical methods", holding thata 
v ··f 
The Court has contsistently emphasized that 
a State which adopts a suspect classification "bears 
a heavy burden of justification", McLaughlin v. 
Florida, 379 u.s. 184, 196(1964), a burden which , 
though variously formulated, requires the State 
to meet certain standards of proof, In order to 
justify the use of a suspect classification , 
a State must show that its pxur_pose or interest 
~ /le"At;~s/blet 7and 
is both constitutionally 1 • 
. ~ substantLal, and that its use of the classification 
is "nece~ary to the accomplishment"of its purpose/ 
or the safeguarling of its interest. 
6. 
II. 
We hold that the Committee, acting on behalf of the state, 
has not carried its heavy burden of justification. The State's 
ultimate interest here implicated is to assure the requisite 
10 
qualifications of persons licensed to practice law. It is 
undisputed that a state has a legitimate and substantial interest 
in determining whether an applicant possesses "the character and 
general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor at law. " 
Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159 
(1970). See also Konigsberg v. state Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 40-41 ~ 
(1961); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 
11 
(1956). But no question is raised in this case as to appellant's 
character or general fitness. Rather, the sole basis for disqualification 
is her status as a resident alien. 
The Committee defends Rule 8 (1) 's requirement that 
applicants for admission to the bar be citizens of the United states 
on the ground that the special role of the lawyer justifies excluding 
alients from the practice of law. In Connecticut, the Committee 
points out, the maxim that a lawyer is an "officer of the court" 
7 
is given concrete meaning by a statute which makes every lawyer a 
"commissioner of the Superior Court." As such, a lawyer has authority 
to "sign writs and subpoenas, take recognizances, administer oaths and 
take depositions and acknowledgements of deeds." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-85. 
In the exercise of this authority, a Connecticut lawyer may command the 
assistance of a county sheriff or a town constable. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-90. 
{~.12--,'-:L;~ 
"the courts not only demand tfte.H! loyalty, con-
A 
fidence and respect, but also require them to 
function in a manner which will foster public con-
fidence in the profession and, consequently, the 
judicial system." 162 Conn. at 262-263, 294 
A. 2d, at 287. 
In order to establish a link between citizenship and 
the powers and responsibilities of the lawyer in 
Connecticut, the Committee contrasts a citizen's 
undivided allegiance to this country with 
a resident alien's possible conflict of loyalties. 
• .I -
From this, the Comittee conclude«s that a resident alien lawyer 
might in the exercise of his functions ignore his responsibilities to the 
I 
'-"oftofl« even his clients J:n" favor of the interest of a foreign power. 
We find these arguments unconvincing. It in no way denigrates a 
lawyer's high responsibilities to observe that the powers "to sign writs 
and subpoenas, take recognizances, ["angl administer oaths" hardly in-
volve matters of state policy or acts of such ~RQ£ 
as to entrust them only to citizens. Nor do we think that the practice of 
law offers meaningful opportunities adversely to affect the interest of the 
United States. Certainly the ommittee has failed to show the relevance 
of citizenship to any likelihood that a lawyer will fail to protect faithfully 
the interest of his clients. 
Nor would the possibility that some resident '1 
aliens are unsuited to the practice of law be a 
justification for a wholesale ban. 
This constitutional warning is especially salient where, 
as here, a State's bar admission standards make explicit 
use of a suspect classification. Although, as we 
have ack~wledged, •a State 
\_. ) does have a substantial interest in the qualifications of those admitted to 
the practice of law, the arguments advanced by the f'ommittee fall short 
of showing that the classification established by Rule 8(1) of the Connecticut 
Practice Book (1963) isr:A~c:n&l>II_.J llnecessary to the promoting or safeguard-l(!'~~·~j <' 
nqual~onnecticut has wide freedom to gauge 
I O, 
on a case-by-case basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law. 
Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training and familiarity 
with Connecticut law. Apart from such tests of competence, it requires 
a new lawyer to take both an "attorney's oath" to perform his functions 
1-J 
faithfully and honestly.*' and a "commissioner's oath" to "support the 
Constitution of the United States , and the Constitution of Connecticut."': 
1 
'I 
Appellant has indicated her willingness and ability to subscribe to the 
' ., 
substance of both oaths, and Connecticut may quite properly conduct a 
character investigation to insure in any given case "that an applicant is 
not one who 'swears to an oath pro forma while declaring or manifesting 
his disagreement with or indifference to the oath.' Bond v. Floyd, 385 
U.S. ll6, 132." Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra, 
If/. 
401 U.S., at 164. · Moreover, once admitted to the bar, lawyers are subject 
to continuing scrutiny by the organized bar and the courts. In addition 




sanctions extends from judgments for contempt to criminal prosecutions 
1151 
~ 
• and disbarment. In sum , the Committee simply has not established that 
it must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order to vindicate 






In its brief, the Examining Committee makes another, quite 
~ule 
different argument in support of 8 8(1). ' ?1 • a I g 1 
L I - I ; Pi -.. 
Its thrust is not that resident aliens lack the attributes necessary to 
I t I hi h 1fc.cwyer&J 
mam am 1g standards in the legal profession, but rather that}f e'~ 
J?-USt be citizens almost as a m_atter of definition. ;1!f!l' ,r-Ae 
tlf?pl/ct.\ftti., 01-fJ -rltis aYta f ysl..s ;·s flra-1- excfv.s 1 ~"1 0 .(' Ot/,'~I?S 
ff-o.,.. .fit@ · l7cJ.I pro*SS'ra,ziJ /s n.o ·l £"u4;'c=>c:f 7& 4-"Y , 
~cv-uf,-n.y u..-d-er +~tr:.. Etval 
The argument builds upon the exclusion of aliens from the 
franchi~\n all fifty States and their disqualification under the Con-
" 
stitution from holding office as President, Art. 2, § 1, cl. 4, or as a 
member of the House of Representatives, Art. 1, § 2, cl. 2, or of the 
Senate, Art. 1, § 3, cl. 3. These and myriad other federal and state 
statutory and constitutional provisions reflect, the Committee contends, 
a pervasive recognition that "participation in the government structure 
as voters and office holders~#~' ~,•••••••Ft•i ••••t is inescapably 
an aspect of citizensh~p. 
/? 
Offered in support of the _._. .... claim 
that th \(41.v' y e '/ . II ff" h ld II • h" e ~ - ¥ LS an o Lce o er Ln t Ls 
sense is an enhanced version of the proposition , 
discussed above, that he is an "officer of the court", 
Specifica~ the Committee states that 
/a..~.Vyer 
the It l 1 1£ "is an officer of the court who acts 
by and with the authority of the statef " and 
is entrusted with the "exercise of actual governmen~ 
Qower". Appellee's "Brief._ n _ S . 
We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond the 
C t which recognized that 
opmion of the Connecticut Supre~e ou~ ' 
I .~ ,..,,.f c::tl'\ o{l-t,ca,... '" -f 4e o('clt'na"'/ ~et1S~ .., 
~.. ¥ ................................. .. 
1 b ::l Co11 n, ~ 7 .:; S '1; 'J- 9 'I AJ~ a."t ;;~s. 
1-t..J._ o-1 1-W-. -~ 
...r I . ..L "f- J. ( cwr . ~:+:i, Pt zl, J"jj s-F' 
1 fii£. co vYt pcrr ':s CVt '« A 
~ ~~-4 ~ ~ ~4~./ t',. ... ; tM__, 
-file~? 2 7 ~ Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 
/\ 
399 (1956)·i~oa "by Mr. Justice Black, the Court distinguished 
• A. 
~1...V'f:l;%em "affjc~ within the eonventional-meaning of t-hat teru£'5 
"It has been stated many times that lawyers are 
Q I officers of the court. I One of the most a 
frequently repeated statements to this effect appears 
in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378. The Court 
pointed out there, however, that an attorney was not 
an 'officer' within the ordinary meaning of that term. 
Certainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland 
or in any other case decided by this Court places 
attorneys in the same category as marshals, 
bailiffs, court clerks or judges. Unlike these officials 
a lawyer is engaged in a private profession, important 
though it be to our system of justice. In general he 
makes his own decisions, follows his own best 
judgment, collects his own fees and runs his own 
business. The word 'officer' a~ as it has 
~----------------~· 
Jd : - / y -
always been applied to lawyers conveys a different 
meaning from the word 'officer' as applied to people 
serving as officers within the conventional meaning 
of that term." 3[ 2! '3 W {1o 'ho ~ oM/7/~J]. .· 
3. ~a u t {,.J f/..1- '-l o,s-
~lndeed occupy professional positions of J 
responsibility and influence that impose on them duties correlative 
with their vital right of access to the courts. ) 
- ---- ~"""------------
Moreover, by virture of their professional aptitudes 
. ~ta.~y e7t: 
and natural interestts, .5 have been leaders in 
government throughout the history of our .. country, 
Y~,they are not officials of government by virture of 
being~Nor does the status of holding 
a license to practice law place one so close to the 
core of the political process as to make him a .. lllllllk ,, 




A~~ hold that Section 8{1) violates the Equal 
Protection Claus-!. O The judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court 
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
l 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Appellant is eligible for naturalization by reason of her 
marriage to a citizen of the United states and residence in the 
United states for more than three years, 8 U. S.C. § 1430(al. She 
~ has not filed a declaration of inten~ to become a citizen of the United 
I 
states, 8 U.S. C. § 1445(f), and has no present intentio of doing so. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 4. In order to become a citizen, appellant 
would be required to renounce her citizenship of the Netherlands. 
that time, aliens were apparently admitted to practice on the same 
l bo f h /"' G, nee. :hcui q:n J e !sf!? w h-ev'-t . / 
•• rn 1872 this Court stated in 
another context thatl the right of admission to practice 
in the courts of a State 
"in no sense depends on citizenship of the 
United States, It has not, as far as we 
know, ever been made in any State, or in any 
case, to depend on citizenship at all, 
Certainly many prominent and distinguished 
lawyers have been admitted to practice, both 
in the State and Federal courts, who were not 
citizens of the United States or of any State," 
Bradwell v, The State, 16 Wall, 130, 139(1872). 
3, Because we find that the rule denies 
equal protection, we do not reach appellant's other 
claims. 
... 
4 . See also .. --. People v . 
crane, 214 N.Y. 154 , 108 N. E. 427 , affti sub nom . 
crane v . New York, 239 u.s . 195(1915); but see 
gG.£r~ahh~amm_:v~. Jf!!ll' • ._, JR~i~c:J:h~a!:!r:!Jd~s~o~n , 4 0 3 U • S • , at 3 7 4 • 
See cases collected at Note, Constitutionality of 
Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 Columbia Law Review 
\ 
1012, 1021-1023 (1957) (restrictions ranging from the vending 
\gghtning ~ 
of soft drinks to the selling of , , ' rods). The full scale 
l 
of restrictions imposed on p ] the work opportunities of aliens 
in 1946 is shown by M. Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic in 
American Law 190-211 (1946). 
- IJJ., -
6 Although alienage is generally equated with 
race as a suspect classification, we did not decide 
in Graham nor do we decide here whether there might 
be circumstances, such as armed hostilities between 
the United States and the country of which an aliia:en 
is a citizen, in which alienage would not be suspect • 
. . ·, 
-I~-
7 ..,_ Discrimination or segregation for its 
I 
own sake is not, of course,a constitutionally 
permissible -purpose, li.J!.t Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 u.s ... 483,495(1954), 
McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, 
~The State interest required has been character-
ized as "overriding", McLaughlin v, Florida, 379 u.s., 
at 196; Loving v. Virginia, 388 u.s. 1,11(1967), 
"compelling", Graham v. Richardson, 403 u.s., at 375, 
"important", Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 u.s. 330,343(1972), 
or "substantial", id, We attribute no particular 
significance to these vari.ations in diction, 
~McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 u.s., at 196; 






J ~ Appellant denies that this was indeed the State's purpose 
in requiring citizenship for the practice of law, not~enship l 
is also required of practitioners in other fields, including hairdressers 
and cosmeticians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-250, architects, Conn. 
Gen. Stat. § 20-291, and sanitarians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-361. 
Because we dispose of the case on other grounds, we do not consider I 
this ••• claim. 
1/f In this confnection, Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
wrote a 
"From a profession charged with such responsibilities 
there must Q~.exacted those qualities of truth-
speaking, o~igh sense of honor, of granite 
discretion, of the strictest observance of 
fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout 
the centuries, been compendiously described 
as 'moral character'." Schware v. 






1 ~ Attorneys frequently represent foreign countries 
and the nationals of such countries in litigation in the 
courts of the United States, as well as in other matters 
in this country. In such representation, the duty of 
the attorney, subject to his role as an"officer of the 
court", is to further the interests of his clients 
by all lawful means, even when those interests are in 
conflict with the interests of the United States or of 
a State. But this representation involves no conflict 
of interest in the invidious ~ sense. Rather, it 
casts the attorney is his homored and traditional 
role as an authorized but independent 
agent acting to vindicate the legaj l rights of a client, 
whoever it may be. It is conceivable that an alien 
licensed to practice law in this country could find 
Ill himself in a position where he might be called upon 
l 
I 
l·- to represent his country of citizenship against 
h 
the United States i• circumstances where there may be 
! . a conflict between his obligations to the two countries, 
In such rare situations, an honorable perso~, whether J 
an alien or not, would decline the representation, 
., .. . 
13 
; .._, The text of the attorney's oath is as follows: 
"You solenmly swear that you will do no falsehood, 
nor consent to any to be done in court, and, if you know 
of any to be done, you will give information thereof to 
the judges, or one of them, that it may be reformed; 
you will not wittingly, or willingly promote, sue or cause 
to be sued, any false or unlawful suit, or give aid, or 
consent, to the same; you will delay no man for lucre 
or malice; but will exercise the office of attorney, 
within the court wherein you may practice, according 
to the best of your learning and discretion, and with 
fidelity, as well to the court as to your client, so 
help you God. 
J. S. App. , p. 44. 
1 L{-~ There is no question as to the validity of requiring an 
applicant, as a precondition to admission to the bar, to take such 
an oath. Law students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra, at 161-164. 
---- -~-.~~ 
~~·· 
Because the commissioner's oath . 
1s an oath to "support 
the constitution of the United stat 
es, and the constitution of 
Connecticut 1 
' so ong as you continue to be a citizen thereof" 
[emphasis added], a lla t 
ppe n could not of course take the oath 
as prescribed. 
To the extent that the oath reiterates Rule 8( 1) 's 
citizenship requirement ·t 
' 1 shares the same constitutional 
%eq8 bt defects wh · 







~ We find no merit in the contention that only citizens 
can in good conscience take an oath to support the Constitution. 
We note that all persons inducted into the armed services, including 
resident aliens, are required by 10 U.S. C.cj 502 to take the 
following oath: 
"I, , o solemnly swear (or 
affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution 
of the United States against all enemies, foreign and 
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance 
to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the 
President of the United States and the orders of the 
officers appointed over me, according to regulations 
and the t 5 t Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
So help me God. " 
If aliens can take this oath when the riation is making use of their 
services in the national defense, ........ resident alienfl 
applicants for admission to the bar<§l~ surely ot be precluded, 
as a class, from taking an oath to support the Constitution on 
the theory they cannot take the oath in good faith. 
IUJCI Jt:; pu t Sf nstss ( 8zt:Mltl ) O;'lt;'•l ,,_ ~ 
jl. See, ~- ~·, Doolittle v. Clark, 47 Conn. 316 (1879). 
I Apart from the courts, the profession itself has long subj.ected its 
members to discipline under codes or cannons of professional ethics. 
As early as 1908 the American Bar Association adopted 32 Canons 1 
of Professional Ethics. In 197~lowing several years of 
study and reexamination, the House of Delegates of the American 
Bar Association approved a new aBe uamprehenam Code of 
··Professional Responsibility, which provides detailed ethical 
a.A--' 
perscriptions aftd well as a comprehensive code of disciplinary rules. 
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility has since been 
r 
approved or adopted in states, including Connecticut. Reports 
of the American Bar Association, Vol. 97, (1972) p. J 
\ 
# 
~othing in our rules prohibits ' from 
admission to p~ctice in this Court • resident aliens 
who~een admitted ••••••••• to practice 
"for three years past in the highest court of a State, 
Territory, District, Commonwealth, or ~IIIIII, Posses-
iorlf"and whose "private and professional characters 
shall appear to be good," Rule 5, Rules of the 
Supreme Court of the United States(l970). 
~ Because the Committee has f "1 
~~- a~ ed to establish 
tha: the ~s a " ff' n o ~ce holder" ' we, need not 
andj do not decide whether there ;s Jl { l .... merit in .. ~, Yl~ Jif2r. era. 
~d , if so , to What off;ces ..... it would apply, 
$.·' ' ~ • tl'• •• . '~ .. 
~D 
~n a thoughtful opinion, tge California Supreme 
unconstitutional a similar California 
rule. Raffaelli v. O.ommittee of Bar Examiners, 
---Cal, 3d ___ , 496 P,2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 
896(1972). See also Application of Park, 
484 P. 2d 690(Alaska 1971). 
Rider A, p. 2 B (Griffiths) 2/11/73 
It has long been established that the national government has ''broad 
constitutional powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to 
the United states, the period they may remain, regulation of their 
conduct before naturalization, ••• " Takahashi v. Fish & Game £x:aaa:u 
gomm'n.., 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.s. 
52, 66 (1941 ); and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
But a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "person" within the 
meaning of the :ik1adk Fourteenth Amendment's directive that a 
state must not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the J11111X 
equal protection of the laws." ~· K·, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.s. 356, 369 (1886). Indeed, it is now settled law that a resident 
alient is in most respects a full member of our society subject to 
duties as well as being entitled to most of the rights of citizenship. 
As noted in ildl Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.s. 365, 376 (1971), 
"aliens like citizens pay taxes and may be called into the armed 
forces", they may live within a state for many years and contribute' 
significantly to its welfare and growth. 
Rider A, p. 4 (Griffiths) 2/11/73 
The Court in Crane also relied on the concept, since rejected, that 
"whatever is a privilege rather than a right, may be made dependent 
upon citizenship". Crane v. New York, suEra at 164. The doctrinal 
foundation of Crane was undermined, however, IlK in 'lxbduUdrt 
Takahashi, supr~, and it retains no force in the present eootext. 
Indeed, subsequent decisions have moved signUicantly in the opposite 
direction, holding that: 
"ClassUications based on alienage, like those based 
on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and 
subject to close judicial scrutiny. " Graham v. 
Richardson, supra at 371, 376. 
(~ill: What other eases, if any, should be cited here?) 
It is thus now clear from the recent deeisioos of this Court that 
resident aliens "as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete 
and lw•a insular' minority. (See United states v . .eax•••~Mw•• 
Carolene Products Co., 304 u.S. 14~ 4c 152-153, n. 4 (1938)) 
for whom' [a] hightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." 
Qraham, ~ra at 372. See also Takahashi, supra at 420. 
Rider A, p. 7 (Griffiths) 2/11/73 
hardly involve matters of state; nor are they powers which are 
likely to result in any conflict of interest with another country or 
enable theMB~ alien attorney to act to the detriment of this 
country.* 
* Attorneys···rrequently represent foreign countries and the nationals 
of such countries in littgattcn in the courts of the United states, as 
well as in other matters in this country. In such representaticns 
the duties of the attorney, subject to his duty as an "officer" of the 
court, are to further the interests of his client by all lawful means, 
even if such interests are in ccnflict with those of the United States 
or a state. Such representation involves no conflict of interest in 
an invidious sense. Rather, it casts the attorney 1n his honored 
and traditional role of acting as the authorized but independent agent 
to vindicate the legal rights of a client, whomever it may be. Of 
course, it is conceivable that an alien licensed to practice law in 
this country could find himself in a position where he might be called 
upon to represent his country of citizenship against the United states 
in circumstances where there may be conflicts between kB his oaths 
to the two countries. In such rare situations, an honorable person, 
whether an alien or not, would decline the representation. 
Note to Bill: 
It seems to me that the "conflict of interest" possibillty needs 
to be addressed a little more fully than your draft. You may think 
of a better way to do it. Also, I wanted to omit the reference to 
"customary concomitants", as I think Connecticut is probably one 
of few states which authorizes lawyers to sign writs and issue 
subpoenas. 
.·~·1 , ~·· 
Rider~ p. 5 (Griffiths) 2/11/73 
It is undisputed that Connecticut has a legitimate interest in 
determining whether an JllppliaL applicant possesses ''the character 
and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor at law". 
Law atudents Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159 (1970). 
See also Konigsberg v. state Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 40-41 ( ); 
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232, 234 ( ); 
(Frankfurter, .r., concurring) . 
.. ·.l, ( 
Rider A. p. 3 of n<tes (Griffiths) 2/11/73 
7. There is no question as to the validity of requiring an 
applicant, as a precondition to admission to the bar, to take such 
an oath. Law students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra, at 161-164. 
Rider A, p. 9 (Griffiths) 2/11/73 
And once admitted to the bar, attorneys are subject to cootinuing 
scrutiny by the organized bar and the courts. In addition to discipline 
for unprofessional conduct, the range of post-admissioo a sanctions 
extends from judgments for contempt to criminal prosecutioos and 
9 
"W*hl disbarment. 
Rider A, p. 4 of notes (Griffith) 2/11/73 
10. §ee, ~· K·, Doolittle v. Clark, 47 Conn. 316 (1879). 
Apart from the courts, the profession itself has long subjected its 
members to discipline under codes or cannons of professional ethics. 
As early as 1908 the American Bar Association adopted 32 Canons 
of Professional Ethics. In 1970( ?) , following several years of 
study and reexamination, the House of Delegates of the American 
Bar Association approved a new and comprehensive Code of 
Professional Respoosibility, which provides detailed ethical 
perscriptioos and well as a comprehensive code of disciplinary rules. 
The ABA Code of Professional RespoosibUity has since been 
approved or adopted in states, including Connecticut. Reports 
of the American Bar Association, Vol. 97, (1972) p. _. 
Note to Bill: 
I do not have the 1972 report of the ABA. Check the library 
to see whether it is available there. If not take a look at p. 676 and 
677 of Volume 96 which I do have oo my shelf and which shows on 
p. 677 that Connecticut was expected to adopt the Code in the 
spring of 1971. If the 1973 volume is not available, call the 
Washington office of the ABA and talk to Don Channell who is In 
charge there. Tell him you are calling at my Jlt request and ask 
him if he has a copy of the report of this Committee made to the ABA 
annual t meeting last summer or possibly even the most recent report 
was made this weekend at the midwinter meeting in Cleveland. 
Then ask Mr. Channell to tell you what Connecticut has done and 
rive vou the date of adontinn tf Ahnwn hv 1"Ann1"t 
Rider A, 2· 10 (Griffiths) 2/11/73 
It is further contended that in Connecticut an attorney 
" is an officer of the court who acts by and with the authority of the 
state, and that - because of ''this power which he has been given" -
the state is concerned with the integrity of the attorney's "exercise 
of actual government power". Appelle~s Brief p. 5. 
We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond the 
q>inion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which recognized that 
"an attorney is 'not an officer within the ordinary meaning of that 
term'". 162 Conn. at • The committee's concept of an --
attorney's participatioo in "actual government power" finds no 
support in fact or authority. In Cammer v. United states, 350 U.S. 
399 (1956) in opinioo by Mr. Justice Black, the Court distinguished 
attorneys from "officers within the conventional meaning of that term": 
"It has been stated many times that lawyers are 
'officers of the c rurt. ' One of the most f:a • 
frequently repeated statements to this effect appears 
in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378. The Court 
pointed out there, however, that an attorney was not 
an 'officer' within the ordinary meaning of that term. 
Certainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland 
or in any other case decided by this Court places 
attorneys tn the same category .... as marshals, 
batliffs, court clerks or judges. Unlike these officials 
a lawyer is engaged in a private profession, important 
though it be to our system of justice. In general he 
makes his own decisims, follows his own best 
judgment, collects his own fees and runs his own 
business. The word 'officer' as '4twlt as tt has 
Rider A, p. 10 (Griffiths) 2/11/73 
It is further contended that in Connecticut an attorney 
"is an officer of the court who acts by and with the authority of the 
state, and that - beeause of ''this power which he has been given"-
the state is concerned with the integrity of the attorney's "exercise 
of actual government power". Appelle~s Brief p. 5. 
We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond the 
opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which recognized that 
"an attorney is 'not an officer within the ordinary meaning of that 
term'"· 162 Conn. at . The committee's concept of an --
attorney's participation in ''actual government power" finds no 
support in fact or authority. In Cammer v. United states, 350 U.S. 
399 (1956) in opinion by Mr. Justice Black, the Court distinguished 
attorneys from "officers within the conventional meaning of that term": 
''It has been stated many times that lawyers are 
'officers of the crurt. ' One of the most :baari: 
frequently repeated statements to this effect appears 
in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall 333, 378. The Court 
pointed out there, however, that an attorney was not 
an 'officer' within the ordinary meaning of that term. 
Certainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland 
or in any other case decided by this Court places 
attorneys in the same category WN •• as marshals, 
bailiffs, court clerks or judges. Unlike these officials 
a lawyer is engaged in a private profession, important 
though it be to our system of justice. In general he 
makes his own dectsims, follows his own best 
judgment, collects his own fees and runs his own 
business. The word 'officer' as :applt as it has 
,') ., . 
Rider A, p. 10 (Griffiths) 2/11/73 
It is further contended that in Connecticut an attorney 
"is an officer of the court who acts by and with the authority of the 
state, and that - because of ''this power which he has been given" -
th tate is concerned with the int grity of the ttorney's "exercis 
of actual governm nt power". Appelle4s Bri f p. 5. 
We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond the 
q>inion of the Conn cticut Supreme Court, which r cognized that 
"an attorney is 'not an offic r within the ordinary meaning of that 
term'"· 162 Conn. t • The committee's concept of an --
attorney's p rticipatioo in "actual government power" finds no 
support in fact or authority. In Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 
399 (1956) in opinion by Mr. Justice Black, the Court distinguished 
ttorneys from "officers within the conventional meaning of that term": 
''It has been stated many times that wyers are 
'officers of the c wrt. ' One of the most max 
fr quently r pe t d t tements to this ffect ppears 
in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378. The Court 
pointed out there, however, that an attorney wa not 
an 'officer' within the ordinary meaning of that term. 
Cert inly nothing that was said in Ex parte rland 
or in any oth r c s decided by this Court places 
attorneys in the s me category MllhC •• as mar hals, 
bailiffs, court clerks or judges. Unlike these officials 
a lawyer is ngaged in a private profession, important 
though it be to our ystem of justice. In general he 
makes his own declaims, follows his own best 
judgm nt, coll ets his own fees and runs hi own 
business. The ord 'offic r' as it ha 
,. 
always been applied to lawyers conveys a different 
meaning from the word 'officer' as applied to people 
serving as officers within the conventional meaning 
of that term. " 350 U.s. at 405. 
Attorneys do indeed occupy professional positions of 
responsibility and influence that impose on them duties cor relative 
with their vital right of access to the courts. Attorney also, by 
virtue of their professional aptitudes and natural interests, have 
government at all levels. Yet, they are net officials of government 
2. 
by virtue of being attorneys. Nor does the status of holding a license 
to practice law place one so close to the core of the political process 
as to e onsider him a participant in the shaping of government policy 
o r the exercise of government power. In short, the practice of 
law is not a position in government; it is a profession from which 
qualified resident aliens may not be validly excluded. 
Rider A, p. 4a (Griffiths) 2/15/73 
The Court has consistently emphasized that a state which 
adopts a suspect classification ''bears a heavy burden of justification", 
Mc_Lau~li~ v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964), a burden which, 
though variously formulated, requires the state to meet certain 
standards of proof. At the outset, there must be a showing that 
the state's interest or purpose is "constitutionally acceptable". 
Id., at 192; the mere desire to punish or disfavor resident aliens 
as a class would, of course, not be a permissible purpose. The 
state also must show that its interest could fairly be characterized 
4 5 6 
as "substantial",. "overriding!' or "compelling". :ftllt Finally, 
the state must show that the use of the suspect classification is 
"necessary to the accomplishment" of its interest or purpose. 
~c~_aughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. at 196; Loving v. Virginia, 388 
u.s. 1, 11 (1967). 




We hold that the Committee, acting on behalf of the state, 
has not carried its heavy burden of justification. The Committee 
does not assert that the state interest in upholding Rule 8( 1) is to 
favor citizens by protecting them from the competition of resident 
alien lawyers. Rather, the Committee's position is that the state 
7 
action is justified by the special role of the lawyer in our society. 
Rider A, p. 4a (Griffiths) 2/17/73 LFP 
The Court has consistently emphasized that a state which adopts 
a suspect classification ''bears a heavy burden of justification," McLaughlin 
v. Florida , 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964), a burden which, though variously 
formulated, requires the state to meet certain standards of proof. At the 
outset, there must be a showing that the state's interest or purpose is 
"constitutionally acceptable." Id., at 192; the mere desire to punish or 
disfavor resident aliens as a class would, of course, not be a permissible 
purpose. The state also must show that its interest could fairly be 
characterized as "substantial' n4 "overriding," 5 or "compelling." 6 
Finally, the state must show that the use of the suspect classification is 
reasonably'hecessary to the accomplishment" of its purpose or the safe-
guarding of its interest. McLa3hlin v. Florida, 379 u.s. at 196; LoviJll 
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
4 
United states v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1967). 
:-- .. 
No. 1336 -Griffiths 
MR • .nJSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents a novel question regarding the constraints 
imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
on the qualifications which a State may require for admission to the 
bar. Appellant, Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of Netherlands, came 
to the United States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In 1967, she 
married a citizen of the United States and became a resident of 
1/ 
Connecticut.- After her graduation from law school, she applied in 
1970 for permission to take the Connecticut bar examination. The 
bar association found her qualified in all respects save that she was 
not a citizen of the United States, as required by Rule 8(1) of the 
2/ 
Connecticut Practice Book (1963), -: ... 1but on that account refused to 
allow her to take the examination. She then sought judie ial relief on 
the ground that the regulation was unconstitutional. Her claim was 
rejected first by the SUperior Court and ultimately by the Connecticut 
Supreme Court. 162 Conn. 249, 294 A.2d 281 (1972). We noted 
probable jurisdiction, 406 U.s. 966 (1972), and now hold that the 
3/ 
regulation unconstitutionally discriminates against resident aliens.-







We begin by sketching the background against which the State 
Bar Examing Committee, appellee here, attempts to justify the total 
preclusion of aliens from the practice of law. It has long been 
established that a resident alien is a "person" within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment• s directive that a state must not "deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. " 
.!.:£:., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 u.s. 356, 369 (1886). While Congress 
has wide power to regulate immigration and naturalization, .!..:.£!., 
Fong Yue Ting v. United states, 149 U.s. 698 (1893), a lawfully-
admitted resident alien is in most respects a full member of our 
society and must, under the Constitution, be treated as such. Indeed, 
as the Court recently held, 
"classifications based on alienage, like those 
based on nationality or race, are inherently 
suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny." 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 u.s. 365, 371-372 
(1971). 
The general principles regarding the rights of resident aliens 
under the Equal Protection Clause have found application in a number 
- 3-
of cases involving state laws interfering with the efforts of resident 
aliens to earn a livelihood. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra, this Court 
invalidated a municipal ordinance regulating the operation of laundries, 
on the ground that the ordinance was discriminatorily enforced against 
Chinese operators. Several decades later, the Court struck down an 
Arizona statute which required employers of more than five persons to 
employ eighty percent "qualified electors or native-born citizens of 
the United states or some sub-division thereof." Truax v. Raich, 
239 U.S. 38 (1915). As stated for the Court by Mr. Chief Justice 
Hughes: 
"It requires no argument to show that the right 
to work for a living in the common occupations 
of the community is of the very essence of the 
personal freedom and opportunity that it was 
the purpose of the /P'ourteenth J Amendment 
to secure. /Citations omitted.J If this could 
be refused solely upon the ground of race or 
nationality, the prohibition of the denial of 
equal protection of the laws would be a barren 
form of words." 239 U.s. , at 41. 
On similar reasoning, finally, the Court ruled unconstitutional a 
California statute barring issuance of commercial fishing licenses to 
- 4-
persons "ineligible to citizenship." Takahashi v. Fish and Game 
Commission, 334 U.s. 410 (1948). 
To be sure, the course of decisions protecting the employment 
rights of resident aliens has not been an unbroken one. In Crane v. 
New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915), a statute prohibiting the employment 
of aliens on public works projects was upheld over an equal protection 
challenge, apparently on the theory that the state might constitutionally 
favor citizens over aliens in the distribution of limited resources, in 
that case a limited number of job openings. As explained in Graham v. 
Richardson, suera, 403 U.S., at 372-374, however, that theory was 
repudiated by implication in Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm. , suera, 
and retains no force in the present context. The mere desire to favor 
citizens in the allocation of employment or other economic opportunities 
no longer serves as an adequate justification for discrimination against 
resident aliens. 
I I. 
The Examining Committee insists nonetheless that even if the 
state may not practice or mandate employment discrimination against 
'' 
- 5-
resident aliens as a general matter, the special role of the attorney 
4/ 
justifies excluding aliens from the practice of law.- In Connecticut, 
the Committee points out, the maxim that an attorney is an "officer of 
the court" is given concrete meaning by a statute which rm kes every 
attorney admitted to practice a "commissioner of the Superior Court." 
As such, an attorney has authority to "sign writs, issue subpoenas, 
take recognizances, and administer oaths," Conn. Gen. Stat. §51-85, 
and, in so doing, to command the assistance of a county sheriff or 
town constable. Conn. Gen. stat. 8 52-90. Because of these and other 
powers, 
"The courts not only demand their loyalty, 
confidence and respect but also require them 
to function in a manner which wlll foster public 
confidence in the profession and, consequently, 
the judicial system." 162 Conn., at 262-263, 
294 A2d, at 287. 
It is undisputed that Connecticut "has a legitimate interest in 
determining whether /in applicantJ has the qualities of character and 
professional competence requisite to the practice of law," Baird v. 
state Bar of Arizona, 401 U.s. 1, 7 (1971) (opinion of Black, J.). 
- 6 -
By the same token, though, it is too late to suggest that the standards 
for admission to the bar are not subject to constitutional constraints. 
"r A _7ny qualification must have a rational connection with the 
applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law," Schware v. Board of 
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957), and may not be "invidiously 
discriminatory." ~· , at 239. 
No claim is made that resident aliens as a class lack the 
competence or personal character necessary for the practice of law. 
But, in defense of the rationality of distinguishing between citizens and 
resident aliens, the Committee contrasts the citizen's undivided 
commitment to this country with the resident alien's possible conflict 
of loyalties. From this, the Committee concludes that a resident 
allen attorney might in the exercise of her functions ignore her 
responsibilities to the courts and her clients in favor of the interests of 
a foreign power. 
We find this danger a remote and unreal one. The Committee 
makes no convincing demonstration that the practice of law offers 
meaningful opportunities adversely to affect the interests of the United 
- 7 -
States, It in no way denigrates the attorney's high responsibilities to 
observe that the powers "to sign writs, issue subpoenas, take 
recognizances t and administer oaths" are customary concomitants of 
the practice of law rather than matters of state. Nor has the Committee 
shown the relevance of citizenship to the likelihood that an attorney 
will protect faithfully the interests of her clients. 
Even if the Committee's contentions were treated as having 
demonstrated that some resident aliens may be unsuited for the practice 
of law, that would be no justification for a wholesale ban. The Commit-
tee calls our attention to Pearl Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Harrington, 
38 F. Supp. 411 (D. Mass.), aff'd. per euriam 313 u.s. 549 (1941), 
which upheld the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute barring 
aliens from positions as resident managers of alien insurance companies 
doing business in Massachusetts. While the Court's summary dis-
position in Pearl does not afford insight into the grounds of its decision, 
the affirmance was presumably based on an analysis most fully 
elaborated in Clarke v. Dekebach, 274 u.s. 392 (1927). There, the 
Court was faced with a challenge to a city ordinance prohibiting the 
is.suance to aliens of licenses to operate pool and billiard rooms. 
I 
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Characterizing the business as one having "harmful and vicious 
tendencies," the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the ordinance: 
"It was competent for the city to make such 
a choice, not shown to be irrational, by excluding 
from the conduct of a dubious business an entire 
class rather than its objectionable members 
selected by more empirical mothods." 274 U.S., 
at 397. 
This easily expandable proposition supported discrimination against 
5/ 
resident aliens in a wide variety of occupations.-
At least after Graham v. Richardson, supra, such reasoning 
is no longer sufficient to justify discrimination against aliens. It is of 
the essence of "strict judicial scrutiny," 403 U.s., at 372, that a 
state must where possible use "empirical methods" rather than broad 
proscriptions to separate the qualified from the unqualified. 
In the present context, Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge 
on a case-by-case basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law. 
Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training and 
1 familiarity with Connecticut law. Apart from such tests of competence, 
it lrequires a new attorney to take both an "attorney's oath" to perform 
- 9-
6/ 
her functions faithfully and honestly- and a "Commissioner's oath" 
to !'support the constitution of the United states, and the constitution of 
Connecticut." Appellant has indicated her willingness and ability to 
7/ 
subscribe to the substance of both oaths,- and Connecticut may 
quite properly conduct a character investigation to insure in any given 
case "that an applicant is not one who •swears to an oath pro forma 
while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or indifference to 
the oath.' Bond v. Floyd, 885 U.s. 116, 182." Law students Research 
8/ 
Council v. Wadmond, supra, 401 U.s. , at 164.- And once admitted 
to the bar, as the cases cited by the Committee amply demonstrate, 
9/ 
attorneys are subject to discipline of abuse of their powers.- In sum, 
the Committee has simply not established that it must exclude all aliens 
from the practice of law in order to vindicate its undoubted interest in 
high professional standards. 
III. 
In its brief, the Examining Committee makes another, quite 
different argument in support of Section 8(1). Appellee's Brief, p. 10. 
Its thrust is not that resident aliens lack the attributes necessary to 
maintain high standards in the legal profession, but rather that attorneys 
must be citizens almost as a matter of definition. 
,. •' ~ - .,. 
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The argument builds upon the exclusion of aliens from the 
fra.nchis in all fifty States and their disqualification under the Con-
stitution from holding office as President, Art. 2, § 1, cl. 4, or as a 
member of the House of Representatives, Art. 1, § 2, cl. 2, or of the 
Senate, Art. 1, I 3, cl. 3. These and myriad other federal and state 
statutory and constitutional provisions reflect, the Committee contends, 
a pervasive recognition that ''participation in the government structure 
as voters and office holders," Appellee's Brief, p. 11, is inescapably 
an aspect of citizenship. 
Whatever the merits of this view in other contexts, we are 
satisfied that the attorney does not occupy a position so close to the core 
of the political process as to warrant the exclusion of aliens. The 
attorney as attorney neither selects those who wUl set governmental 
policy nor sets it herself. The practice of law does, of course, impinge 
upon the political process broadly conceived, but notwithstanding the 
powers conferred by custom and law, the attorney is principally the 
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Accordingly, we hold that Section 8(1) violates the Equal 
Protection Clause. The judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court 
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
·' 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Appellant is eligible for naturalizatioo by reason of her 
marriage to a citizen of the Unlted States and residence in the 
United States for more than three years, 8 u. S. C. § 1430(a), She 
has not filed a declaration of intent to become a citizen of the United 
States, 8 U. S. C. § 1445(f), and has no present intentionof doing so. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 4. In order to become a citizen, appellant 
would be required to renounce her citizenship of the Netherlands. 
8 U. S.C. § 1448(a). 
2. The rule was first promulgated in 1879. Application 
of Griffith~, 162 Conn. 249, 253, 294 A. 2d 281, 283 (1972). Before 
that time, aliens were apparently admitted to practice on the same 
basis as citizens. 
3. Because we find that the rule denied equal protection, 
we do not reach appellant's other claims. 
2. 
4. Appellant denies that this was indeed the State•s purpose 
in requiring citizenship for the practice of law, noting citizenship 
is also required of practitioners in other fields, including hairdressers 
and cosmeticians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-250, architects, Conn. 
Gen. Stat. § 20-291, and sanitarians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-361. 
Because we dispose of the ease on other grounds, we do not consider 
this dar.tlomx claim. 
5. See eases collected at Note, Constitutionality of 
Re~trietion!._~ Aliens' Right to Work, 57 Columbia Law Review 
1012, 1021-1023 (1957) (restrictions ranging from the vending 
lightning 
of soft drinks to the selling of~ rods). The full scale 
of restrictions imposed on JI!XJIZ:the work opportunities of aliens 
in 1946 is shown by M. KDnvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic in 
American Law 190-211 (1946). 
6. The text of the attorney's oath is as follows: 
''You solenmly swear that you will do no fllsehood, 
nor consent to any to be dme in court, and, if you know 
of any to be done, you wtll give informaticm thereof to 
the judges, or one of them, that it may be reformed; 
you will not wittingly, or willingly promcte, sue or cause 
to be sued, any false or unlawful suit, or give aid, or 
consent, to the same; you will delay no man for lucre 
or malice; but will exercise the office of attorney, 
within the court wherein you may practice, according 
to the best of your learning and discretion, and with 
fidelity, as well to the court as to your client, so 
help you God. 
J. S. App. , p. 44. 
7. Because the commissioner's oath 1s an oath to "support 
the constitution of the United States, and the constitution of 
Connecticut, so long as you continue to be a citizen thereof" 
[emphasis added], appellant could not of course take the oath 
as prescribed. To the extent that the oath reiterates Rule 8(l)'s 
citizenship requirement, it shares the same constitutional 
*'•'(•be defects when required of prospective members of the bar. 
3. 
4. 
8. We find no merit in the contention that only citizens 
can in good conscience take an oath to support the Constitution. 
We note that all persons inducted into the armed services, including 
resident aliens, are required by 10 U.S. C. 502 to take the 
following oath: 
"I, - , to solemnly swear (or 
affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution 
of the United States against all enemies, foreign and 
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance 
to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the 
President of the United States and the orders of the 
officers appointed over me, according to regulations 
and the llJodac Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
So help me God. " 
If aliens can take this oath when the nation is making use of their 
services in the national defense, .• - ; 1.1.1 1.4. * ·:. resident alient 
applicants for admission to the bar can sur ly not be precluded, 
as a class, from taking an oath to support the Constitution, on 
the theory they cannot take the oath in good faith. 
i 9. Appellee's Brief, pp. 20-21 (citing, e. g., Doolittle 











Rider A, p. 4b Griffiths (2/17/73) 
II. 
We hold that the committee, acting on behalf of the state, has 
not carried its heavy burden of justification. The state's ultimate interest 
here implicated is to assure the requisite qualifications of persons licensed 
to practice law. It is undisputed that a state has a legitimate and sub-
stantial interest in determining whether an applicant possesses "the character 
and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor at law." Law 
a 
students Research Counsel v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159 (1970). See 
also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.s. 36, 40-41 (1961). But no question 
is raised in this case as to applicants' character or general fitness. Rather, 
the sole basis for disqualificatbn is her status as a resident alien. The 
committee defends Rule 8(1), requiring that applicants for admission to the 
bar be citizens of the United states, on the ground that the special role of 
'· 
' 
) the lawyer justifies excluding aliens from the practice of law. It is pointed 
out that in Connecticut the maxim that a lawyer is an "officer of the court" 
··' 
-2-
is given concrete meaning by a statute which makes every lawyer a 
"commissioner of the Superior Court." As such, a lawyer has authority 
to "sign writs and subpoenas, take recognizances, administer oaths and 
take depositions and acknowledgements of deeds." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-85. 
In the exercise of this authority, a Connecticut lawyer may command the 
assistance of a county sheriff or a town constable. Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 52-90. 
Beaause of these and other powers, it is noted that: 
"the courts not only demand their loyalty, con-
fidence and respect, but also require them to 
function in a manner which will foster public con-
fidence in the profession and, consequently, the 
judicial system." 162 Conn. at 262-263, 294 
A. 2d, at 287. 
The committee also emphasizes a citizen's undivided allegiance to 
this country and contrasts this with a resident alien's possible conflict of 
loyalties. From this, the committee concludes that a resident alien lawyer 
, I • 
.. 
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might in the exercise of his functions ignore his responsibilities to the 
courts - and even his clients - in favor of the interest of a foreign power. 
We find these arguments unconvincing. It in no way denigrates a 
lawyer's high responsibilities to observe that the powers "to sign writs 
and subpoenas, take recognizances, Lang? administer oaths" hardly in-
volve matters of state policy or acts of such extraordinary responsibility 
as to entrust them only to citizens. Nor do we think that the practice of 
law offers meaningful opportunities adversely to affect the interest of the 
United States. Certainly the committee has failed to show the relevance 
of citizenship to any likelihood that a lawyer will fail to protect faithfully 
the interest of his clients. 
It is settled doctrine that a state's requirements for admission to 
the bar are subject to constitutional constraints. 
"A State can require high standards of qualifi-
cation, such as good moral character or pro-
ficiency in its law, before it admits an appli-
cant to the bar, but any qualification must have 
a rational connection with the applicant's fitness 
-4-
or capacity to practice law. Douglas v. Noble, 
261 U.S. 165; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 
277, 319-320. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 
U.s. 502. Obviously an applicant could not be 
excluded merely because he was a Republican 
or a Negro or a member of a particular church. 
Even in applying permissible standards, officers 
of a State cannot exclude an applicant when there 
is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet 
these standards, or when their action is in-
vidiously discriminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356." Schware 'V. Board of Bar Examiners, 
353 u.s. 232, 239 (1956): 
And at least since Graham v. Richardson, supra, a classif~ation directed 
against aliens is a suspect one, imposing upon the state the heavy burden 
of justification mentioned above. Acknowledging, as we have, that a state 
does have a substantial interest in the qualifications of those admitted to 
the practice of law, the arguments advanced by the committee fall short 
of showing that the classification established by Rule 8(1) of the Connecticut 
Practice Book (1963) is reasonably necessary to the promoting or safeguard-
ing of this interest. There is certainly no justification for a broad proscrip-
tion against all resident aliens with no effort being required to distinguish 
the qualified from the unqualified. Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge 
-5-
on a case-by-case basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law. 
Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training and familiarity 
with Connecticut law. Apart from such tests of competence, it requires 
a new lawyer to take both an "attorney's oath" to perform his functions 
1.1 
faithfully and honestly~ and a "commissioner's oath" to "support the 
lv 
Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of Connecticut. ">IF 
Appellant has indicated her willingness and ability to subscribe to the 
~ 
substance of both oaths,'* and Connecticut may quite properly conduct a 
character investigation to insure in any given case "that an applicant is 
not one who 'swears to an oath pro forma while declaring or manifesting 
his disagreement with or indifference to the oath.' Bond v. Floyd, 385 
U.s. 116, 132." Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra, 
If 
401 U.S., at 164. Moreover, once admitted to the bar, lawyers are subject 
to continuing scrutiny by the organized bar and the courts. In addition 
to di.--~ipline for unprofessional conduct, the range of post-admission 
-6-
sanctions extends from judgments for contempt to criminal prosecutions 
;5 ... 
and disbarment. In sum, the Committee simply has not established that 
it must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order to windicate 
its undoubted interest in high professional standards. 
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Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 51-80 'l'llll fl!tdm .. :er IB Rpl,c, s (1) "'HI tit*"- - -
Wahljshcd jn 1 ~~~~ 4 ?~1i;pa<&~&1 ~f ~11i,qtHs, W~t~nli. i18, 11&3., 
. ( 
) 0kd ~ 4~~ Al. --lrrt 1-t.....c_ 
~-'L~  • _. , ..r" A .S.SOC.tc.t.fl~tl • 
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L t?at account refused to allow her to take the examina-
tion. She then sought .i udic.ial relief, asserting that the 
regulation was unconstitutional. Her claim was rejected 
first by the Superior Court and ultimately by the Con-
necticut Supreme Court. 162 Conll. 249, 294 A. 2d 281 
(1972). We noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U. S. 966 
L (1972~, al.ld.now hold ~hat th~ l'-9gtl:latioli unconstitution-ally d1scrunmates against resident aliens. a 
I 
We begin by sketching the background against which 
e State ~ar .Examining Committee~peHce ht'N\ at-
npts to .JUstify the total exclusion of aliens from the 
actice of law. 
From its inception , our nation welcomed and drew strength from 
the immigration of aliens. Their contributions to the social and 
~f-' ..,e-~. t 1-(. f; J.f ~L ~ 
economic life of the country were~ · 1 t be ells tt z W rszsicial 
du Y-t.# 1 u_._ ~~ ~ ~A.A-61.. I ~ ~H .. a.-~ 
•t!;tl5&1 tts ag . wt ttew Ons jpj' I. • Lis£ sp L it& 5 • ·o¢ 
J 
;; as tJ · a s tJ r I • u•• diut tt lg' I IF L 1 
"'~ .. ~~ tL J 
t:r1'- / 1..A lA.. 
·· the s a* 
18 7 l. .. 1-t..... 
4 ~"-4-.F .. 
1- t.L c .t· ~..., • I ~ 
;G._ ) ~ 
"in no sense depends on citizenship of the United 
States. It has not , as far as we know , ever been 
made in any State , or in any case , to depend on 
citizenship at all. Certainly many prominent and 
distinguished lawyers have been admitted to prac-
tice , both in the State and Federal courts, who were 
not citizens of the United States or of any State.~ 
Bradwell v. The State, 16 Wall. 130 , 139 (1872). -, 
~ 
(' ,Shortly thereafter, •••• in 1879, Connecticut established the pre-
decessor to its present rule totally excluding aliens from the practice 
of law. 162 Conn., at 253 , 294 A.2d, at 283. In subsequent - • 
3, Because we find that the rule denies equal 
protection , we do ntt reach appellant ' s other claims . 
4 . We do not,of course , rely on Bradwell to 
establish that admission to the bar may not be 
made to depend on citizenship . The holding of that 
case was simply that the right to practice law is 
not a "privilege or immunity" within the meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment . 
:.,,, 





decades, wide-ranging restrictions for the first time began to impair 
significantly the efforts of aliens to earn a livelihood in their chosen 
~s­
occupations. 
In the face of this trend, the Court nonetheless held in 1886 
that a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "person" within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment's directive that a State must not 
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, l18 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). The 
decision in Yick Wo invalidated a municipal ordinance regulating the 
operation of laundries on the ground that the ordinance was discrimina-
torily enforced against Chinese operators. Some years later, the 
Court struck down an Arizona statute requiring employers of more 
than five persons to emply at least 80% "qualified electors or native-
born citizens of the United States or some sub-division thereof." 
J ~ See J. Higham, Strangers in the Land 46, 161, 183 (2d ed. 1965). 
The full scale of restrictions imposed on the work opportunities of 
aliens in 1946 is shown by M. Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic in 




/ Truax v. Raich, 230 U. S. 33 (1915). As stated for the 
Court by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes: 
/ · " It requires no argument to show that the right to 
work for a living in the common occupations of the 
community is of the very essence of the personal 
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of 
the LFourteenth l Amendment to secure. [Citations 
.omitted.] If this could be refused solely upon the 
ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the 
denial of equal protection of the laws would be a 
barren form of words." 230 U. S., at 41. 
On similar reasoning, the Court ruled unconstitutional a 
California statute barring issuance of commercial fishing 
licenses to persons "ineligible to citizenship." Takahashi 
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To be sure, the cour:-:e of decisions protecting the em-
ployment rights of resident aliens has not been an un-
swerving one.6 In Clarke v. Dekebach, 274 U. S. 392 
(1927), the Court was faced with a challenge to a city 
ordinance prohibiting the issuance to aliens of licenses 
to operate pool and billiard rooms. Characterizing the 
business as one having "harmful and vicious tendencies," 
the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the 
ordinance: 
"It was competent for the city to make such a 
choice, not shown to be irrational, by excluding from 
the conduct of a dubious business an entire class 1 
rather than its objectionable members selected by \ 
more empirical methods." 274 U, S., at 397. 
This easily expandable proposition supported discrimina- \ 
tion against resident aliens in a wide range of occupation@< 7 } 
But the doctrinal foundations of Clarke were under-
mined in Takahashi, where the Court stated that "the 
power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien 
inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits." 
334 U. S., at 420. In deed, -ilil~ll!l!-'!~1-!·[llllliil 
" [ C J lassifications based on alienage, like those based 
on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and 
subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class 
are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' 
'~eo nl~o People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. K 427, aff'd 
s.ub nom. Crane v. New York, 2;39 . S. 195 (1915); but see 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S{!!:.t 370 
7 /-GSce case~ collectrd at Notr, Constitutionality of R0~trirtions on 
Alirns' Right to Work , 57 Col. L. Rev. 1012, 1021-1023 (1957) 
(restriction~ ranging from thr vrnding of soft drink::> to the ::;elling 
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minority [see United Slates v. Carolene Products 
Co ., 304 U. S. 144, 152- 153, n. 4 (1938)] for whom 
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." 
Graham, v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 372. (Foot-
notes omitted.)G>-f1f 
The Court has collsistently emphasized that a State 
which adopts a suspect classification "bears a heavy 
burden of justification," McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 
184, 196 ( 1964) , a burden which, though variously for-
mulated, requires the State to meet certain standards of 
proof. In order to justify the usc of a suspect classifica-
tion, a State must show that its ~urpose or interest is 
both constitutionally permissible 7 and substantial~ and 
that its usc of the classification is "necessary to the ac-
complishment" of its purposef or the safeguarding of its 
interest. J II 
Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support 
the economy, serve in the armed forces, and cort: ribute 
in myriad other ways to our society, It is Plally 
a_ 
appropriate that a State bear ~ heavy • burden when 
it deprives 
! -t~e;M I ....... -. .. .-z.t-..- of employment opportunities. 
II 
We hold that the Committee, acting· on behalf of th 
State, has not carried its ur en• ...... iiiiiiiiit:GL:" 
The State's ultimate intere t here implicated is to assure 
the requisite qualifications of persons licensed to practice 
'i (-Q\lllwugh alienagr is gcnrrally rquatcd with race as a supsec t 
dassifirat ion, we did not drcidr in Graham nor do we deride here 
wlwlhcr there might be circumstances, such as armed hostilities be-
tween the U11ited State~ and the country of which an alien is a 
citizen, in whieh alienage would not be suspect. 'f (~isrrimination or segrcgat ion for it:,; own sake i>:> not , of course, 
a constitutionnll~· pcrmi,Hible purpose. E. g., Brown v. Board of 
Edutation, 3-!7 U.S. -!8:~, -!95 (1954); liicLaughlin v. Florida, supra. 
/0 1-!J!;he ::;tate interc>:>t required has been characterized as " ol'erricling," 
lt1 cLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S., at 196; Loving v. Viroinia, .3R8 
U. S. 1, 11 (1967), "comprlling," Graham v. Richardsou, 40:3 U.S., 
at :375, "important," Dunn v. Blu111stein, 405 U. S. 3:30, .34:3 (1972), 
or ":mbslantial," ibid. We atlribntc no particular significance to 
the:,;c varia! ion~ in die I ion. 
f ( f---:!;>!1 cLaughlin v. Flor·ida, 379 U. S., at 196; Loving v. Virginia, 388 
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cv•< du t!,.o(ly e f'M ,'t;.s 1 b / 
t ~ ~ It is undisputed that a State has a~-·--ra:mr--"""""-----.~i~ 
substantial interest in determining whether an applicant 
I possesses "the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor at law." Law Students Re-
search Council v. TVadmond, 401 U. S. 154, 159 (1970). 
See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U. S. 36, 40--41 
(1961); Schware v. Board of Bar Examine1's, 353 U. S. 
232, 2SO (1056)0 But no question is raised in this case 
as to appellant's character or general fitness. Rather, 
the sole basis for disqualification is her status as a resi-
dent alien. 
The Committee defends Rule 8 (I)'s requirement that 
applicants for admission to the bar be citizens of the 
United States on the ground that the special role of 
the lawyer justifies excluding aliens from the practice 
of law. In Connecticut, the Committee points out, the 
maxim that a lawyer is an "officer of the court" is given 
concrete meaning by a. statute \vhich makes every lawyer 
a "commissioner of the Superior Court." As such, a 
lawyer has authority to "sign writs and subpoenas, take 
recognizances, administer oaths and take depositions and 
acknowledgements of deeds." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-85. 
f ~ ~ ]lprllant denies that thi::; was indrrd the Statr'H purpose in 
rr~;.ing citizenship for thr practice of !ttw, noting that f'it izen~hip 
is also rrquirrd of prnctitionrrs in othrr firlds, including hairdressers 
and cosmrtieians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-250, architcctH, Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 20-201, and sanitarinns, Conn. Orn. Stat. § 20-:361. Brcause 
we di~pose of the ca!:ic on other ground::;, we do noL consider this 
claim. 
f '3 ~n this connection, l\Ir. Justice Frnnkfurter wrote: 
"From a profrs!:'ional chargrcl with such rrsponsibilitie~ there must 
be exactrd thoc;r qualitieH of truth-spraking, of a high ::;en:-;e of honor, 
of grnnite di:-;crrtion, of the "trictest ob:<ervancr of fiduciar~ · rrspon-
sibility, that luwe, throughout the centurir~<, bren comprndiou::;J~· de-
srribrd as 'moral charactrr.'" Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 
353 U. S. 232, 247 (1957) (concurring opinion), 
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In the exercise of this authority, a Connecticut lawyer 
may command the assistance of a county sheriff or a town 
constable. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-90. Because of these 
and other powers, the Connecticut Supreme Court com-
mented that: 
"the courts not only demand [lawyers'] loyalty, con-
fidence and respect, but also require them to func-
tion in a manner which will foster public confidence 
in the profession and , consequently, the judicial sys-
tem." 162 Conn., at 262- 263, 294 A. 2d, at 287. 
In order to establish a link between citizenship and the 
powers and responsibilities of the lawyer in Conneeticut, 
the Committee contrasts a citizen's undivided allegiance 
to this country with a resident alien's possible conflict 
of loyalties. From this, the Committee concludes that a 
resident alien lawyer might in the exercise of his func-
tions ignore his responsibilities to the courts or even his p 
clients in favor of the interest of a foreign power.e St. t: ' ~ 
vVe find these arguments unconvincing. It in no way 
denigrates a lawyer's high responsibilities to observe that 
i"t'1l-HH''Ht"l.rti' frequen1ly reprrsent foreign count ric~ and the na-
of such countrirs in litigation in thr courts of the United 
Statrs, a::; wrll as in othrr mattrrs in this count r)·. In Huch rC'j)rC'::;C'n-
tation , the duty of the · . , su J<'C o m; roC' as an "ofwC'l' o 
lhC' court," is to fmtllC'r the intrre~ts of hi~ dirnts by all lawful 
means, C'VC'll wbrn those interC'st~ arc in conflict " ·ith 111C' intC'rest;; 
of thC' l JnitC'd States or of a State. But this reprrsentation im·oh·es 
i1o conflict of intNC'st in the itwidions l:iC'I1SC'. RatllC'r, it casts ihc 
· in his 10norC'd and traditional rolco a::; an aut10rizrd but 
indC'pC'nclent agrnt acting to vindieatC' thr legal rights of a client, 
whoever it may br. It is conceintblr th:tt an alien licensed to prac-
tice law in ibis countr)· could find himself in a position where he 
might. be callrd upon to represent his countr)· of citizenship against 
thr United States in r·ircumsUtnceH where there mny be a conflict 
hetweC'n hi,; obligation~ to the two <'otmlric~. Tn Hurh ran' ~ituationH, 
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the powers "to sign writs and subpoenas, take recogni-
zances, [and] administer oaths" hardly involve matters 
of state policy or acts of such unique re ponsibility as 
to rntrust them only to citizrns. Nor do we think that 
tlw practice of law offrrs mraningfu l opportunities ad-
versely to affect the iiJteresL of the United 8tatcs. Cer-
tainly the Committee has failed to show the relevance of 
citizenship to any likelihood that a lawyer\'Uil fail to pro-
tect faithfully the interest of his clients. 'F' 
Nor would the possibility that some resident aliens are 
unsuited to the practice of law be a justification for 
a wholesale ban. 
"Even in applying permissible standards, officers of 
a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no 
basis for their finding that he fails to meet these 
standards, or when their action is invidiously dis-
criminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S, 
356." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 
U. S., at 239. 
This constitutional warning is especially salient where, 
as here, a State's bar admission standards make explil/t 
use of a suspect classification. Although, as we have 
acknowledged, a State doc have a substantial interest 
in the qualifications of those admitted to the practice o£ 
law, the arguments advanced by the Committee fall short 
of showing that the classification established by Rule 
8 (1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963) is neces-
sary to the promoting or safeguarding of this interest, 
Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge on a case-by-
case basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law. 
Connecticut can, and docs, require appropriate training 
and familiarity with Connecticut law. Apart from such 
tests of competence, it requires a new lawyer to take both 
an "attorney's oath" to perform his functions faithfully 
71-1336-0PINION 
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and honestl a a "commissioner's oath" to "suppor.t 
the Constitution of ~ United States, and the Constitu-
tion of ConnectiCut.'h f Appellant has indicated her will-
ingness and ability to subscribe to the substance of both 
oath(!i> and Connecticut may quite properly conduct a 
character investigation to insure in any given case "that 
an applicant is not one who 'swears to an oath pro fornia 
while declaring or manifesting his disagreement wiLh or 
indifference to the oath.' Bond v. Floyd, :385 U. S. 116, 
132." Law Students ~earch Council v. Wadmond, 
sup!·a, 4oi U. $., at 164. " Moreover, once admitted t 
t\"v 1 p;!l'e information therrof to the judge;;, or one of them, that it 
may be rrformed; you will not wittingly, or willinp;ly promote, Hue 
or etnl~e to be ~ued, any fnl~e or unlawful suit, or gi1·e aid, or con-
sent , to the ;;a me; you will drlay no man for lucre or malice; buL 
will exerri~e the office of attorney, within the court 11·herrin ) ' 011 may 
practice, according to the be~t of your learning nncl cli;;cn't ion , and 
with ficlrlity, a:; well to the court a:; to your client , ::;o help you God." 
J. S. A)). ). 44. 
1.r f-<!J?!he text of the attorney'R ortthH iH as followR: 
"You o;olemnly ~wear that you will do no falsehood, nor con;;ent to 
~to be clone in court, nnd, if ~·o u know of any to be done, you~. 
'' ~rhere i;; no que;;tion a::; to the Yalidit~ · of requiring an applicant, 
as a precondition to admisHion to the hnr, to take such an oath. 
Law Students Research Council \'. TT'admond, supra, at 161- 16-1. 
11 ~Because thr commi~sionrr'H oath is an oath to "support the 
constitution of the United Rtates, and the constitution of Con-
nrcticut, so long as you continue to be a titizen thereof" (emphasis 
addrcl), appellant could not of coursr take thr oath a~ prescribed. 
To the extrnt that the oath reiterateH Hulc 8 (1)'~ citiz('nship re-
quirement, it sharer:; the ~:>ame com;titutional clcfeets when required of 
prospective members of tho bar. 
I t ~We find no merit in the contention that only citizens can in r;;;cl con~cienc(' take an oath to ~upport the Constitutwn. We note 
that all persons incluetecl into the armed sen·ices, including resident 
aliens, arc re(Juirecl by 10 U. S. C. § .502 to take the followinp; oath: 
"I, , do solemnly swear (or nffirm) that I will 
support nnd defend the Constitution of the United Rtat<'s ag~1inst 
all enemies, foreign and dome;; tic ; that I will bear true faith and 
71-1336-0PINION 
10 APPLICATION OF GRIFFITHS 
the bar, lawyers arc subject to continuing scrutiny by 
the organized bar and the courts. In addition to dis-
cipline for unprofessional conduct, the range of post-
admission sanctions extends from judgments for con-
1 tempt to criminal prosecutions and disbarmenB' In I Cf 
sum, the Committee simply has not established that it 
must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order 
to vindicate its undoubted interest in high professional 
standard~ 
III 
In its brief, the Examining Committee makes another, 
different argument in support of Rule 8 (I). Its 
thrust is not that resident aliens lack the attributes neces-
sary to maintain high standards in the legal profession, 
allrgiancP to thr ~mnr; and that I will ohr)' ihe ordrrs of the Prrsi-
drnt of tht' Unitrd SUttrs and thr orciN~ of ihc officrr~ nppoinied 
over mr, according to rrgulatiom; and the Uniform Codr of l\Iilitary 
.lustier. So help me God." 
If nlirns can take this oath when the Nation iH making uo;r of their 
srrYicrs in the national dcfrm;r, rr~idrnt alirn applic:tnts for ndmis-
sion to the bnr surrly can not be prrclndrd, as a elass, from taking 
an oath to Hnpport the Constitution on the theory thry cannot take 
thr oath in good faith. 
~rr, e. g., Doolittle v. Clark, ·17 Conn. 316 (1il79). Apart from 
tlw courtH, the profrs~ion itHclf has long subjected its mrmbrrs to 
discipline unclrr codes or cannons of prol'rs~ional rthic·s. A:-; C':11'1)· aH 
1908 thr Americ:m Bar A~sociation adopted 32 Canons of Profrs-
sional Ethics. In 1970, following several year~ of st nd)· and rr-
rxamination, the House of Drlegatrs of the AmNican Bar A~socia­
iion approved a new Code of Profrssional Hesponsibilit)·, which pro-
vides detailed rthical presrript ions as well a~ comprehensive code of 
disriplinar·y rules. The ABA Code of Profr~sional Rr,-p<msibilit)' has 
e~incr brrn appro\·rd or ncloptrcl in -States, including Connecticut. 
R orts of the American Bar Association, YO!. 97 (1972) p. -. 
Nothing in our rule~ prohibits from aclmis~ion to pr:1cticr in 
C'ourt rrsidrnt alirns who havr bern admitted to pmctirc "for 
thrrr )·ears pm;t in the highrHt court of a State, Trrritory, District, 
Commonwralth, or Pos~rssion" and whose " private and profe~~ional 
chn.r:wtrn.; shall appear to be good." Rule 5, Rules of the Supreme 
Court of the United States ( 1970). 
\ 
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/ but rather that lawyers must be citizens almost as a mat-
ter of definition. The implication of this analysis is 
that exclusion of aliens from the legal profession is not 
subject to any scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
The argument builds upon the exclusion of aliens from 
the franchise in all 50 States and their disqualification 
under the Constitution from holding office as President, 
Art. 2, ~ 1, cl. 4, or as a member of the House of Rep-
( 
resentatives, Art. 1, ~ 2, cl. 2, or of the Senate, Art. 1, 
§ 3, cl. 3. These and ·myriad"" other federal and statutory 
- and constitutional provisions reflect, the Committee con-
tends, a pervasive recognition that "participation ~tbe 
government structure as voters and office holders" is 
inescapably an aspect of citizenship. Appellee's Brief, ---
~ 
~~~red in support of the claim that the lawyer is an 
'office holder" in this sense is an enhanced version of 
the proposition, disoossecl above, that he is an "officer 
of the court." Specifically, the Committee states that 
the lawyer "is an officer of the court who acts by and 
;vith the authority of the state" and is entrusted with the 
"exercise of actual government power." Appellee's Brief, 
p. 5. 
We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond 
the opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which 
recognized that a lawyer is not an officer in the ordinary 
sense. 162 Conn., at 254; 294 A. 2d, at 283. This com-
ports with the view of tho Court expressed by Mr. Jus-
tice Black in Cammer v. United States, 350 U. S. 399 
(1956): 
"It has been stated n1any times that lawyers are 
'officers of the court.' One of the most frequently 
repeated statements to this effect appears in Ex parte 
Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378. The Court pointed out 
there, however, that an attorney was not an 'officer' 
I II'\ 7 
12 
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within the ordinary meaning of that term. Cer-
tainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland or 
in any other case decided by this Court places attor-
neys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs, court 
clerks or j udgcs. Unlike these officials a lawyer is 
engaged in a private profession, important though 
it be to our system of justice. In general he makes 
his own decisions, follows his own best judgment, 
collects his own fees and runs his own business. The 
word 'officer' as it has always been applied to lawyers 
conveys a different meaning from the word 'officer' 
as applied to people serving as officers within the 
conventional meaning of that term." (Footnote 
omitted.) 350 U. S., at 405. 
Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions of 
responsibility and influence that impose on them duties 
correlative with their vital right of access to the courts. 
Moreover, by virtue of their professional aptitudes and· 
natural interests, lawyers have been leaders in govern-
ment throughout the history of our country. Yet, they 
are not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers. 
Nor docs the status of holding a license to practice law 
place one so close to the core of the political proc~ 
to make him a formulator of government polic~ ( ~/ 
We hold that § 8 (1) violates the Equal Protection 
'# d-f"'-.,.C"'l~au~s~<e The j udgmcnt of the Connecticut Supreme 
Court is reversed, and the case is rcm.anded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
~ ( l--t!'J).3ecnuse thr Committee has failed to establish that the lawyer 
{ is-;n "office holdrr," we nred not and do not decide whrt her there is 
merit in the genrral argument and, if so, to what offices it would 
ap )ly . 
._~.,-0,~n a thought fnl opinion, the Cnlifornin Supreme Court unani-
mously drrlarrd nmonstitutional a similar California rulr. Raffarlli 
v. Co111mitter of Bar E:wminers, - Cal. 3d -, 496 P. 2d 1264, 
101 Cal. Rptr. R96 (1972), Sec also Application of Park, 484 P. 2d 
690 (Alaska 1971) . 
·-
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 71-1336 
In re Application of Fre Le Poole j On Appeal from the 
Griffiths for Admission to Supreme Court of 
the Bar, Appellant. Connecticut. 
[February -, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This case presents a novel question as to the con-
straints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment on the qualifications which a 
State may require for admission to the bar. Appellant, 
Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands, came 
to the United States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In 
1967, she married a citizen of the United States and be-
came a resident of Connecticut.' After her graduation 
from law school, she applied in 1970 for permission to 
take the Connecticut bar examination. The bar associa-
tion found her qualified in all respects save that she was 
not a citizen of the United States, as required by Rule 
8 (1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963),~ and on 
1 Apprllanl is rl igible for naturalization by rrason of her marriage 
to a citizen of the United States and rr,.;idrner in thr United States 
for more than three years, 8 U. S. C. § 1-+30 (a). She ha;.; not filed 
a declaration of intention to become a eitizru of the United States, 
8 U. S. C. § 1445 (f), and has no prrsrnt intention of doing ~o . 
Appellant's Brief, p. 4. In order to become a cit izrn, apprllant 
would be rrquirrcl to renounce her citizenHhip of the Ndherlunds. 
8 U.S. C. § 1448 (a). 
2 The rules arc promulgated by thr juclgr:-; of the Suprrior Court. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 51-80. The prcdccr~sor to Rule 8 (1) was first 
established in 1879. Application of Griffiths, 162 Conn. 249, 253, 
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that account refu8cd to allow her to take the examina-
tion. She then sought judicial relief, asserting that the 
regulation was unconstitutional. Tier claim was rejected 
first by the Superior Court ancl ulLimately by the Con-
necticut Supreme Court. 162 Conu. 249, 294 A. 2d 281 
(1972). We noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U. S. 966 
( 1972), and now hold that the regulation unconstitution-
ally discriminates against resident aliens.3 
I 
We begin by sketching the background against which 
the State Bar Examining Committee, appellee here, at-
tempts to justify the total exclusion of aliens from the 
practice of law. It has long been established that the 
national Government has "broad constitutional powers 
in determining what aliens shall be admitted to the 
United States, the period they may remain, [and as to 
the l regulation of their conduct before naturaliz~­
tion .... " Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 
U. S. 410, 419 (1948); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 
66 (1941); Fang Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 
(1893). But a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "per-
son" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
directive that a State must not "deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
294 A. 2d 281, 283 (1972). Before that time, aliens wrrr nppnrently 
admiltrd to practice on the :same basi::; a::; citizrn::;, both in Connrcti-
cut and d~rwhen.>. In 1872 thi::; Court ~;tatrd in anothr1' context 
that the right of admis~ion to practice in the court:; of a State 
"in no Hrnse drpendH on cit izen:ship of lhr United Slatrs. It ha~ not, 
as far as wr know, evrr been made in any State, or in any casr, to 
deprncl on eilizenship at all. Crrtainly many prominrnt nncl dis-
tinguished lawyrrs have bern admittrd to practicr, both in the 
State and Federal court~. who wrrc not citizpn~; of the Unitrcl States 
or of any State." Bradwell v. The State, 16 Wall. 1:30, 1:~9 (1872). 
3 Becau8r we find that the rule denie~; equal protection, we do not 
reach appellant's other claims. 
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E. g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886). 
Indeed, it is now settled law that a resident alien is in 
most respects a full member of our society subject to 
duties as well as being entitled to most of the rights of 
citizenship. As noted in Graham v. Richardson, 400 
U. S. 363, 376 (1971), aliens pay taxes, contribute to the 
economy, may serve i11 the armed forces, and may well 
be long-term residents. 
The gelleral principles with respect to the rights of 
resident aliens under the Equal Protection Clause have 
found application in a number of cases involving state 
laws interfering with the efforts of resident aliens to 
earn a livelihood. In Yick Wo v. Hopkin.~, supra, this 
Court invalidated a municipal ordinance regulating the 
operation of laundries on the ground that the ordinance 
was discriminatorily enforced against Chinese operators. 
Several decades later, the Court struck dovvn an Arizona 
statute which required employers of more than five per-
sons to employ 80;/'( "qualified electors or native-born 
citizens of the United States or some sub-division thereof." 
Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915). As stated for the 
Court by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes: 
"It requires no argument to show that the right to 
work for a living in the common occupations of the 
community is of the very essence of the personal 
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of 
the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure. [Citations 
omitted.] If this could be refused solely upon the 
ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the 
denial of equal protection of the laws would be a 
barren form of words." 239 U. S., at 41. 
On similar reasoning, the Court ruled unconstitutional a 
California statute barring issuance of commercial fishing 
licenses to persons "ineligible to citizenship." Takahashi 
v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U. S. 410 (1948). 
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To be sure, the course of decisions protecting the em-
ployment rights of resident aliens has not been an un-
swerving one.~ In Clarke v. Dekebach, 274 U. S. 392 
(1927), the Court was faced with a challenge to a city 
ordinance prohibiting the issuance to aliens of licenses 
to operate pool and billiard rooms. Characterizing the 
business as one having "harmful and vicious tendencies," 
the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the 
ordinance: 
"It was competent for the city to make such a 
choice, not shown to be irrational, by excluding from 
the conduct of a dubious business an entire class 
rather than its objectionable members selected by 
more empirical methods." 274 U. S., at 397. 
This easily expandable proposition supported discrimina .. 
tion against resident aliens in a wide range of occupations." 
But the doctrinal foundations of Clarke were under-
mined in Takahashi, where the Court stated that "the 
power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien 
inhabitants as a class is confined wiLhin narrow limits." 
334 U. S., at 420. Indeed, subsequent decisions have 
moved even further in requiring "empirical methods," 
holding· that: 
" [ C] lassifications based on alienage, like those based 
on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and 
subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class 
are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' 
4 Sec al~o Prople v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427, aff'd 
sub nom. Crane v. New York , 239 U. S. 195 (1915); but sec 
Graham v. Richardson, 40:3 U. S., at 374. 
"Sec ca:<es collected at Note, Constitutionality of Rr:<trietions on 
Alirns' Hight to Work, 57 Col. L. Hcv. 1012, 1021-1023 (1957) 
(restrict iom; rungi11g from the vrnding of >:o ft drink:; to the srlling 
of lightniug rod~). The full :::calr of rrstridion:-: imposrd on the 
work opportunitirs of aliens in 19~6 is ~hown by 1\I. Kom·itz, The 
Alien and the Asiatic in American Law 190-211 (1946). 
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minority [see United States v. Carolene Products 
Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938)] for whom 
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." 
Graharn v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 372. (Foot-
notes omitted.) a 
The Court has consistently emphasized that a State 
which adopts a suspect classification "bears a heavy 
burden of justification," McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 
184, 196 (1964), a burden which, though variously for-
mulated, requires the State to meet certain standards of 
proof. In order to justify the use of a suspect classifica-
tion, a State must show that its purpose or interest is 
both constitutionally permissible 7 and substantial/ and 
that its use of the classification is "necessary to the ac-
complishment" of its purpose u or the safeguarding: of its 
interest. 
II 
We hold that the Committee, acting on behalf of the 
State, has not carried its heavy burden of justification. 
The State's ultimate interest here implicated is to assure 
the requisite qualifications of persons licensed to practice 
u Although alienage is generally equated with race as a supsect 
classification, we did not decide in Graham nor do we decide hero 
whether there might be circumstances, such as armed hostilities be-
tween tho United StatoH and the country of which an alien is a 
citizen, in which alienage would not be suspect. 
7 Discrimination or segregation for its own sake is not, of course, 
a constitutionally permissible pnrposr. E. g., Brown v. Board of 
Education, 847 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); McLaughlin v. Florida, supra. 
8 Tho state intoreHt rC'quirC'd has bC'en characterized as "overriding," 
McLaughlin v. Ji'lorida, 379 U. S., at 196; Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 11 (1967), "compelling," Graham v. Richardson, 408 U.S., 
at 375, "important," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, :343 (1972), 
or ·'substantial," ibid. We attribute no particular significance to 
thC'sc variations in diction. 
u McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S., at 196; Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U. S., at 11. 
71-1336-0PINION 
6 APPLICATION OF GRIFFITHS , · ·6A 
ConS t-,•fvftol'l.:.lfl p~rY"'tJ.Sf e. 
law.10 It is undisputed that a State has a and 
substantial interest in determining whether an applicant 
possesses "the character and general fitness requisite for 
an attorney and counselor at law." Law Students Re-
search Council v. TVadmo11d, 401 U. S. 154. 159 (Hl70). 
See also Konigsberg v. Stale Bar, 366 U. S. 36, 40-41 
(1961); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 
232, 239 (1956)." But no question is raised in this case 
as to appellant's character or general fitness. Rather, 
the sole basis for disqualification is her status as a resi~ 
dent alien. 
The Committee defends Rule 8 ( 1) 's requirement that 
applicants for admission to the bar be citizens of the 
United States on the ground that the special role of 
the lawyer justifies excluding aliens from the practice 
of law. In Connecticut, the Committee points out, the 
maxim that a lawyer is an "officer of the court" is given 
concrete meaning by a statute which makes every lawyer 
a "commissio11er of the Superior Court." As such, a 
lawyer has authority to "sign writs and suhpoenas, take 
recognizances, administer oaths and take depositions and 
acknowledgements of deeds." Conn. Gen. Stat. ~ 51-85. 
10 Appellant drnir~ that thi::; wa~ indrrd thr Statr'::; purpo~r in 
rrquiring eitizrn::;hip for thr practirr of Jaw, noting that c·itizrn;;hip 
18 also rrquirrd of prnctit ionrr~ in othrr firld~, inrlnding ha irclressers 
and co::;mrticiam.;, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-250, architrct~, Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 20-291, and ~anitarian::;, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-:3Gl. Because 
we di~po~e of the cm;e on other groundH, we do not con~ider this 
claim. 
11 In thi8 connection, l\Ir. Justice Frankfurter wrote: 
"From a profr~~ional chargrd with ::;uch rc·Hpon~ibil it ir~ t ilrrr must 
be exactrd those qualitirs of truth-sprnking, of a high srn~r of honor, 
of granite di~crrtion , of the ~tricte;;t obsrrvame of fiduciar:-· respon-
sibility, that ha,·e. 1lwoughout the rentmirs, bern eomprndiou~l:-· de-
scribed a~ 'moral character.'" Schu•w·r v. Board of Bar E.raminrrs, 
353 U. S. 2:32, 247 ( 1957) (concurring opinion). 
·' 
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In the exercise of this authority, a Connecticut lawyer 
may command the assistance of a county sheriff or a town 
constable. Conn. Gen. Stat. ~ 52-90. Because of these 
and other powers, the Connecticut Supreme Court com-
mented that: 
"the courts not only demand [lawyers'] loyalty, con-
fidence and respect, but also require them to func-
tion in a manner which will foster public confidence 
in' the profession and, consequently, the judicial sys-
tem." 162 Conn., at 262- 263, 294 A. 2d, at 287. 
In order to establish a link between citizenship and the 
powers and responsibilities of the lawyer in Connecticut, 
the Committee contrasts a citizen's undivided allegiance 
to this country with a resident alien's possible conflict 
of loyalties. From this, the Committee concludes that a 
resident alien lawyer might in the exercise of his func-
tions ignore his responsibilities to the courts or even his 
clients in favor of the interest of a foreign powB ( 5 E E P. ~ 
\Ve find these arguments unconvincing. It in no way 
denigrates a lawyer's high responsibilities to observe that 
' 2 Attorneys frequently reprc~cnt foreign count rics and the na-
tionals of ~;u ch countries in litigation in the court" of the United 
States, as well as in other matters in thi~ country. In such rcprcsrn-
tation, tho duty of the attorney, :,;ubject to his role as an "officer of 
the court," i~ to further the intC'rcst::; of his rlicnt s b~ · all lawful 
mC'ans, even wllC'n tho~C' interest,; arc in <'onflict with the interest~ 
of the United States or of a State. But this I'C']li'CHCntation in1·olves 
no conflict of interest in the iiwidious sense. Rather, it casts tho 
r1tto rne~· in hi,; honored and traditional role as nn nuthorir.ccl but 
independent agent acting to vindicate the legal rights of a cliC'nt, 
whoever it may be. It is conceivable that ;~n alien li!'cnscd to prac-
tice law i'n this country could find himself in n position wh(•re he 
might be called upon to represent his countr~· of cit izcnship agnin8t 
the United Stiltcs in circumstance~ when• there may be a conflict 
between hi" obligation:-; to the two count ric;;. In ;;uch rarr situations, 
an honorable person, whether an aliC'n or not , would decline tho 
rcpre~C'ntation. 
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the powers "to sign writs and subpoenas, take recogn!-:. 
zances, [and] administer oaths" hardly involve matters 
of state policy or acts of such unique responsibility as 
to entrust them only to citizens. Nor do we think that 
the practice of law offers meaningful opportunities ad"' 
versely to affect the interest of the United States. Cer-
tainly the Committee has failed to show the relevance of 
citizenship to any likelihood that a lawyer will fail to pro-
tect faithfully the interest of his clients. 1 ~ 
Nor would the possibility that some resident aliens are 
unsuited to the practice of law be a justification for 
a wholesale ban. 
"Even in applying permissible standards, officers of 
a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no 
basis for their finding that he fails to meet these 
standards, or when their action is invidiously dis-
criminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 
356." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 
U. S., at 239. 
This constitutional warning is especially salient where, 
as here, a State's bar admission standards 1nakc expliict 
use of a suspect classification. Although, as we have 
acknowledged, a State doe have a substantial interest 
in the qualifications of those admitted to the practice of 
law, the arguments advanced by the Committee fall short 
of showing that the classification established by Rule 
8 (1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963) is neces-
sary to the promoting or safeguarding of this interest. 
Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge on a case-by-
case basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law. 
Connecticut can, and docs, require appropriate training 
and familiarity with Connecticut law. Apart from such 
tests of c01npetence, it requires a new lawyer to take both 
an "attorney's oath" to perform his functions faithfully 
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and honestly 13 and a "commissioner's oath" to "support 
the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitu-
-tion of Connecticut." ll Appellant has indicated her will-
ingness and ability to subscribe to the substance of both 
oaths,[" an.d Connecticut may quite properly conduct a 
character investigation to insure in any given case "that 
an applicant is not one who 'swears to an oath pro forma 
while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or 
indifference to the oath.' Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116, 
132." Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 
supra, 401 U. S., at 164. w Moreover once admitted to 
will give information thereof to tho judp;os, or one of t 1em, t 1a 1L 
may be reformod; you will not willingly, or willing!~· promoto, sue 
or cau~e to be sued, any faloe or unlawful suit, or givo aid, or ron-
sent, to the same; you will delay no man for lucre or malice; buL 
will exorrio:e the office of attorney, within the court whNoin you may 
practiro, according to the be;;t of your loarning and diorrotion, :md 
with fiddity, as well to the court as to your client, so help you God." 
J. S. App., p. 44. 
13 The toxt of the attorney's oaths is as follows: 
"You solemnly swear that you will do no fabchood, nor ronsont to 
any to be clone in court, and, if you know of any to bo done, you~ 
1 '1 There is no qneotion as to the validity of requiring an applicant, 
as a precondition to admi~~ion to the bar, to take such an oath. 
Law Students Research Council v. ll'admond, supra, at 161-164. 
15 Bocau~e the rommisHionor's oath iH an oath to "support the 
con::;titution of the Unitod Stato;.;, and the conHtitution of Con-
necticut, so long as you continue to be a citizen thereof" (rmphasis 
addrd), appellant could not of course takr the oath ns prescribed. 
To tho rxtenL that the oath rritrratrs Hule 8 (I)'s citizenship re-
quirement, it shares the same constitutional defects when required of 
proHpect i vr members of the bar. 
w We find no meriL in tho contention that only citizons can in 
p;ood consrirnrr take an oath to support thr Constitution. We note 
that all prrsons inducted into the armed srrYiros, including ro~idont 
alien~:~, are required by 10 U.S. C.§ 502 to take thr following oath: 
"I, , do solemnly ;;wear (or affirm) that I will 
support nnd defend the Cons tit ut ion of tho United States against 
all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and 
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the bar, lawyers are subject to continuing scrutiny by 
the organized bar and the courts. In addition to dis-
cipline for unprofessional conduct, the range of post-
admission sanctions extends from judgments for con-
tempt to criminal prosecutions and disbarment.' 7 In 
sum, the Committee simply has not established that it 
must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order 
to vindicate its undoubted interest in ]:ligh professio:(}al 
standards.18 
III 
In its brief, the Examining Committee makes another, 
quite different argument in support of Rule 8 (1). Its 
thrust is not that resident aliens lack t_hc attributes I1cces-
sary to maintain high standards in the legal profession, 
allegiance to thr samr; and that I will ober the orclrr~ of the Prrsi-
dent of the United States :mel the orders of the officer~ appointrd 
over me, according to rrgulations and the Uniform Code of Military 
.Ju~tice. So help me God." 
If aliens can taler thi~ oath whenihc Nation i~ making u;;e of their 
services in thr nationnl defense, rr~iclrnt alien applic:1nt~ for admis-
sion to the bar surely can not br prrcludcd, as a cla~~, from taking 
:Ul oath to support the Con~iitution on the throry thry cannot take 
the onth in good faith. 
17 Sec, e. g., Doolittle v. Cia1'k, 47 Conn. 816 (1870). Apart from 
the courts, the profeHHion it~elf has long ~ubjectcd its memberH to 
di~cipline under code~ or cannons of profes~ional ethics. A" rarly as 
1908 the American Bar Associntion adoptrd 32 Cnnon~ of Profc~­
;;ional Ethics. In 1970, following severn] )'Car~ of Rt ud~· n ncl re-
examination , the Hou;;r of Drlegnic~ of the American Bar As::;ocia-
tion approved a new Coclr of Profcs~ionnl H.rRponsibility, which pro-
vides drtailecl ci hical prescriptions as well :1s comprehensivr rode of 
disciplinary rules. The ABA Code of Profr~~ionnl Rr~pon::;ibil ii)' haH 
since been npprovrcl or acloptrd in- Stairs, including; C'onnrctirui. 
Reports of the American Bar A~~ociation, vol. 97 (1972) p. -. 
•s Nothing; in om rules prohibits from admission to practicr in 
this Court resident alirns who have brcn admiltrcl to prnctire "for 
ihrre years past in 1 he hig;hest court of a State, Territon·, Dist rici, 
Commonwealth, or Pos~rssion" and whose "private and profes;;ional 
character:,; shall ftppcnr to br good." Rule 5, Rulrs of the Supreme 
Court of the United States (1970). 
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but rather that lawyers must be citizens almof't as a mat-
ter of definition. The implication of this analysis is 
that exclusion of aliens from the legal profession is not 
subject to any scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
The argument builds upon the exclusion of aliens from 
the franchise in all 50 States and their disqualification 
under the Constitution from holding office as President, 
Art. 2, § 1, cl. 4, or as a member of the House of Rep-
resentatives, Art. 1, § 2, cl. 2, or of the Senate, Art. 1, 
§ 3, cl. 3. These and myriad other federal and statutory 
and constitutional provisions reflect, the Committee con-
t·encls, a pervasive recognition that "participation is the 
government structure as voters and office holders" is 
inescapably an aspect of citizenship. Appellee's Brief, 
~ q ::tiered in support of the claim that the lawyer is an 
"office holder" in this sense is an enhanced version of 
the proposition, discussed above, that he is an "officer 
of the court." Specifically, the Committee states that 
the lawyer "is an officer of the court who acts by and 
with the authority of the state" and is entrusted with the 
"exercise of actual government power." Appellee's Brief, 
p. 5. 
We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond 
the opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which 
recognized that a lawyer is not an officer in the ordinary 
sense. 162 Conn., at 254; 294 A. 2d, at 283. This com-
ports with the view of the Court expressed by Mr. Jus-
tice Black in Cammer v. United Stales, 350 U. S. 399 
(1956): 
"It has been stated many times that lawyers are 
'officers of the court.' One of the most frequently 
repeated statements to this effect appears in Ex parte 
Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378. The Court pointed out 
there, hO\Yever, that an attorney was not an 'officer' 
12 
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within the ordinary meaning of that term. Cer-
tainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland or 
in any other case decided by this Court places attor-
neys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs, court 
clerks or judges. Unlike these officials a lawyer is 
engaged in a private profession, important though 
. it be to our system of justice. In general he makes 
his own decisions, follows his own be.st judgment, 
collects his own fees and runs his own busil1ess. The 
word 'officer' as it has always been applied to lawyers 
conveys a different meaning from the word 'officer' 
as applied to people serving as officers within the 
conventional meaning of that term." (FoOtnote 
omitted.) 350 U. S., at 405. 
Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions of 
responsibility and influence that impose on them duties 
correlative with their vital right of access to the courts. 
Moreover, by virtue of their professional aptitudes and 
natural interests, lawyers have been leaders in govern~ 
ment throughout the history of our country. Yet, they 
are not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers. 
Nor docs the status of holding a license to practice law 
place one so close to the core of the political process as 
to make him a formulator of government policy.10 
We hold that ~ 8 (I) violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.20 The judgment of the Connecticut Supreme 
Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
10 Because the Committee has failed to establi~h that the lawyer 
is an "ofiicr holclrr," we need not and do not decide whet her there is 
merit in the general argument and, if so, to what offices it would 
apply. 
20 In a thoughtful opinion, the California Supreme Court unani-
mou~l)· drclarrd unconstitutional a similar California rule. Raffaelli 
v. Committee of Bar Examiners, - CaL ad -, 496 P. 2d 1264, 
101 Cal. H pt r. 896 ( 1972). Sec al~o Application of Park, 484 P. 2d 
690 (Alaska 1971). 
3 
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SUPREME COlJRT ()F THE UNITED STATES 
No. 71-1336 ,, 
In re Application of Fre Le Poole 
Griffiths for Admission to 
the Bar1 Appellant. 
On Appeal from the 
Supreme Court of 
Connecticut. 
[February -, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This case presents a novel question as to the con-
straints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment on the qualifications which a 
State may require for admission to the bar. Appellant, 
Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands, came 
to the United States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In 
1967, she married a citizen of the United States and be-
came a resident of Connecticut.1 After her graduation 
from law school, she applied in 1970 for permission to 
take the Connecticut bar examination. The County Bar 
Association found her qualified in all respects save that 
she was not a citizen of the United States as required by 
Rule 8 (1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963),2 and 
1 Appellant is eligible for naturalization by reason of her marriage 
to a citizen of the United States and residence in the United Stales 
for more than three years, 8 U.S. C. § 1430 (a). She has not filed 
a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States, 
8 U. S. C. § 1445 (f), and has no present intention of doing so. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 4. In order to become a citizen, appellant 
would be required to renounce her citizenship of the Netherlands. 
8 U. S. C. § 1448 (a). 
"The rules arc promulgated by the judges of the Superior Court, 
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on that account refused to allow her to take the examina-
tion. She then sought judicial relief, asserting that the 
regulation was unconstitutional. Her claim was rejected 
first by the Superior Court and ultimately by the Con-
necticut Supreme Court. 162 Conn. 249, 294 A. 2d 281 
(1972). We noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U. S. 966 
(1972) , and no\v hold that the rule unconstitutionally 
discriminates against resident aliens. 'l 
I 
We begin by sketching the background against which 
the State Bar Examining Committee attempts to justify 
the total exclusion of aliens from the practice of law. 
Fron1 its inception, our Nation welcomed and drew 
strength from the immigration of aliens. Their contri-
butions to the social and economic life of the country 
were self-evident. especially during the periods when the 
demand for human resources greatly exceeded the native 
supply. This demand was by no means limited to the 
unskilled or the uneducated. In 1872, this Court noted 
that admission to the practice of law in the courts of a 
State 
"in no sense depends on citizenship of the United 
States. It has not, as far as we know, ever been 
made in any State, or in any case, to depend on 
citizenship at all. Certainly many prominent and 
distinguished lawyers have been admitted to prac-
tice, both in the State ami Federal courts, who were 
not citizens of the United States or of any State." 
Bmdwell v. The State, 1G Wall. 130, 139 (1872).4 
" Bec~mr wr find that the rulr drnir~ rqunl protection, wr do not 
ren r h n ppr lln nt '~ ot hrr rla im~. 
4 We do not , of cour~e . rrl)' on Bmdwe/1 to e~ tablisb th:l t admi~­
sion to the bnr m:ly not br m~1de to deprnd on citizrn ~hip. The 
holdin~ of that r:l se was simp!)· that thr right to practice lnw is not 
a "privilege or immunity" within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
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But shortly thereafter , in 1879, Connecticut established 
the predecessor to its present rule totally excluding aliens 
from the practice of law. 162 Conn. , at 253, 294 A. 2d, 
at 283. In subsequent decades, wide-ranging restrictions 
for the first time began to impair significantly the efforts 
of aliens to earn a livelihood in their chosen occupations." 
In the face of this trend, the Court nonetheless held 
in 1886 that a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "per-
son" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
directive that a State must not "deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886). The 
decision in Yick TV o invalidated a municipal ordinance 
regulating the operation of laundries on the ground that 
the ordinance was discriminatorily enforced against Chi-
nese operators. Some years later, the Court struck down 
an Arizona statute requiring employers of more than five 
persons to employ at least 80 7'(; "qualified electors or 
native-born citizens of the United States or some sub-
division thereof." Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915). 
As stated for the Court by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes: 
"It requires no argument to show that the right to 
work for a living in the common occupations of the 
community is of the very essence of the personal 
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of 
the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure. {Citations 
omitted.] If this could be refused solely upon the 
ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the 
denial of equal protection of the laws would be a 
barren form of words." 239 U. S., at 41. 
On similar reasoning, the Court ruled unconstitutiona a ) 
California statute barring issuance of commercial fishing 
"See J. Highmn , Strangers i11 the Land 4fl , 161 , 183 (2d eel. 1965). 
The full sen le of rrstriction~ impo~ecl on the work opportunities of 
aliens in 1946 i ~ FhO\m by M. Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic 
in Americnn Law 190-211 (1946) . 
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'icenses t~ersons "ineligible to citizenship." Takahas~ 
· nd Garne Comm'n, 334 U. S. 410 (1948). --} 
To be sure, the course of decisions protectmg tlie em-
ployment rights of resident aliens has not been an un-.,.........-
swerving one.6 In Clarke v. Dekebach, 274 U. S. 392 
(1927), the Court was faced with a challenge to a city 
ordinance prohibiting the issuance to aliens of licenses 
to operate pool and billiard rooms. Characterizing the 
business as one having "harmful and vicious tendencies," 
the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the 
ordinance: 
"It was competent for the city to make such a 
choice, not shown to be irrational, by excluding from 
the conduct of a dubious business an entire class 
rather than its objectionable members selected by 
more empirical methods." 274 U. S., at 397. 
This easily expandable proposition supported discrimina-
tion against resident aliens in a wide range of occupations.7 
But the doctrinal foundations of Clarke were under-
v. r;,t, <lHd Gonte ,;y;'f*j.l::li) the Court stated that "the 
(' omm 'n 3 3 'I (), S. v:::=.-p-o_w_e_r_o_f;;--a-s-:t-a
7te--:-to-ac...p._p_y~its laws exclusively to its alien 
- --) ) inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits." 
Lft o ( 1 9 c.t"l. J' wftereJ 334 U.S., at 420. Indeed, with the issue squarely before 
1
n r u f111 q un co"'ll"lro"f]/ 'tin Graham v. Richardso-n, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the 
C/ Court concluded that: 
t:i ( o / ~ f'O>f'ntq s icd ufe 
ho.rr;'JJ t.SSUC!~c e 
0 r f','shtngt f•C'en<;~~ 
1o persons '/~~ ltjrhll! 
-fo 
" [ C] lassifications based on alienage, like those based 
on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and 
subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class 
are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' 
6 Sec also People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427, aff'd 
sub nom. Crane v. New York, 239 U. S. 195 (1915); but sec 
. .G.J:..aham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971). 
7 See cases collected at N otc, Constitutionality of Rcstric1 ions on 
liens' Right to Work, 57 Col. L. Rev. 1012, 1021-1023 (1957) 
(reslrictions ranging from the vending of soft drinks to the :;elling 
~ lightning rods). 
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minority [see United States v. Carolene Products 
Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938)] for whom 
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 372. (Foot-
notes omitted.) 8 
The Court has consistently emphasized that a State 
which adopts a suspect classification "bears a heavy 
burden of justification," McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 
184, 196 ( 1964) , a burden which, though variously for-
mulated, requires the State to meet certain standards of 
proof. In order to justify the use of a suspect classifica-
tion, a State must show that its purpose or interest is 
both constitutionally permissible 9 and substantial/0 and 
that its use of the classification is "necessary to the ac-
complishment" of its purpose n or the safeguarding of its 
interest. 
Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the 
economy, serve in the armed forces, and contribute in 
myriad other ways to our society. It is appropriate that 
a State bear a heavy burden when it deprives them of 
employment opportunities. 
8 Although alienage is generally equated with race as a suspect 
c assification, did not decide in Graham nor do we decide here 
whether there might be circumstances, such as armed hostilities be-
tween the United States and the country of which an alien is a 
citizen, in which alienage would not be suspect. 
9 Discrimination or segregntion for its own sake is not, of course, 
a constitutionally permissible purpose. E. g., Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); McLaughlin v. Florida, supra. 
10 The state interest required has been characterized as "overriding," 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S., at 196; Loving v. Virginia, 888 
U.S. 1, 11 (1967), "compelling," Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S., 
at 375, " important," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972), 
or ·'substantial," ibid. We attribute no partil'ubr significance to 
these variations in diction. 
1 L McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S., at 196; Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U. S., at 11. 
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II 
We hold that the Committee, acting on behalf of the 
State, has not carried its burden. The State's ultimate 
interest here implicated is to assure the requisite quali-
fications of persons licensed to practice law.'~ It is un-
disputed that a State has a constitutionally permissible 
and substantial interest in determining whether an appli-
cant possesses "the character and general fitness requisite 
for an attorney and counselor at law." Law Students Re-
search Council v. TVadmond, 401 U. S. 154, 159 (1970). 
See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U. S. 36, 40-41 
(1961); Schwarr!, v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 
232, 239 ( 1956). '" But no question is raised in this case 
as to appellant's character .or general fitness. Rather, 
the sole basis for disqualification is her status as a resi-
dent alien. 
The Committee defends Rule 8 ( 1) 's requirement that 
applicants for admission to the bar be citizens of the 
United States on the ground that the special role of 
the lawyer justifies excluding aliens from the practice 
of law. In Connecticut. the Committee points out. the 
maxim that a lawyer is an "officer of the court" is given 
concrete meaning by a statute which makes every lawyer 
a "commissioner of the Superior Court." As such, a 
12 Appellant donie~ thnt this was indeed the Stntc's purpose in 
requiring citizenship for the practice of law, noting that. citizenship 
is nlso required of practitioners in other fields, including hairdrc~sers 
and cosmeticians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-250, architect~, Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 20-291, and sanitarians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-361. Bcftuse / G~ 
we dispose of tho case on other grounds, we do not et)tl!"ids this r~.r. 
claim. 
'"In this connec-tion, :\fr . .Ju~tice Fmnkfmtcr wrote: 
"From a profe~sional charged with such respon~ibilil ies 1 here must 
be exarted those qualities of t.ruth-speaking, of a high sen~e of honor, 
of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciar~' respoll-
sibilit:v, that have, throughout the centuries, been compendious!~' do-
scribed as 'moral character.'" Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 
353 U. S. 232, 247 ( 1957) (concurring opinion). 
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lawyer has authority to "sign writs and subpoenas, take 
recognizances, administer oaths and take depositions and 
acknowledgements of deeds." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-85. 
In the exercise of this authority, a Connecticut lawyer 
may command the assistance of a county sheriff or a town 
constable. Conn. Gen. Stat. ~ 52-90. Because of these 
and other powers, the Connecticut Supreme Court com-
mented that: 
"the courts not only demand [lawyers'] loyalty, con-
fidence and respect. but also require them to func-
tion in a manner which will foster public confidence 
in the profession and, consequently. the judicial sys-
tem." 162 Conn., at 262-263, 294 A. 2d, at 287. 
In order to establish a link between citizenship and the 
powers and responsibilities of the lawyer in Connecticut, 
the Committee contrasts a citizen's undivided allegiance 
to this country with a resident alien's possible conflict 
of loyalties. From this, the Committee concludes that a 
resident alien lawyer might in the exercise of his func-
tions ignore his responsibilities to the courts or even his 
clients in favor of the interest of a foreign power. 
We find these arguments unconvincing. It in no way 
denigrates a lawyer's high responsibilities to observe that 
the powers "to sign writs and subpoenas, take recogni-
zances, [and] administer oaths" hardly involve matters 
of state policy or acts of such unique responsibility as 
to entrust them only to citizens. Nor do we think that 
the practice of law offers meaningful opportunities ad-
versely to affect the interest of the United States. Cer-
tainly the Committee has failed to show the relevance of 
citizenship to any likelihood that a lawyer will fail to pro-
tect faithfully the interest of his clients.14 
14 Lawyers frequrnt]~r rrpreRent forrig;n count rics and the na-
tional~ of such countries in litigation in the: courts of the United 
States, as well as in other matters in 1 his country. In such represen-
tation, the duty of the lawyer, subject to his role as an "officer of 
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Nor would the possibility that some resident aliens are 
unsuited to the practice of law be a justification for 
a wholesale ban. 
"Even in applying permissible standards, officers of 
a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no 
basis for their finding that he fails to meet these 
standards, or when their action is invidiously dis-
criminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 
356." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 
U. S., at 239. 
This constitutional warning is especially salient where, 
as here, a State's bar admission standards make expli'i&t 
use of a suspect classification. Although, as we have 
acknowledged, a State does have a substantial interest 
in the qualifications of those admitted to the practice of 
law, the arguments advanced by the Committee fall short 
of showing that the classification established by Rule 
8 ( 1) of the Connecticut Practice Book ( 1963) is neces-
sary to the promoting or safeguarding of this interest. 
Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge on a case-by-
case basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law. 
Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training 
and familiarity with Connecticut law. Apart from such 
tests of competence, it requires a new lawyer to take both 
the court," is to further the intere~ts of hiH clients by all lawful 
means, even when those interests arc in conflict with the inlerestH 
of the United States or of a Statr. But this representation involves 
no conflict of interest in the invidious sense. Rather, it casts the 
lawyer in his honored and traditional role as an authorized but 
independent agent acting to vindicate the legal rights of a cli<·nt, 
who<.'ver it may be. It is conceivable that an aliPn lirPnsed to j)rtlC- 1 1 ~ ,, w,.c. ... 
1ice law in this country could find him~elf in a position whenl11c 
might be called upon to reprP::;ent his country of citizcn~hip ugainst 
the United StatcH in circumstances ~there may be a conllict lm w l'llc. A 
between his obligations to the two countries. In such rare situations, 
an honorable person, whether an alien or not, would decline the 
representation. 
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an "attorney's oath" to perform his functions faithfully 
and honestly 1(j and a "commissioner's oath" to "support 
the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitu-
tion of Connecticut." 16 Appellant has indicated her will-
ingness and ability to subscribe to the substance of both 
oatl~t and Connecticut may quite properly conduct a 
character investigation to insure in any given case "that 
an applicant is not one who 'swears to an oath pro forma 
while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or 
indifference to the oath.' Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116, 
132." Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 
supra, 401 U. S., at 164.18 Moreover, once admitted to 
15 The text of thr attorney's oaths is as follows: 
"You solemnly swear that you will do no fabebood, nor conRrnt to 
an~· to be done in court, and, if you know of any to be done, you 
will give information thereof to tbr judgrs, or one of them, that it 
may be rrformcd; you will not wittingly, or willingly promote, sue 
or rau~c to be sued, any false or unlawful suit , or give ::tid, or con-
sent, to the samr; you will deJa~· no man for lucre or malice; but 
will exercise the office of attorney, within thr court wherein you may 
practicr, according to the best of your learning and discretion , and 
with fiddity, as well to the court as to your client, so help ~·ou God." 
J. S. App., p. 44. 
16 There is no question as to thr validity of requiring an applicant, 
as a prerondition to admission to t hr bnr, to take such an oath. 
Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra, at 161-164. 
17 Bccau~e the commissioner's oath i~ nn oath to "support the 
constitution of the United Statrs, and the constitution of Con-
necticut, so Zona as you continue to be a citizen thereof" (emphasis 
added), appellant could not of course take the oath as prescribed. 
To the extent that the oath reiteratrs Rule 8 (I)'s citizenship re-
quirement, it shares the same constitutional defrrt:; when required of 
prospective membrr:; of the bar. 
18 We find no merit in the contrntion that only citizens can in 
good con~cicncc take an oath to support the Constitution. Wr note 
that. all prr:;on~ inducted into the armed services, including r<'~idrnt 
aliens, arc rcquirrd by 10 U. S. C. § 502 to take 1 he followinf( oath: 
''I, , do solemnly swrnr (or affirm) that I will 
support and dcfrnd the Con~titntion of the United States against 
all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true fnith and 
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the bar, lawyers are subject to continuing scrutiny by 
the organized bar and the courts. In addition to dis-
cipline for unprofessional conduct, the range of post-
admission sanctions extends from judgments for con-
tempt to criminal prosecutions and disbarment. 1n In 
sum, the Committee simply has not established that it 
must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order 
to vindicate its undoubted interest in high professional 
standards. 20 
III 
In its brief, the Examining Committee makes another, 
somewhat different argument in support of Rule 8 ( 1). 
Its thrust is not that resident aliens lack the attributes 
allrgianrr to t,hr Hamr; and thai, I will obe~· 1 he order~ of the Presi-
drnt of the United Statr~ ami the orders of the officers appointed 
ovrr me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military 
.Justice. So help me God." 
If aliens can take this oai,h when the ?\fation i~ making usr of their 
~en·ices in the national drfensc, resident alien Gpplir:mts for :ldmis-
,-mon to the bar surely caf[Eot be prccludrd, as a cla~s, from taking ~ 4 ~ at 
an oath to support the Constitution on the thror/1-'they ~\take ..f / 
the oath in good faith. ar-e u,..ob e -1-o 
\::: 'n Srr. e. g .. Doo/.ittle v. Clark. 47 Conn. :31G (1879). Ap:1rt from 
the courts, the profrssion it:<C'!f has long suhjectrd its members to 
discipline under codrs or cai@i1s of profrs~ion:1l r1 hies. A.-, e:nl~r :1s 
JCl08 i,hr American Bar ARsociation adopted :32 Cnnons of T'rofC's-
sional Ethics. In 1970, following several ~·car~ of stud~· and re-
rxamination, thr Hou~e of Drlegatrs of thr American B:u· Associa-
tion approvrd n nrw Codr of Professional Hrspon~ibilit~·. which pro-
12 
vides detailed ethienl proscriptions as well as ... comprehensi\·e rocl...,.o _o_f _.,., 
L-disriplinnry rules. Tho ABA Code of Profo~sional RoRponsihillty has 
1 
{' 
l Hinro been approvrd~ adop1rd in • · · · · · he tJ,~ tr1C.'I o 
. . . ~ ro I u ~ b; o. o. "'J 
20 Nothing ]n our rule~ prohibits from aclmis~ion 1o practice in 
this Comt. rrsiclont nlicns who have been admitted to prnctirP "for ;, 'I 6 .S r~ f~~.; 
throe year~ past in the higlwst eomt of a Stn1o, Territor~' , Di~trict, ;..,c/vo/,,;.,_r, lcHp1 c-1-,cil, 
Commonwealth, or Possrssion" and whose "private nncl profr~i'ional V 
rharnctrrs Rhall apponr to br good." Rule 5, Rules of the Supreme 
Court of the United States ( 1970). 
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JJ<'cessary to maintain high standards in the legal profes-
sion, but rather that lawyers must be citizens almost as a 
matter of definition. The implication of this analysis is 
that exclusion of aliens from the legal profession is not 
subject to any scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
The argument builds upon the exclusio11 of aliens from 
the franchise in all 50 States and their disqualification 
under the Constitution from holding office as President, 
Art. 2, § 1, cl. 4, or as a member of the House of Rep-
resentatives, Art. 1, § 2, cl. 2, or of the Senate, Art. 1, § 3, 
cl. 3. Thes<' and num0rous other federal and statutory 
and constitutional provisions reflect, the Committee con-
tends, a pervasive recognition that "participation in the 
government structure as voters and office holders" is 
inescapably an aspect of citizenship. Appellee's Brief, 
p. 11. Offered in support of the claim that the lawyer is 
an "office holder" in this sense is an enhanced version of 
the proposition, discussed above, that he is an "officer 
of the court." Specifically, the Committee states that 
the lawyer "is an officer of the court who acts by and 
with the authority of the state" and is entrusted with the 
"exercise of actual government power." Appellee's Brief, 
p. 5. 
We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond 
the opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which 
recognized that a lawyer is not an officer in the ordinary 
sense. 162 Conn., at 254; 294 A. 2d, at 283. This com-
ports with the view of the Court expressed by Mr. Jus-
tice Black in Cammer v. United States, 350 U. S. 399 
(1956): 
"It has been stated many times that lawyers arc 
'officers of the court.' One of the most frequently 
repeated statements to this effect appears in Ex parte 
Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378. The Court pointed out 
there, however, that an a.ttorney was not an 'officer'· 
12 
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within the ordinary meaning of that term. Cer-
tainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland or 
in any other case decided by this Court places attor-
neys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs, court 
clerks or judges. Unlike these officials a lawyer is 
engaged in a private profession, important though 
it be to our system of justice. In general he makes 
his own decisions, follows his own best judgment, 
collects his own fees and runs his own business. The 
word 'officer' as it has always been applied to lawyers 
conveys a different meaning from the word 'officer' 
as applied to people serving as officers within the 
conventional meaning of that term." (Footnote 
omitted.) 350 U. S., at 405. 
Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions of 
responsibility and influence that impose on them duties 
correlative with their vital right of access to the courts. 
Moreover, by virtue of their professional aptitudes and 
natural interests, lawyers have been leaders in govern-
ment throughout the history of our country. Yet, they 
are not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers. 
Nor does the status of holding a license to practice law 
place one so close to the core of the political process as 
to make him a formulator of government policy."1 
We hold that § 8 ( 1) violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. 22 The judgment of the Connecticut Supreme 
Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
21 Because the Commit1 rr has failed to estn bli~h that the lawyrr 
i~ an "office holder," we need not and do not decide whether there is 
merit' in the general argument and, if so, to what offices it would 
apply. 
22 In a thoughtful opinion, the California Supreme Court unani-
mously declared unconstitutional a similar California rule. Raffaelli 
v. Committee of Bar Examiners, - Cal. 3d -, 496 P. 2d 1264, 
101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972). See also Application of Park, 484 P. 2d 
690 (Alaska, 1971). 
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This case presents a novel question as to the con-
straints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment on the qualifications which a 
State may require for admission to the bar. Appellant, 
Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands, came 
to the United States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In 
1967, she married a citizen of the United States and be-
came a resident of Connecticut.1 After her graduation 
from law school, she applied in 1970 for permission to· 
take the Connecticut bar examination. The County Bar 
Association found her qualified in all respects save that 
she was not a citizen of the United States as required by 
Rule 8 (1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963)/ and 
1 Appellant is eligible for naturalization by reason of her marriage 
to a citizen of the United States and residence in the United States 
for more than three years, 8 U. S. C. § 1430 (a). She has not filed 
a declaration of intention to become a citizen of tho Unilcd States, 
8 U. S. C. § 1445 (f), and has no prescn L intention of doing so. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 4. In order to become a citizen, appellant 
would be required to renounce her citizenship of the Netherlands. 
8 U. S. C. § 1448 (a). 
2 The rules are promulgated by the judge,; of the Superior Court, 
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§51- 0, and administered by the Connecticut Bar 
Associa Lion. 
71-1336-0PINION 
2 APPLICATION OF GRIFFITHS 
on that account refused to allow her to take the examina-
tion. She then sought judicial relief, asserting that the 
regulation was unconstitutional. Her claim was rejected 
first by the Superior Court and ultimately by the Con-
necticut Supreme Court. 162 Conn. 249, 294 A. 2d 281 
(1972). We noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U. S. 966 
( 1972), and now hold that the rule unconstitutionally 
discriminates against resident aliens.~ 
I 
We begin by sketching the background against which 
the State Bar Examining Committee attempts to justify 
the total exclusion of aliens from the practice of law. 
From its inception, our Nation welcomed and drew 
strength from the immigration of aliens. Their contri-
butions to the social and economic life of the country 
were self-evident, especially during the periods when the 
demand for human resources greatly exceeded the native 
supply. This demand was by no means limited to the 
unskilled or the uneducated. In 1872, this Court noted 
that admission to the practice of law in the courts of a 
State 
"in no sense depends on citizenship of the United 
States. It has not, as far as we know, ever been 
made in any State, or in any case, to depend on 
citizenship at all. Certainly many prominent and 
distinguished lawyers have been admitted to prac-
tice, both in the State and Federal courts, who were 
not citizens of the United States or of any State." 
Bradwell v. The State, 16 ·wall. 130, 139 (1872).4 
~ Be(·ause we find that tlH' rule denic,; equal protection, we do not 
reach appellant's other rlaimH. 
4 We do not, of rour~c, rei~· on Bmdwell to cstabli~h that. admiR-
sion to the bar may no1 be made to depend on citizl'nship. The 
holding of that case was simp!~' that the right to practice law is not 
a "privilege or immunity" within the menning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
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But shortly thereafter, in 1879, Connecticut established 
the predecessor to its present rule totally excluding aliens 
from the practice of la\\·. 162 Conn., at 253, 294 A. 2d, 
at 283. In subsequent decades, wide-ranging restrictions 
for the first time began to impair significantly the efforts 
of aliens to earn a livelihood in their chosen occupations." 
In the face of this trend. the Court nonetheless held 
in 1886 that a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "per-
son" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
directive that a State must not "deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
Yick Tro v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886). The 
decision in Yick W o invalidated a municipal ordinance 
regulating the operation of laundries on the ground that 
the ordinance was discriminatorily enforced against Chi-
nese operators. Some years later, the Court struck down 
an Arizona statute requiring employers of more than five 
persons to employ at least 805"o "qualified electors or 
native-born citizens of the United States or some sub-
division thereof." Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). 
As stated for the Court by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes: 
"It requires no argument to show that the right to 
work for a living in the common occupations of the 
community is of the very essence of the personal 
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of 
the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure. [Citations 
omitted.] If this could be refused solely upon the 
ground of race or nationality, tho prohibition of the 
denial of equal protection of the laws would be a · . 
barren form of words." 239 U. S., at 41. < ~
To be sure, the course of decisions protecting the em-
ployment rights of resident aliens has not been an un-
0 Sre .J. Higham, Strangcrd in the Land 4G, 161, 183 (2d ed. 1965). 
The full scale of restri<'tions impo~cd on the work opportunities of 
aliens in 1946 is shown by M. Kom·itz, The Alien and the Asiatic-
in American Law 190-211 (1946). 
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swerving one.6 In Clarke v. Dekebach, 274 U. S. 392 
(1927), the Court was faced with a challenge to a city 
ordinance prohibiting the issuance to aliens of licenses 
to operate pool and billiard rooms. Characterizing the 
business as one having "harmful and vicious tendencies," 
the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the 
ordinance: 
"It was competent for the city to make such a 
choice, not shown to be irrational, by excluding from 
the conduct of a dubious business an entire class 
rather than its objectionable members selected by 
more empirical methods." 274 U. S., at 397. 
This easily expandable proposition supported discrimina-
tion against resident aliens in a wide range of occupations.7 
But the doctrinal foundations of Clarke were under-
mined in Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U. S. 
410 ( 1948), where, in ruling unconstitutional a California 
statute barring issuance of fishing licenses to persons 
"ineligible to citizenship," the Court stated that "the 
power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien 
inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits." 
334 U. S., at 420. Indeed, with the issue squarely before 
it in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), the 
Court concluded that: 
"[C]lassifications based on alienage, like those based 
on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and 
subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class 
are a prime example of a 'discrete and insularr 
6 See also People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427, aff'd 
sub norn. Crane v. New York, 239 U. S. 195 (1915) ; but see 
Graharn v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 374 (1971). 
7 See lower court cases collected at Note, Constitutionality of Re-
strictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 Col. L. Rev. 1012, 1021-1023 
(1957) (restrictions ranging from the vending of soft drink~ to the 
f'rliing of lightning rods). 
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minority [see United States v. Carolene Products 
Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938)] for whom 
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."· 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 372. (Foot-
notes omitted.) s 
The Court has consistently emphasized that a State· 
which adopts a suspect classification "bears a heavy 
burden of justification," McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 
184, 196 ( 1964), a burden which, though variously for-
mulated, requires the State to meet certain standards of 
proof. In order to justify the use of a suspect classifica-
tion, a State must show that its purpose or interest is 
both constitutionally permissible 0 and substantial,10 and 
that its use of the classification is "necessary to the ac-
complishment" of its purpose 11 or the safeguarding of its 
interest. 
Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the 
economy, serve in the armed forces, and contribute in 
myriad other ways to our society. It is appropriate that 
a State bear a heavy burden when it deprives them of 
employment opportunities. 
8 Although alienage is generally equated with race as a suspect 
classification, the Court did not decide in Graham nor do we decide 
here whether there might be circumstances, such as armed lw.~tilities 
between the United States and the country of whirh an alien is a 
citizen, in which alienage would not be suspect. 
9 Discrimination or segregation for its own sake is not, of course, 
a constitutionally permissible purpose. E. g., Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U. S. 483, 495 (1954); McLaughlin v. Florida. supra. 
10 The state interest required has been characterized as "overriding," 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S., at 196; Loving v. l'irginia, 388 
U. S. 1, 11 (1967), "compelling," Graham v. Rirhardson, 403 U. S., 
at 375, "important," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972), 
or "substantial," ibid. We attribute no particular signifir:mce to 
these variations in diction. 
n .McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S., at 196 ; Loving v. l'irginia, 38 
U. S., at 11. 
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II 
We hold that the Committee, acting on behalf of the 
State, has not carried its burden. The State's ultimate 
interest here implicated is to assure the requisite quali-
fications of persons licensed to practice law.12 It is un-
disputed that a State has a constitutionally permissible 
and substantial interest in determining whether an appli-
cant possesses "the character and general fitness requisite 
for an attorney and counselor at law." Law Students Re-
search Council v. Wadmond, 401 U. S. 154, 159 (1970). 
See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U. S. 36, 40-41 
(1961); Schwan> v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 
232, 239 (1956).13 But no question is raised in this case 
as to appellant's character or general fitness. Rather, 
the sole basis for disqualification is her status as a resi-
dent alien. 
The Committee defends Rule 8 ( 1) 's requirement that 
applicants for admission to the bar be citizens of the 
United States on the ground that the special role of 
the lawyer justifies excluding aliens from the practice 
of law. In Connecticut, the Committee points out, the 
maxim that a lawyer is an "officer of the court" is given 
concrete meaning by a statute 'vhich makes every lawyer 
a "commissioner of the Superior Court." As such, a 
1 ~ Appellant denies that this wt~s indeed the State'~ purpose in 
requiring citizenship for the practice of law, noting that citizenship 
is al~o required of practitioners in other fteld~, int>luding hairdressers 
and cosmeticians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-250, architect~. Conn. Gen . 
St:1t. § 20-291, :1nd sanitarians, Coun. Gen. Stat. § 20-361. Because 
we di"pose of the c:t~e on other grounchi, we do not reach this 
cbirn. 
1 ~ In this ronnertion. :\ T r. J u~ticc Frnnkfmter wrote: 
"From a professional elw.rged with ~uch re~pon~ibilities there must 
be exacted those qunlities of truth-spe:tking, of a high sen~e of honor, 
of grnnite di::;crction, of the strictest obsetYmlre of fiduri :u~· respon-
sibility, that ha,·e, throughout the renturic~. been compendiou~l.'· de-
scribed as 'moral character.'" Srh1cm·r "· Board of Bar E~·ami11rrs, 
353 U. S. 232, 247 ( 1957) ( conrurriug opinion). 
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lawyer has authority to "sign writs and subpoenas, take 
recognizances, administer oaths and take depositions and 
acknowledgements of deeds." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-85. 
In the exercise of this authority, a Connecticut lawyer 
may command the assistance of a county sheriff or a town 
constable. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52- 90. Because of these 
and other powers, the Connecticut Supreme Court com-
mented that: 
" the courts not only demand [lawyers'] loyalty, con-
fidence and respect, but also require them to func-
tion in a manner which will foster public confidence 
in the profession and , consequently, the judicial sys-
tem." 162 Conn., at 262- 263, 294 A. 2d, at 287. 
In order to establish a link between citizenship and the 
po'>Yers and responsibilities of the lawyer in Connecticut, 
the Committee contrasts a citizen's undivided allegiance 
to this country with a resident alien's possible conflict 
of loyalties. From this, the Committee concludes that a 
resident alien lawyer might in the exercise of his func-
tions ignore his responsibilities to the courts or even his 
clients in favor of the interest of a foreign power. 
"\Ve find these arguments unconvincing. It in no " ·ay 
denigrates a lawyer's high responsibilities to observe that 
the powers "to sign writs and subpoenas, ta.ke recogni-
zances, [and] administer oaths" hardly involve matters 
of state policy or acts of such unique responsibility as 
to entrust them only to citizens. Nor do we think that 
the practice of law offers meaningful opportunities ad-
versely to affect the interest of the United States. Cer-
tainly the Committee has failed to show the relevance of 
citizenship to any likelihood that a lawyer will fail to pro-
tect faithfully the interest of his clients.1 ' 
14 Law~·crs frequent]~· rPpre;:ent forrip;n countries and the na-
tional~ of such countries in litigation in the courts of tho United 
States, as well as in other matters in this country. In such represen-
tation, the duty of the lawyer, subject to his role as an "officer of 
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Nor would the possibility that some resident aliens are 
unsuited to the practice of law be a justification for 
a wholesale ban. 
"Even in applying permissible standards, officers of 
a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no 
basis for their finding tha.t he fails to meet these 
standards, or when their action is invidiously dis-
criminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 
356." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 
U. S., at 239. 
This constitutional warning is especially salient where, 
as here, a State's bar admission standards make explicit 
use of a suspect classification. Although, as we have 
acknowledged, a State does have a substantial interest 
in the qualifications of those admitted to the practice of 
law, the arguments advanced by the Committee fall short 
of showing that the classification established by Rule 
8 (1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963) is neces-
sary to the promoting or safeguarding of this interest. 
Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge on a case-by-
case basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law. 
Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training 
and familiarity with Connecticut law. Apart from such 
tests of competence, it requires a new lawyer to take both 
the court," is to further the interests of his clients by all lawful 
menus, even when those intere3ts are in conflict with the interests 
of the United States or of a State. But this representation involves 
no confiirt of interest in the invidious sense. Rather, it casts the 
lawyer in his honored and tmditionnl role as an aut horized but 
independent agent acting to vindicate the legal rights of a client, 
whoever it may be. It is conceivable that an alien li censed t o prac-
ti ce law in this country could find himself in a position in which he 
might be called upon to represent his country of citizenship against 
the United States in circumstances in which there rna~· be a conflict 
between his obligations to the two countries. In such rare situations, 
an honorable person, whether an alien or not, would decline the 
representation. 
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an "attorney's oath" to perform his functions faithfully 
and honestly 15 and a "commissioner's oath" to "support 
the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitu-
tion of Connecticut." 10 Appellant has indicated her will-
ingness and ability to subscribe to the substance of both 
oaths,1 ' and Connecticut may quite properly conduct a 
character investigation to insure in any given case "that 
an applicant is not one who 'swears to an oath pro forrna 
while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or· 
indifference to the oath.' Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116, 
132." Law Students Research Council v. Wadm.ond, 
supra, 401 U. S., at 164.18 Moreover, once admitted to· 
15 The text of the attorney's oaths is as follows: 
"You solemnly swenr that you will do no falsehood, nor consent to 
an? to be done in court, and, if you know of any to be done, you 
will give information thereof to the judges, or one of them, that it 
may be reformed; you will not wittingly, or willingly promote, sue 
or cause to be sued, any false or unlawful suit, or give aid, or con-
sent, to the same; you will delay no man for lucre or malice; but 
will exercise the office of attorney, within the court wherein you may 
practice, according to the best of your learning and discretion, and 
with fidelity, as well to the court as to your client, so help you God." 
J. S. App., p. 44. 
16 There is no question as to the validity of requiring an applicant, 
as a precondition to admission to the bar, to take such an oath. 
Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra, at 161-164. 
17 Because the commissioner's oath is an oath to "support the 
constitution of the United States, and the constitution of Con-
necticut., so long as you continue to be a citizen thereof" (emphasis 
added), appellant could not of course take the oath as prescribed. 
To the e)l.ient that the oath reiterates Rule 8 (l)'s citizenship re-
quirement, it shares the same constitutional defects when required of 
prospective members of the bar. 
18 We find no merit in the contention that. only citizens can in 
good conscience take an oath to support the Constitution. "\Ve note 
that all persons inducted into the armed sen·iccs, including resident 
nliens, arc required by 10 U.S. C.§ 502 to take the following oath: 
'·1, , do solemnly swenr (or affirm) that I will 
support and defend the Constitution of the United States against 
all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will brar true faith and 
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the bar, lawyers arc subject to continuing scrutiny by 
the organized bar and the courts. In addition to dis-
cipline for unprofessional conduct, the range of post-
admission sanctions extends from judgments for con-
tempt to criminal prosecutions and disbarment.10 In 
sum, the Committee simply has not established that it 
must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order 
to vindicate its undoubted interest in high professional 
standards.20 
III 
In its brief, the Examining Committee makes another, 
somewhat different argument in support of Rule 8 (1). 
Its thrust is not that resident aliens lack the attributes 
allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the order~ of the Presi-
dent of the United States and the orders of the officer~ appointed 
over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military 
.Justice. So help me God." 
If aliens cnn take this oath when the Nation is making usc of their 
scn·ices in the nationnl defense, re~>ident alien npplicants for admis-
sion to the b:u sure]~· cannot be prcrlnded, ns a clnsH, from t:tking 
an oath to support the Constitution on the thcor~· that they are 
unable to take the o:tth in good faith. 
10 Sec, e. g .. Doolittle \'. Cla1'1,-, 47 Conn. 315 (1879). Ap:ut from 
the courts, the profc~~ion itself has long snbjcetcd it~ members to 
discipline under rode~ or canons of professional ct hir~. As carl~· as 
1908 the American Bar As~ociation adopted 32 Canons of Profes-
sion:\! Et hie". In 1970, following sc\·cral years of st ntl.\· and re-
examination, the Ilou~c of Delegates of the American Bar Associa-
tion approvrd a new Code of Profr~sional Rc~pon~ibilit~·, which pro-
vide,; detailed ethical presrriptions as well as n romprchen:-iw rode of I 
disriplinary rules. The ABA Code of Profes~ional Responsibility hns 
,;inrc been npproYcd and ndoptcd in the Di:;t ri<'t of Colnmhia and in 
45 States, including Connecticut. 
20 Nothing in our rule~ prohibitR from aclmi~~ion to praetiee in 
this Court rc:::idcnt aliens who haye bern admitted to pmctice "fol" 
three ~:cars pa~t in the highc~t rourt of a State, Tcnitory, Di~trict, 
Commonwealth, or Pos~e~~ion" nnd whoRr "pri\·ate and profe~~ionnl 
charartrrs shall appcnr to be good." Rule 5, Rules of the Supreme· 
Court of the United Stntcs (1970). 
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necessary to maintain high standards in the legal profes-
sion, but rather that lawyers must be citizens almost as a 
matter of definition. The implication of this analysis is 
that exclusion of aliens from the legal profession is not 
subject to any scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
The argument builds upon the exclusion of aliens from 
the franchise in all 50 States and their disqua1ification 
under the Constitution from holding office as President, 
Art. 2, § 1, cl. 4, or as a member of the House of Rep-
resentatives, Art. 1, ~ 2, cl. 2, or of the Senate, Art. 1, § 3, 
cl. 3. These and numerous other federal and statutory 
and constitutional provisions reflect, the Committee con-
tends, a pervasive recognition that "participation in the 
govcrnmen t structure as voters and office holders" is 
inescapably an aspect of citizenship. Appellee's Brief, 
p. 11. Offered in support of the claim that the lawyer is 
an "office holder" in this sem:e is an enhanced version of 
the proposition, discussed above, that he is an "officer 
of the court." Specifically, the Committee states that 
the la\Yyer "is an officer of the court who acts by and 
with the authority of the state" and is entrusted with the 
"exercise of actual government po,,·er." Appellee's Brief, 
p. 5. 
We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond 
the opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which 
recognized that a lawyer is not an officer in the ordinary 
sense. 162 Conn., at 254; 294 A. 2d, at 283. This com-
ports with the view of the Court expressed by Mr. Jus-
tice Black in Camm,er v. United States, 350 U. S. 399-
( 1956): 
"It has been stated many times that lawyers are 
'officers of the court.' One of the most frequently 
repeated statements to this effect appears in Ex parte 
Garland, 4 WalL 333, 378. The Court pointed out 
there, however, that an attorney was not an 'officer' 
12 
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within the ordinary meaning of that term. Cer-
tainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland or 
in any other case decided by this Court places attor-
neys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs, court 
clerks or judges. Unlike these officials a lawyer is 
engaged in a private profession, important though 
it be to our system of justice. In general he makes 
his own decisions, follows his own best judgment, 
collects his own fees and runs his own business. The 
word 'officer' as it has always been applied to lawyers 
conveys a different meaning from the word 'officer' 
as applied to people serving as officers within the 
conventional meaning of that term." (Footnote 
omitted.) 350 U. S., at 405. 
Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions of 
responsibility and influence that impose on them duties 
correlative with their vital right of access to the courts. 
Moreover, by virtue of their professional aptitudes and 
natural interests, lawyers have been leaders in govern-
ment throughout the history of our country. Yet, they 
are not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers. 
Nor does the status of holding a license to practice law 
place one so close to the core of the political process as 
to make him a formulator of government policy.21 
We hold that § 8 (I) violates the Equal Protection 
Clausc.22 The judgment of the Connecticut Supreme 
Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
21 Because the Committrr has failed to establish that the lawyer 
is an "offirr holder," we need not and do not decide whether there is 
merit in the general argument and, if so, to what offices it would 
apply. 
~ 2 In a thoughtful opinion, the California Supreme Court unani-
mously declared unconstitutional a similar California rule. Raffaelli 
v. Committee of Bar Examiners, - Cal. 3d -, 496 P. 2d 1264, 
101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972). See also Application of Park, 484 P. 2d 
690 (Alaska 1971) . 
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Connecticut. 
[February -, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opuuon of the 
Court. 
This case presents a novel question as to the con-
straints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment on the qualifications which a 
State may require for admission to the bar. Appellant, 
Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands, came 
to the United States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In 
1967, she married a citizen of the United States and be-
came a resident of Connecticut.1 After her graduation 
from law school, she applied in 1970 for permission to 
take the Connecticut bar examination. The County Bar 
Association found her qualified in all respects save that 
she was not a citizen of the United States as required by 
Rule 8 (1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963)/ and 
1 Appellant is eligible for naturalization by reason of her marriage 
to a citizen of the United States and residence in the United States 
for more than three years, 8 U. S. C. § 1430 (a). She has not flied 
a declaration of intention to become a citizrn of the United States, 
8 U. S. C. § 1445 (f), and has no present intention of doing so. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 4. In order to become a citizen, appellant 
would be required to renounce her citizen::;hip of the Netherlands. 
8 U.S. C.§ 1448 (a). 
2 The rules are promulgated by the judge~ of the Superior Court, 
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 51-80, and administered by the Connecticut Bar 
As~ociation . 
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on that account refused to allow her to take the examina-
tion. She then sought judicial relief, asserting that the 
regulation was unconstitutional. Her claim was rejected 
first by the Superior Court and ultimately by tho Con-
necticut Supreme Court. 162 Conn. 249, 294 A. 2d 281 
(1972). We noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U. S. 966 
(1972), and now hold that the rule unconstitutionally 
discriminates against resident aliens. 3 
I 
We begin by sketching the background against which 
the State Bar Examining Committee attempts to justify 
the total exclusion of aliens from the practice of law. 
From its inception, our Nation "·elcomed and drew 
strength from the immigration of aliens. Their contri-
butions to the social and economic life of the country 
wore self-evident, especially during tho periods when the 
demand for human resources greatly exceeded the native 
supply. This demand was by no means limited to the 
unskilled or the uneducated. In 1872, this Court noted 
that admission to the practice of law in the courts of a 
State 
"in no sense depends on citizenship of the United 
States. It has not, as far as we know, ever been 
made in any State, or in any case, to depend on 
citizenship at all. Certainly many prominent and 
distinguished lawyers have been admitted to prac-
tice, both in the State and Federal courts, who were 
not citizens of the United States or of any State." 
Bradwell v. The State, 16 Wall. 130, 139 (1872).4 
3 Because we find that thr rulr denir~ rqual protection, wr do not 
re.'lrh appellant's ot hrr claim~. 
4 We do not , of rour~e, rel)· on Bradu•ell to r,.:tnbli~h that admis-
sion to the bar may not br madr to deprnd on citizen~hip. The 
holding of that case was simp])' that the right to practice law is not 
a "privilege or immunity" within the mcnning of the Fourtcrnth 
Amrndment. 
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But shortly thereafter, in 1879, Connecticut established 
the predecessor to its present rule totally excluding aliens 
from the practice of law. 162 Conn., at 253, 294 A. 2d, 
at 283. In subsequent decades, wide-ranging restrictions 
for the first time began to impair significantly the efforts 
of aliens to earn a livelihood in their chosen occupations.r. 
In the face of this trend. the Court nonetheless held 
in 1886 that a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "per-
son" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
directive that a State must not "deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886). The 
decil'lion in Yick fVo invalidated a municipal ordinance 
regulating the operation of laundries on the ground that 
the ordi11ance was discriminatorily enforced against Chi-
nese operators. Some years later, the Court struck down 
an Arizona statute requiring employers of more than five 
persons to employ at least 80% "qualified electors or 
natiYe-born citizens of the United States or some sub-
division thereof." 'l'ruax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915). 
As stated for the Court by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes: 
"It requires no argument to show that the right to 
work for a living in the common occupations of the 
community is of the very essence of the personal 
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of 
the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure. [Citations 
omitted.] If this could be refused solely upon the 
ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the 
denial of equal protection of the la.ws would be a 
barren form of words." 239 U.S., at 41. <. ~ 
To be sure, the course of decisions protecting the em-
ployment rights of resident aliens has not been an un-
fi Sec J. Higham, Strangrrs in the Land 4G. 161, 183 (2d ed. 1965). 
The full scalr of re~trirtions imposrcl on the work opportunities of 
aliens in 1946 is shown by 1VI. Kom·itz, The Alien and the Asiatic-
in American Law 190-211 (1946). 
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swerving one.6 In Clarke v. Dekebach, 274 U. S. 392 
(1927), the Court was faced with a challenge to a city 
ordinance prohibiting the issuance to aliens of licenses 
to operate pool and billiard rooms. Characterizing the 
business as one having "harmful and vicious tendencies," 
the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the· 
ordinance: 
"It was competent for the city to make such a 
choice, not shown to be irrational, by excluding from 
the conduct of a dubious business an entire class 
rather than its objectionable members selected by 
more empirical methods." 274 U. S., a.t 397. 
This easily expandable proposition supported discrimina-
tion against resident aliens in a wide range of occupations.7 
But the doctrinal foundations of Clarke were under-
mined in Takahashi v. Fish and Garne Cornrn'n, 334 U.S. 
410 ( 1948), where, in ruling unconstitutional a California 
statute barring issuance of fishing licenses to persons 
"ineligible to citizenship," the Court stated that "the 
power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien 
inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits." 
334 U. S., at 420. Indeed, with the issue squarely before 
it in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), the 
Court concluded that: 
"[C]lassifications based on alienage, like those based 
on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and 
subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class 
are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular'· 
6 See also People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427, aff'd 
sub nom. Crane v. New York, 239 U. S. 195 (1915); but sec 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 374 (1971). 
7 Sec lower court cases collected at Note, Con titutionality of Re-
strictiom: on Alien::;' Right to Work, 57 Col. L. Rev. 1012, 1021-1023 
(1957) (restrictions ranging from the vending of soft drink::; to the 
srlling of lightning rods). 
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minority [see United States v. Carolene Products 
Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938)] for whom 
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.'" 
Graharn v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 372. (Foot-
notes omitted.) 8 
The Court has consistently emphasized that a State 
which adopts a suspect classification "bears a heavy 
burden of justification," McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 
184, 196 ( 1964), a burden which, though variously for-
mulated, requires the State to meet certain standards of 
proof. In order to justify the use of a suspect classifica-
tion, a State must show that its purpose or interest is 
both constitutionally permissible o and substantial,10 and 
that its use of the classification is "necessary to the ac-
complishment" of its purpose 11 or the safeguarding of its 
interest. 
Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the· 
economy, serve in the armed forces, and contribute in 
myriad other ways to our society. It is appropriate that 
a State bear a heavy burden when it deprives them of 
employment opportunities. 
8 Although alienage is generally equated with race as a suspect 
classification, the Court did not decide in Graham nor do we decide 
here whether there might be circumstances, such as armed hostilities 
between the United States and the country of which an alien is a 
citizen, in which alienage would not be suspect. 
9 Discrimination or segregation for its own sake is not, of course,. 
a constitutionally permicsible purpose. E. g., Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U. S. 483, 495 (1954); McLaughlin v. Florida, supra. 
10 The state interest required has been characterized as "overriding," 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S., at 196; Loving v. Viroinia, 388 
U. S. 1, 11 (1967), "compelling," Graham v. Richardson , 403 U. S., 
at 375, "important," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972), 
or "substantial," ibid. We attribute no particubr signific:mce to 
these variations in diction. 
11 M cLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S., at Hl6; Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U. S., at 11. 
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II 
We hold that the Committee, acting on behalf of the 
State, has not carried its burden. The State's ultimate 
interest here implicated is to assure the requisite quali-
fications of persons licensed to practice law.12 It is un-
disputed that a State has a constitutionally permissible 
and substantial interest in determining whether an appli-
cant possesses "the character and general fitness requisite 
for an attorney and counselor at law." Law Students Re-
search Council v. Wadmond, 401 U. S. 154, 159 (1970). 
See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U. S. 36, 40-41 
(1961); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 
232, 239 (1956).1 3 But no question is raised in this case 
as to appellant's character or general fitness. Rather, 
the sole basis for disqualification is her status as a resi-
dent alien. 
The Committee defends Rule 8 (I)'s requirement that 
applicants for admission to the bar be citizens of the 
United States on the ground that the special role of 
the lawyer justifies excluding aliens from the practice 
of law. In Connecticut, the Committee points out, the 
maxim that a la.wyer is an "officer of the court" is given 
concrete meaning by a statute which makes every lawyer 
a "commissioner of the Superior Court." As such, a 
12 Appellant drnir~ that thi~ "·a~ inclerd the Statc'ci purpose in 
rrquiring citizen~hip for the prartiee of law, noting that citizenf'hip 
i~ alHo rectuircd of practitioners in other ficldN, inelucling hn irclre~scrs 
and cosmeticians, Conn. Gen. Stnt. § 20-250, nrehitects, Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 20-291, nne! ~unitarians, Conn. Gen. Stnt. § 20-3Gl. Bcrnuse 
wr di~po~r of thr cn~e on othrr grounds, we do not rr:1ch ihi;; 
claim. 
n In this connection, "\Ir .. Tn~tire Fr:mkfurter wrotr: 
"From a profe~sional charged with ~uch rr-<ponsibilities thrrc must 
be exacted those qunlitirs of truth-RJWaking, of n high sen~c of honor, 
of granite discretion, of the strietrst ob~eiTaJJcc of fidurinr~· respon-
sibility, that have, throughout the rentmies, been romprncliou~l.'· cle-
srribcd as 'moral character.'" Schwarr Y. Board of Bar Examiners, 
353 U.S. 232, 2-1:7 (1957) (concurring opinion). 
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lawyer has authority to "sign writs and subpoenas, take 
recognizances, administer oaths and take depositions and 
acknO\vledgements of deeds." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-85. 
In the exercise of this authority, a Connecticut lawyer 
may command the assistance of a county sheriff or a town 
constable. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-90. Because of these 
and other pO\Yers, the Connecticut Supreme Court com-
mented that: 
"the courts not only demand [lawyers'] loyaHy, con-
fidence and respect. but also require them to func-
tion in a manner which will foster public confidence 
in the profession and, consequently, the judicial sys-
tem." 162 Conn., at 262-263, 294 A. 2d, at 287. 
In order to establish a link between citizenship and the 
powers and responsibilities of the lawyer in Connecticut, 
the Committee contrasts a citizen's undivided allegiance 
to this country "·ith a resident alien's possible conflict 
of loyalties. From this, the Committee concludes that a 
resident alien lawyer might in the exercise of his func-
tions ignore his responsibilities to the courts or even his 
clients in favor of the interest of a foreign power. 
We find these arguments unconvincing. It in no way 
denigrates a la,Yyer's high responsibilities to observe that 
the powers "to sign writs and subpoenas, take recogni-
zances, [and] administer oaths" hardly involve matters 
of state policy or acts of such unique responsibility as 
to entrust them only to citizens. Nor do we think that 
the practice of law offers meaningful opportunities ad-
versely to affect the interest of the United States. Cer-
tainly the Committee has failed to show the relevance of 
citizenship to any likelihood that a lawyer will fail to pro-
tect faithfully the interest of his clients.14 
14 L:twycrs frequent!~· rPprc,cnt forei~~:n roun1 ric:; and the na-
tionald of surh countries in litigatio11 in tho courts of the United 
States, ns well as in other matters in this country. In such rrprescn-
tn.tion, the duty of the lawyer, subject to his role as nn "officer o[ 
.-
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Nor would the possibility that some resident aliens are 
unsuited to the practice of law be a justification for 
a wholesale ban. 
"Even in applying permissible standards, officers of 
a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no 
basis for their finding that he fails to meet these 
standards, or when their action is invidiously dis-
criminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 
356." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 
U. S., at 239. 
This constitutional warning is especially salient where, 
as here, a State's bar admission standards make explicit 
use of a suspect classification. Although, as we have 
acknowledged, a State does have a substantial interest 
in the qualifications of those admitted to the practice of 
law, the arguments adva.nced by the Committee fall short 
of showing that the classification established by Rule 
8 ( 1) of the Connecticut Practice Book ( 1963) is neces-
sary to the promoting or safeguarding of this interest. 
Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge on a case-by-
case basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law. 
Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training 
and familiarity with Connecticut law. Apart from such 
tests of competence, it requires a new lawyer to take both 
the court ," is to further the interests of his clients by all lawful 
means, eYen when those interests are in conflict with the in terests 
of the United States or of a State. But this repre~entation involves 
no conflict of interest in the invidious sense. Rather , it casts the 
lawyer in hiR honored and t radi tional role as an authorized but 
independrnt agent acting to vindicat e the legal rights of a client, 
whoever it may be. It is conceivable that an alien licensed to prac-
tice law in this country could find himself in a position in which he 
might be called upon to represent his country of cit izenship against 
the United States in circumst anccs in which t here may be a conHict 
bet\\·een hi:> obligations to the two countries. In such rare situations, 
an honorable person, whether an alien or not, would decline the 
reprc:>entation. 
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an "attorney's oath" to perform his functions faithfully 
and honestly 15 and a "commissioner's oath" to "support 
the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitu-
tion of Connecticut." 16 Appellant has indicated her will-
ingness and ability to subscribe to the substance of both 
oaths,17 and Connecticut may quite properly conduct a 
character investigation to insure in any given case "that 
an applicant is not one who 'swears to an oath pro forma 
while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or 
indifference to the oath.' Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116, 
132." Law Students Research Council v. Wadrnond, 
supra, 401 U. S., at 164_18 Moreover, once admitted to 
15 The text of the nttorney's oaths is as follows: 
"You solemnly swenr that you will do no falsehood, nor consent io 
an~· to be done in court, and, if you know of any to be done, you 
will give information thereof to the judges, or one of them, that it 
may be reformed; you will not wittingly, or willingly promote, sue 
or cause to be sued, any false or unlawful suit, or give aid, or con-
sent, to ihe same; you will delay no man for lucre or malice; but 
will exercise the office of attorney, within the court wherein you may 
practice, according to the best of your learning and discretion, and 
with fidelity, as well to the court as to your client, so help you God." 
J. S. App., p. 44. 
16 There is no question ns to the validity of requiring an applicant, 
as a precondition to admission to the bar, to take such an oath. 
Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra, at 161-164. 
17 Because the commissioner's oath is an oath to "support the 
constitution of the United States, and the constitution of Con-
necticut, so long as you continue to be a citizen thereof" (emphnsis 
added), appellant could not of course take the oath as prescribed. 
To the extent that the onth reiterates Rule 8 (1)'s citizenship re-
quirement, it shares the same constitutional defects when required of 
prospective members of the bar. 
18 Wo find no m<'rit in 1he contention that. only citizens can in 
good conscience take an oath to support the Constitution. We note 
that all persons inducted into the armed smTiec;:, including resident 
nliens, arc required by 10 U. S. C. § 502 to tnkc the following oath: 
' ·I, , do solemnly swear (or aJTirm) that I will 
support and defend the Con titution of the United States against 
all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and 
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the bar, lawyers are subject to continuing scrutiny by 
the organized bar and the courts. In addition to dis-
cipline for unprofessional conduct, the range of post-
admission sanctions extends from judgments for con-
tempt to criminal prosecutions and disbarment.10 In 
swn, the Committee simply has not established that it 
must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order 
to vindicate its undoubted interest in high professional 
standards.20 
III 
In its brief, the Examining Committee makes another, 
somewhat different argmnent in support of Rule 8 (1). 
Its thrust is not that resident aliens lack the attributes 
nllegiance to the ~ame; and that I will obey the order~ of the Prrsi-
dent of the United States and tho order~ of tlw officer~ appointed 
o\'er me, according to regulations and tho Uniform Code of Military 
.Ju~tico. So help me God." 
If aliens ran take this oath when tho Nation i~ making nse of their 
r::er\'ices in the national defense, re~ident nlien applicant~ for ndmis-
sion to the bar smel~· cannot be precluded, as a rlas:<, from tr1king 
nn o:~th to support the Con~titution on the theory that th('y are 
unable to tnke the onth in good faith. 
1 " Sec, e. g .. Doolittle\'. Clark, 47 Conn. 316 (1879). Apart from 
tho courts, the prol'o~~ion itself has long subjoctrd its members to 
di~C'ipline nndrr rodr~ or canons of profcs::'ional ethiP~. As early as 
1908 the American Bar As~ociation adopted 32 Canons of Profes-
sional Ethirs. In 1970, following se,·oral ~·cars of stud~· and re-
Px:unination, tho House of Dolegatr~ of tho American l3:tr As~ori:t­
tion appro\·ed n 110\\' Code of Profo~~ional ne~pon"ibilit~·, whi('h pro-
\'idr:> drtailed rt bien! prescriptions n~ well a;; a comprrheH~i,·e rode of I 
disriplinar~· mlrs. The ABA Code of Professional nr~ponsibility has 
sinro been approwd and adoptrcl in the Di,-( rirt of Columbia nnd in 
46 StateR, inrludinp; Connortirut. 
20 Nothing in om ru le" prohibit" from admi,-sion t.o prartire in 
this Court rr~iclrnt aliens who haYo brrn :1dmittecl to prac·t icc "for 
throe years pai't in the hip;he~t rourt of n State. Territor~·. Di,trict, 
Commonwealth, or Pos:;r""ion" and whosr "private and profe,.:,-ionnl 
rhameters shall appear to be good." Rule 5, Rulf's of the Supreme 
Comt of the United States (1970). 
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necessary to maintain high standards in the legal profes-
sion, but rather that ]a\\'yrrs must be citizens almost as a 
matter of definition. The implication of this analysis is 
that exclusion of aliens from the legal profession is not 
subject to any scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
The argument builds upon the exclusion of aliens from 
the franchise in all 50 States and their disqualification 
under the Constitution from holding office as President, 
Art. 2, § 1, cl. 4, or as a member of the House of Rep-
resentatives, Art. 1, ~ 2, cl. 2, or of the Senate, Art. 1, § 3, 
cl. 3. These a11d num0rous other federal and statutory 
and constitutional provisions reflect, the Committee con-
tends, a pervasive recognition that "participation in the 
government structure as voters and office holders" is 
inescapably an aspect of citizenship. Appellee's Brief, 
p. 11. Offered in support of the claim that the lawyer is 
an "office holder" in this sen~e is an enhanced version of 
the proposition, discussed above, that he is an "officer 
of the court." Specifically, the Committee states that 
the lawyer "is an officer of the court who acts by and 
with the authority of the state" and is entrusted with the 
"exercise of actual government power." Appellee's Brief, 
p. 5. 
·we note at the outset that this argument goes beyond 
the opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which 
recognized that a lawyer is not an officer in the ordinary 
sense. 162 Conn., at 254; 294 A. 2d, at 283. This com-
ports with the view of the Court expressed by Mr. Jus-
tice Black in Cammer v. United States, 350 U. S. 399' 
(1956): 
"It has been stated many times that lawyers are 
'officers of the court.' One of the most frequently 
repeated statements to this effect appears in Ex parte 
Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378. The Court pointed out 
there, however, that an attorney was not an 'officer' 
12 
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within the ordinary meaning of that term. Cer-
tainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland or 
in any other case decided by this Court places attor-
neys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs, court 
clerks or judges. Unlike these officials a. lawyer is 
engaged in a private profession, important though 
it be to our system of justice. In general he makes 
his own decisions, follows his own best judgment, 
collects his own fees and runs his own business. The 
word 'officer' as it has always been applied to lawyers 
conveys a different meaning from the word 'officer' 
as applied to people serving as officers within the 
conventional meaning of that term." (Footnote 
omitted.) 350 U. S., at 405. 
Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions of 
responsibility and influence that impose on them duties 
correlative with their vital right of access to the courts. 
Moreover, by virtue of their professional aptitudes and 
natural interests, lawyers have been leaders in govern-
ment throughout the history of our country. Yet, they 
are not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers. 
Nor does the status of holding a. license to practice law 
place one so close to the core of the political process as 
to make him a formulator of government policy.21 
We hold that § 8 ( 1) violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.22 The judgment of the Connecticut Supreme 
Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
21 Because the Committ ee has failed to establish thnt the lawyer 
is an "office holder," we need not and do not decide whether there is 
merit in the general argument and, if so, to what offices it would 
apply. 
2
" In a thoughtful opinion , the California Supreme Court unani-
mously declared unconstitutional a similar California rule. Raf!aelli 
v. Committee of Bar Examiners, - Cal. 3d - , 496 P. 2d 1264, 
101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (19i2). See also Application of Park, 484 P . 2d 
690 (Alaska 1971) . 
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This case presents a novel question as to the con-
straints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment on the qualifications which a 
State· may require for admission to the bar. Appellant, 
Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands camve ..... ~ t..y1 h o 
to the United States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In ~ 
1967, she married a citizen of the United States and be-
came a resident of Connecticut.1 After her graduation 
from law school, she applied in 1970 for permission t(} 
take the Connecticut bar examination. The County Bar 
Association found her qualified in all respects save that 
she was not a citizen of the United States as required by 
Rule 8 (1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963)/ and 
1 Appellant is eligible for naturalization by reason of her marriage 
to a citizen of the United States and residence in the United States 
for more than three years, 8 U. S. C. § 1430 (a). She has not filed 
a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States, 
8 U. S. C. § 1445 (f), and has no present intention of doing so. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 4. In order to become a citizen, appellant 
would be required to renounce her citizenship of the N cthcrlands. 
8 U. S. C. § 1448 (a). 
2 The rules are promulgated by the judges of the Superior Court, 
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 51-80, and administered IJy the Connecticut Bar 
~s ·ociation. --rte .po-5.: fto'l 0 -1 fh~ ~fc... fe__ J 
/l-1 fi.L$. q,..(e_ (.!. rer'r~.sc:-,., ..J.~J 6y 
·f-h e. .5 f-q k /5 cc r- '£'x a m /1-1 '1/ Con,,~ ' I/~ e , 
bv-f' ( 
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on that account refused to allow her to take the examina-
tion. She then sought judicial relief, asserting that the 
regulation was unconstitutional ;fer claim was rejected 
first by the Superior Court and ultimately by the Con-
necticut Supreme Court. 162 Conn. 249, 294 A. 2d 281 
(1972). We noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U. S. 96 
( 1972), and now hold that the rule unconstitutionall 
discriminates against resident aliens." 
I 
We begin by sketching the background against which 
the State Bar Exarnining Committee attempts to justify 
the total exclusion of aliens from the practice of law. 
From its inception, our Nation welcomed and drew 
strength from the immigration of aliens. Their contri-
butions to ·the social and economic life of the country 
were self-evident, especially during the periods when the 
demand for human resources greatly exceeded the native 
supply. This demand was by no means limited to the 
unskilled or the uneducated. In 1872, this Court noted 
that admission to the practice of law in the courts of a 
State 
"in no sense depends on citizenship of the United 
States. It has not, as far as we know, ever been 
made in any State, or in any case, to depend on 
citizenship at all. Certainly many prominent and 
distinguished lawyers have been admitted to prac-
tice, both in the State and Federal courts, who were 
not citizens of the United States or of any State." 
Bradwell v. 'Phe State, 16 Wall. 130, 139 (1872).< 
3 Because \H' find thnt thr rulr cknir~ rqunl protection, we do not 
reach appellant's othrr rlaim8. 
1 We do not , of ronr~c, rrl~· on Bradwell to rstnblish that admis-
sion to the bar may not be mnde to drprncl on ritizcn~hip. The 
holding of that rase wns simply that the right to practice bw is not 
a "privilege or immuniiy" within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendnwnt. 
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But shortly thereafter, in 1879, Connecticut established 
the predecessor to its present rule totally excluding aliens 
from the practice of law. 162 Conn., at 253, 294 A. 2d, 
at 283. In subsequent decades, wide-ranging restrictions 
for the first time began to impair significantly the efforts 
of aliens to earn a livelihood in their chosen occupations." 
In the face of this trend, the Court nonetheless held 
in 1886 that a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "per-
son" \Yithin the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
directive that a State must not "deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886). The 
decision in Yick Wo invalidated a municipal ordinance 
regulating the operation of laundries on the ground that 
the ordinance was discriminatorily enforced against Chi-
nese operators. Some years later, the Court struck clown 
an Arizona statute requiring employers of more than five 
persons to employ at least 805-'o "qualified electors or 
native-born citizens of the United States or some sub-
division thereof." 'Pnwx v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). 
As stated for the Court by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes: 
"It requires no argument to show that the right to 
work for a living in the conunon occupations of the 
community is of the very essence of the personal 
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of 
the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure. ·[Citations 
omitted.] If this could be refused solely upon the 
ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the 
denial of equal protection of the laws would be a 
barren form of words." 239 U. S., at 41. ( 0 Nt IS..$ frJ ,J 
To be sure, the course of decisions protecting the em-
ployment rights of resident aliens has not been an un-
5 See J. Higham, Stranger~ in tho Lnnd 4n, 161 , 183 (2d ed. 1965). 
The full sralo of reHtrirlions imposed on tho work opportunities of 
aliens in 1946 is shown by Ivi. Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic 
in Ameriran L:nv 190-211 (1946). 
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swerving one.6 In Clarke v. Dekebach, 274 U. S. 392 
(1927), the Court was faced with a challenge to a city 
ordinance prohibiting the issuance to aliens of licenses 
to operate pool and billiard rooms. Characterizing the 
business as one having "harmful and vicious tendencies," 
the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the 
ordinance: 
"It was competent for the city to make such a 
choice, not shown to be irrational, by excluding from 
the conduct of a dubious business an entire class 
rather than its objectionable members selected by 
more empirical methods." 274 U. S., at 397. 
This easily expandable proposition supported discrimina-
tion against resident aliens in a wide range of occupations.7 
But the doctrinal foundations of Clarke were under-
mined in Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 
410 (1948), where, in ruling unconstitutional a California I 
statute barring issuance of fishing licenses to persons 
"ineligible to citizenship," the Court stated that "the 
power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien 
inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits." 
334 U. S., at 420. Indeed, with the issue squarely before 
it in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), the 
Court concluded that: 
" [ C] lassifications based on alienage, like those based 
on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and 
subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class 
are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' 
6 See also People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427, aff'd 
sub nom. Cmne v. New York, 239 U. S. 195 (1915); but sec 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 355, 374 (1971) . 
7 Sec lower court cases collected at N otc, Constitut ionality of Re-
st ri ctions on Aliens' RighL to Work, 57 Col. L. Rev. 1012, 10:21-1023 
(1957) (restrictions ranging from the vending of soft drinks to the 
selling of lightning rods). 
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minority [see United States v. Carolene Products 
Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938)] for whom 
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 372. (Foot-
notes omitted.)<. 
The Court has consistently emphasized that a State 
which adopts a suspect classification "bears a heavy 
burden of justification," McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 
184, 196 ( 1964), a burden which, though variously for-
mulated, requires the State to meet certain standards of 
proof. In order to justify the use of a suspect classifica-
tion, a State must show that its purpose or interes . . g 
both constitutionally permissible an substantial, and 9 
that its use of the classification is "necessary to the ac-
~omplishment" of its purpose 4'!1 or the safeguardmg of les -1
10 mterest. 11 I 
Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the· 
economy, serve in the armed forces, and contribute in 
myriad other ways to our society. It is appropriate that 
a State bear a heavy burden when it deprives them of 
employment opportunities. 
~ pnisrriminatwn or segregation for its own sake is not, of course, 
a constitutionally permissible purpose. E. g., Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); McLaughlin v. Florida, supra. 
9 I-":':", The state interest required has been characterized as "overriding," 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S., at 196; Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U. S. 1, 11 (1967), "compelling," Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S., 
at 375, "important," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972), 
or "substantial," ibid. We attribute no particular significance to 
these variations in diction. 
/ O~McLaughlin v. Flo1·ida, 379 U.S., at 19G ; Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U. S., at 11. 
11 
We did not decide in Graham nor do we decide 
- here whether special circumstances, such as armed 
hostilities between the United States and the country 
of which an alien is a citizen, would justify the use 
of a classification based on alienage. 
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II 
We hold that the Committee, acting on behalf of the 
State, has not carried its burden. The State's ultimate 
interest here implicated is to assure the requisite quali-
fications of persons licensed to practice law.' 2 It is un-
disputed that a State has a constitutionally permissible 
and substantial interest in determining whether an appli-
cant possesses "the character and general fitness requisite 
for an attorney and counselor at law." Law Students Re-
search Council v. Wadmond, 401 U. S. 154, 159 (1970). 
See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U. S. 36, 40-41 
(1961); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 
232, 239 (1956).13 But no question is raised in this case 
as to appellant's character or general fitness. Rather, 
the sole basis for disqualification is her status as a resi-
dent alien. 
The Committee defends Rule 8 (I)'s requirement that 
applicants for admission to the bar be citizens of the 
United States on the ground that the special role of 
the lawyer justifies excluding aliens from the practice 
of law. In Connecticut, the Committee points out, the 
maxim that a lawyer is an "officer of the court" is given 
concrete meaning by a statute which makes every lawyer 
a "commissioner of the Superior Court." As such, a 
12 Apprlln.nt denies thnt thi~ wns indeed the Stnte's purpose in 
requiring citizenship for the practice of law, noting that citizenship 
is ul8o required of prartitioners in other fields, inC'htding hairdressers 
nne! cosmeticians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-250, architects, Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 20-291, and sanitarians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-361. Because 
we di:,;po~e of the case on other grmmdl!', we do not reach 1 his 
claim. 
1 a In this connection , ::\Jr. Ju~til'e Frnnkfurter wrote: 
"From ::t professi<;mal charged with such rP~pon:,;ibilities there must 
be exacted those qualities of truth-spanking, of a high sense of honor, 
of granite discretion, of the strirtest ob,;en·anee of fiduciary respon-
sibility, that have, throughout the centuries, been compcndiou~ly de-
scribed as 'moral character.'" Schwan' Y. Boa1'd of Bar Examiucrs, 
353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (conl'urriug opinion). 
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lawyer has authority to "sign writs and subpoenas, take 
recognizances, administer oaths and ta.ke depositions and 
acknowledgements of deeds." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-85. 
In the exercise of this authority, a Connecticut lawyer 
may command the assistance of a county sheriff or a town 
constable. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-90. Because of these 
and other powers, the Connecticut Supreme Court com-
mented that: 
"the courts not only demand [lawyers'] loyalty, con-
fidence and respect, but also require them to func-
tion in a manner which will foster public confidence 
in the profession and, consequently, the judicial sys-
tem." 162 Conn., at 262-263, 294 A. 2d, at 287. 
In order to establish a link between citiilenship and the 
powers and responsibilities of the lawyer in Connecticut, 
the Committee contrasts a citizen's undivided allegiance 
to this country with a resident alien's possible conflict 
of loyalties. From this, the Committee concludes that a 
resident alien lawyer might in the exercise of his func-
tions ignore his responsibilities to the courts or even his 
clients in favor of the interest of a foreign power. 
'\Ve find these arguments unconvincing. It in no way 
denigrates a lawyer's high responsibilities to observe that 
the powers "to sign writs and subpoenas, ta.ke recogni-
zances, [and] administer oaths" hardly involve matters 
of state policy or acts of such unique responsibility as 
to entrust them only to citizens. Nor do we think that 
the practice of law offers meaningful opportunities ad-
versely to affect the interest of the United States. Cer-
tainly the Committee has failed to show the relevance of 
citizenship to any likelihood that a lawyer will fa.il to pro-
tect faithfully the interest of his clients.14 
14 Lawrers frequrntl~· rrpre;:ent forrign countries and the na-
tional~ of such countries in litigation in the courts of the United 
States, as well as in other matters in this country. In such represen-
tation, the duty of the lawyer, subject to his role as an "officer of 
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Nor would the possibility that some resident aliens are 
unsuited to the practice of law be a justification for 
a wholesale ban. 
"Even in applying permissible standards, officers of 
a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no 
basis for their finding that he fails to meet these 
standards, or when their action is invidiously dis-
criminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 
356." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 
U. S., at 239. 
This constitutional warning is especially salient where, 
as here, a State's bar admission standards make explicit 
use of a suspect classification. Although, as we have 
acknowledged, a State does have a substantial interest 
in the qualifications of those admitted to the practice of 
law, the arguments advanced by the Committee fall short 
of showing that the classification established by Rule 
8 (I) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963) is neces-
sary to the promoting or safeguarding of this interest. 
Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge on a case-by-
case basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law. 
Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training 
and familiarity with Connecticut law. Apart from such 
tests of competence, it requires a new lawyer to take both 
the court," is to further the interests of his clients by all lawful 
means, even when those interests are in conflict with the interests 
of the United States or of a State. But this representation involves 
no conflict of interest in the invidious sense. Rather, it casts the 
lawyer in his honored and traditional role as an authorized but 
independent agent acting to vindicate the legal rights of a client, 
whoever it may be. It is conceivable that an alien licensed to prac-
tice law in this country could find himself in a position in which he 
might be called upon to represent his country of citizenship against 
the United States in circumstances in which there may be a conflict 
between his obligations to the two countries. In such rare sit,uations, 
an honorable person, whether an alien or not, would decline the 
representation. 
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an "attorney's oath" to perform his functions faithfully 
and honestly 15 and a "commissioner's oath" to "support 
the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitu-
tion of Connecticut." 10 Appellant has indicated her will-
ingness and ability to subscribe to the substance of both 
oaths/7 and Connecticut may quite properly conduct a 
character investigation to insure in any given case "that 
an applicant is not one who 'swears to an oath pro forma 
while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or· 
indifference to the oath.' Bond v. Floy.d, 385 U. S. 116, 
132.'' Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 
supra, 401 U. S., at 164.18 Moreover, once admitted to-
15 The text of the attorney's oaths is as follows: 
"You solemnly swear that you will do no falsehood, nor consent to-
any to be done in court, and, if you know of any to be done, you 
will give information thereof to the judges, or one of them, that it 
may be reformed; you will not wittingly, or willingly promote, sue 
or cause to be sued, any false or unlawful suit, or give aid, or con-
sent, to the same; you will delay no man for lucre or malice; but 
will exercise the office of attorney, within the court wherein you may 
practice, acl'ording to the best of your learning and discretion, and 
with fidelity, as well to the court as to your client, so help you God.". 
J. S. App., p. 44. 
10 There is no question as to the validity of requiring an applicant, 
as a precondition to admission to the bar, to take such an oath. 
Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra, at 161-164. 
17 Because the commissioner's oath is an oath to "support the· 
constitution of the United States, and the constitution of Con-
necticut, so long as you continue to be a citizen thereof" (emphasis 
added), appellant could not of course take the oath as prescribed. 
To the extent that the oath reiterates Rule 8 ( 1) 's citizenship re-
quirement, it shares the same constitutional defects when required of 
prospective members of the bar. 
18 We find no merit in the contention that only citizens can in 
good conscience take an oath to support the Constitution. We note 
that all per~ons inducted into the armed sen·ices, including re::;ident 
aliens, are required by 10 U. S. C. § 502 to take the following oath: 
"I, , do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will 
support and defend the Constitution of the United St.1tcs against 
all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and 
71-1336-0PINION 
10 APPLICATION OF GRIFFITHS 
the bar, lawyers are subject to continuing scrutiny by 
the organized bar and the courts. In addition to dis-
cipline for unprofessional conduct, the range of post-
admission sanctions extends from judgments for con-
tempt to criminal prosecutions and disbarment.19 In 
sum, the Committee simply has not established that it 
must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order 
to vindicate its undoubted interest in high professional 
standards. 20 
III 
In its brief, the Examining Committee makes another, 
somewhat different argument in support of Rule 8 (1). 
Its thrust is not that resident aliens lack the attributes 
allegiance to the ~arne; and that I will obey the orders of the Presi-
dent of the United States and the orders of the offircr;; appointed 
over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military 
.Justire. So help me God." 
If aliens can take this oath when the Nation i ~ making usc of their 
services in the national defense, resident alien applicants for admis-
sion to the bar smdy cannot be prcrludcd, as a class, from taking 
an oath to support the Constitution on the theory that they are 
unnble to take the oath in good faith. 
19 See, e. g., Doolittle\'. C/a!'k, 47 Conn. 3Hi (1879). Apart from 
the courts, the profcs~ion itself has long subjected its members to 
discipline under rode~ or canons of profes~ional ethirs. As early as 
1908 the American Bar Association adopted 32 Canons of Profes-
sional Ethir~. In 1970, following severn! years of stud~· and re-
examination, the Hou~e of Delegates of the American Bar ARsocia-
tion approved a new Code of Profe:<sional Rr~pon~ibility , which pro-
vides detailed et hirnl prescriptions ns well ns n rompr<•hpn~iw rode of 
disciplinary rulPs. The ABA Code of Profe~~ional Re~ponsibility has ' 
since been approv<'d and adoptPd in the Di>'t rirt of Columbia and in 
46 States, including Connecticut. 
20 Nothing in our mle;;: prohibit :< from ndmi~sion t.o practice in 
this Court re~idcnt aliens who luwc been ndmitl<'d to praet ire " for 
three ~·ea rs pn~t in thr highr~t ronrt of a Statr, Trrritory, Di:-;t rict, 
Commonwcnlth, or Pos~es~ion" and whose "pri\·ate and profe~.~ional 
characters shall appear to be good." Rule 5, Rules of the Supremo 
Court of the United States (1970) . 
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necessary to maintain high standards in the legal profes-
sion , but rather that lawyers must be citizens almost as a 
matter of definition. The implication of this analysis is 
that exclusion of aliens from the legal profession is not 
subject to any scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
The argument builds upon the exclusion of aliens from 
the franchise in all 50 States and their disqualification 
under the Constitution from holding office as President, 
Art. 2, § 1, cl. 4, or as a member of the House of Rep-
resentatives, Art. 1, § 2, cl. 2, or of the Senate, Art. 1, § 3, 
cl. 3. These and numerous other federal and statutory 
and constitutional provisions reflect, the Committee con-
tends, a pervasive recognition that "participation in the 
government structure as voters and office holders" is 
inescapably an aspect of citizenship. Appellee's Brief, 
p. 11. Offered in support of the claim that the lawyer is 
an "office holder'' in this sense is an enhanced version of 
the proposition, discussed above, that he is an "officer 
of the court." Specifica.lly, the Committee states that 
the lawyer "is an officer of the court who acts by and 
with the authority of the state" and is entrusted with the 
"exercise of actual government power." Appellee's Brief, 
p. 5. 
We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond 
the opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which 
recognized that a lawyer is not an officer in the ordinary 
sense. 162 Conn., at 254; 294 A. 2d, at 283. This com-
ports with the view of the Court expressed by Mr. Jus-
tice Black in Cammer v. United States, 350 U. S. 399" 
(1956): 
"It has been stated many times that lawyers are 
'officers of the court.' One of the most frequently 
repeated statements to this effect appears in Ex parte 
Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378. The Court pointed out 
there, however, that an attorney was not an 'officer' 
12 
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within the ordinary meaning of that term. Cer-
tainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland or 
in any other case decided by this Court places attor-
neys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs, court 
clerks or judges. Unlike these officials a lawyer is 
engaged in a private profession, important though 
it be to our system of justice. In general he makes 
his own decisions, follows his own best judgment, 
collects his own fees and runs his own business. The 
"·ord 'officer' as it has always been applied to lawyers 
conveys a different meaning from the word 'officer' 
as applied to people serving as officers within the 
conventional meaning of that term." (Footnote 
omitted.) 350 U. S., at 405. 
Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions of 
responsibility and influence that impose on them duties 
correlative with their vital right of access to the courts. 
Moreover, by virtue of their professional aptitudes and 
natural interests, lawyers have been leaders in govern-
ment throughout the history of our country. Yet, they 
are not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers. 
Nor does the status of holding a license to practice law 
place one so close to the core of the political process as 
to make him a formulator of government policy. 21 
We hold that § 8 ( 1) violates the Equal Protection 
Clausc.22 The judgment of the Connecticut Supreme 
Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
21 Berau~e the Committee has failed to estu bli~h that the lawyer 
is an "office holder," we need not and do not decide whether there is 
merit in the general argument and, if so, to what offices it would 
appl~·. 
22 In a thoughtful opinion, the California Supreme Court unani-· 
mously declared unconstitutional a similar Cali fo rnia rule. Raffaelli 
v. Committee of Bm· Examiners, - Cal. 3d - , 496 P. 2d 1264, 
101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972). See al~o Application of Park , 484 P . 2d 
690 (Alaska 1971) . 
NOTE: Where It Is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be re-
leased, as Is belnl:' done In connection with this case, at the time 
the opinion Is Issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for 
the convenience of the reader. See United Btatea v. Detroit Lumber 
Oo., 200 U.S. 321, 337. 
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No. 71-1336 
In reApplication of Fre Le Poole) On Appeal from the 
Griffiths for Admission to Supreme Court of 
the Bar, Appellant. Connecticut. 
'[June 25, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This case presents a novel question as to the con-
straints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment on the qualifications which a 
State may require for admission to the bar. Appellant, 
Fre Le Poole Griffiths, is a citizen of the Netherlands who 
came to the United States in 1965, originally as a visitor. 
In 1967 she married a citizen of the United States and be-
came a resident of Connecticut.1 After her graduation 
from law school, she applied in 1970 for permission to 
take the Connecticut bar examination. The County Bar 
Association found her qualified in all respects save that 
she was not a citizen of the United States as required by 
Rule 8 (1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963),2 and 
1 Appellant is eligible for naturalization by reason of her marriage 
to a citizen of the United States and residence in the United States 
for more than three years, 8 U. S. C. § 1430 (a). She has not filed 
a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States, 
8 U. S. C. § 1445 (f) , and has no present intention of doing so. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 4. In order to become a citizen, appellant 
would be required to renounce her citizenship of the Netherlands. 
8 U. S. C. § 1448 (a ) . 
2 The rules are promulgated by the judges of the Superior Court, 
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 51-80, and administered by the Connecticut Bar 
Association. The position of the State in this case is represented by 
the State Bar Examining Committee. 
·- -----· - - - -·- ---- -·-- - --- --, 
: 
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on that account refused to allow her to take the examina-
tion. She then sought judicial relief, asserting that the 
regulation was unconstitutional but her claim was re-
jected first by the Superior Court and ultimately by the 
Connecticut Supreme Court. 162 Conn. 249, 294 A. 2d 
281 (1972). We noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U. S. 
966 ( 1972), and now hold that the rule unconstitutionally 
discriminates against resident aliens.3 
I 
We begin by sketching the background against which 
the State Bar Examining Committee attempts to justify 
the total exclusion of aliens from the practice of law. 
From its inception, our Nation welcomed and drew 
strength from the immigration of aliens. Their contri-
butions to the social and economic life of the country 
were self-evident, especially during the periods when the 
demand for human resources greatly exceeded the native 
supply. This demand was by no means limited to the 
unskilled or the uneducated. In 1872, this Court noted 
that admission to the practice of law in the courts of a 
State 
"in no sense depends on citizenship of the United 
States. It has not, as far as we know, ever been 
made in any State, or in any case, to depend on 
citizenship at all. Certainly many prominent and 
distinguished lawyers have been admitted to prac-
tice, both in the State and Federal courts, who were 
not citizens of the United States or of any State." 
Bradwell v. The State, 16 Wall. 130, 139 (1872).4 
3 Because we find that the rule denies equal protection, we do not 
reach appellant.'s other claims. 
4 We do not, of course, rely on Bradwell to establish that admis-
sion to the bar may not be made · to depend on citizenship. The 
holding of that case was simply that the right to practice law is not 
a "privilege or immunity" wi.thin the meaning of the Fourteenth 
.Amendment. 
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But shortly thereafter, in 1879, Connecticut established 
the predecessor to its present rule totally excluding aliens 
from the practice of law. 162 Conn., at 253, 294 A. 2d, 
at 283. In subsequent decades, wide-ranging restrictions 
for the first time began to impair significantly the efforts 
of aliens to earn a livelihood in their chosen occupations.5 
In the face of this trend, the Cour't nonetheless held 
in 1886 that a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "per-
son" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
directive that a State must not "deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886). The 
decision in Yick Wo invalidated a municipal ordinance 
regulating the operation of laundries on the ground that 
the ordinance was discriminatorily enforced against Chi-
nese operators. Some years later, the Court struck down 
an Arizona statute requiring employers of more than five 
persons to employ at least 80% "qualified electors or 
native-born citizens of the United States or some sub-
division thereof." Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915). 
As stated for the Court by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes: 
"It requires. no argument to show that the right to 
work for a living in the common occupations of the 
community is of the very essence of the personal 
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of 
the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure. [Citations 
omitted.] If this could be refused· solely upon the 
ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the 
denial of equal protection of the laws would be a 
barren form of words." 239 U. S., at 41. 
To be sure, the course of decisions protecting the em-
ployment rights of resident aliens has not been an un-
5 See J. Higham, Strangers in the Land 46, 161, 183 (2d ed. 1965) .. 
The full scale of restrictions imposed on the work opportunities of 
aliens in 1946 is shown by M. Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic: 
in. American Law 190-211 (1946),. 
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swerving one.6 In Clarke v. Dekebach, 274 U. S. 392 
(1927) , the Court was faced with a challenge to a city 
ordinance prohibiting the issuance to aliens of licenses 
to operate pool and billiard rooms. Characterizing the 
business as one having "harmful and vicious tendencies," 
the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the 
ordinance: 
"It was competent for the city to make such a 
choice, not shown to be irrational, by excluding from 
the conduct of a dubious business an entire class 
rather than its objectionable members selected by 
more empirical methods." 274 U. S., at 397. 
This easily expandable proposition supported discrimina-
tion against resident aliens in a wide range of occupations.7 
But the doctrinal foundations of Clarke were under-
mined in Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U. S. 
410 ( 1948) , where, in ruling unconstitutional a California 
statute barring issuance of fishing licenses to persons 
"ineligible to citizenship," the Court stated that "the 
power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien 
iiiliabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits." 
334 U. S. , at 420. Indeed, with the issue squarely before 
it in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), the 
Court concluded that: 
"[C]lassifications based on alienage, like those based 
on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and 
subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class 
are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' 
6 See alJ>o People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427, aff'd 
sub nom. Crane v. N ew York , 239 U. S. 195 (1915) ; but see 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 374 (1971) . 
' 7 See lower court cases collected at Note, Constitutionality of Re-
strictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 Col. L. Rev. 1012, 1021-1023 
(1957) (restrictions ranging from the vending of soft drinks to the 
selling of lightning rods) . 
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minority [see United States v. Carolene Products 
Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938)] for whom 
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 372. (Foot-
notes omitted.) 
The Court has consistently emphasized that a State 
which adopts a suspect classification "bears a heavy 
burden of justification," McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S, 
184, 196 ( 1964), a burden which, though variously for .. 
mulated, requires the State to meet certain standards of 
proof. In order to justify the use of a suspect classifica• 
tion, a State must show th.at its purpose or interest is 
both constitutionally permissible 8 and substantial,9 and 
that its use of the classification is "necessary to the ac-
complishment" of its purpose 10 or the safeguarding of its 
interest.11 
Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the 
economy, serve in the armed ·forces, and contribute in 
myriad other ways to our society. It is appropriate that 
a State bear a heavy burden when it deprives them of 
employment opportunities. 
8 Discrimination or segregation for its own sake is not, of course, 
a constitutionally permissible purpose. E. g., Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U. S. 483, 495 (1954); McLaughlin v. Florida, supra. 
9 The state interest required has been characterized as "overriding," 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S., at 196 ;' Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 11 (1967), "compelling," Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S., 
at 375, "important," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972), 
or "substantial," ibid. We ·attribute no particular significance to 
these variations in diction. 
'lo McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S., at 196; Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U. S., at 11. 
11 We did not decide in Graham nor do we decide here whether 
special circumstances, such as armed hostilities between the United 
States and the country of which an alien is a citizen, would justify 
the use of a classification based on alienage. 
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II 
We hold that the Committee, acting on behalf of the 
State, has not carried its burden. The State's ultimate 
interest here implicated is to assure the requisite quali-
fications of persons licensed to practice law.12 It is un-
disputed that a State has a constitutionally permissible 
and substantial interest in determining whether an appli-
cant possesses "the character and general fitness requisite 
foc an attorney and counselor at law." Law Students Re· 
search Council v. Wadmond, 401 U. S. 154, 159 (1970). 
See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U. S. 36, 40-41 
(1961); Schware v. Board· of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 
232, 239 (1956).1 3 But no question is raised in this case 
as to appellant's character or general fitness. Rather, 
the sole basis for disqualification is her status as a resi-
dent alien. 
The Comll1ittee defends Rule 8 ( 1) 's requirement that 
applicants for admission to the bar be citizens of the 
United States on the ground that the special role of 
the lawyer justifies excluding aliens from the practice 
of law. In Connecticut, the Committee points out, the 
maxim that a lawyer is an "officer of the court" is given 
concrete meaning by a. statute which makes every lawyer 
a "commissioner of the Superior Court." As such, a 
1 2 Appellnnt denie~ that thiti wns ind()('d the Stnte's purpose in 
requiring citizenship for the practice of law, noting that citizenship 
is also required of practitioners in other fields, including hnirdressers 
and cosmeticians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20--250, architects, Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 20--291 , and sanitarians, Conn. Gen. Stat .. § 20-361. Because 
we dispose of the case on other grounds, we do not reach this. 
claim. 
13 In this connec tion , l\Ir . .Juti tice Frankfurter wrote : 
"From a profestiional charged with such rrspon ·ibilities there must 
be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high srnse of honor, 
of granit e discrrtion, of the strictest ob~erva n ce of fidu ciary r espon-
sibility, that have, throughout the centuries, been compendious!~· de-
scribed as 'moral cha racter.'" Schware v. Board of Bar Examinet·s , 
353 U. S. 232, 2.47 (1957.) (concurring opinion) . 
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lawyer has authority to "sign writs and subpoenas, take 
recognizances, administer oaths and take depositions and 
acknowledgements of deeds." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-85. 
In the exercise of this authority, a Connecticut lawyer 
may command the assistance of a county sheriff or a town 
constable. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-90. Because of these 
and other powers, the Connecticut Supreme Court com-
mented that: 
"the courts not only demand [lawyers'] loyalty, con-
fidence and respect, but also require them to func-
tion in a manner which will foster public confidence 
in the profession and, consequently, the judicial sys-
tem." 162 Conn., at 262-263, 294 A. 2d, at 287. 
In order to establish a link between citizenship and the 
powers and responsibilities of the lawyer in Connecticut, 
the Committee contrasts a citizen's undivided allegiance 
to this country with a resident alien's possible conflict 
of loyalties. From this, the Committee concludes that a 
resident alien lawyer might in the exercise of his func-
tions ignore his responsibilities to the courts or even his 
clients in favor of the interest of a foreign power. 
We find these arguments unconvincing. It in no way 
denigrates a lawyer's high responsibilities to observe that 
the powers "to sign writs and subpoenas, take recogni-
zances, [and] administer oaths" hardly involve matters 
of state policy or acts of such unique responsibility as 
to entrust them only to citizens. Nor do we think that 
the practice of law offers meaningful opportunities ad-
versely to affect the interest of the United States. Cer-
tainly the Committee has failed to show the relevance of 
citizenship to any likelihood that a lawyer will fail to pro-
tect faithfully the interest of his clients.14 
14 Lawyers frequently represent foreign countries and the na-
tionals of such countries in litigation in the courts of the United 
States, as well as in other matters in this country. In such represen-
tation, the duty of the lawyer, subject to his role as an "officer of 
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Nor would the possibility that some resident aliens are 
unsuited to the practice of law be a justification for 
a wholesale ban. 
"Even in applying permissible standards, officers o£ 
a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no 
basis for their finding that he fails to meet these 
standards, or when their action is invidiously dis-
criminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 
356." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 
U. S., at 239. 
This constitutional warning is especially salient where, 
as here, a State's bar admission standards make explicit 
use of a suspect classification. Although, as we have 
acknowledged, a State does have a substantial interest 
in the qualifications of those admitted to the practice of 
law, the arguments advanced by the Committee fall short 
of showing that the classification established ' by Rule 
8 (1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963) is neces-
sary to the promoting or safeguarding of this interest. 
Connecticut ha-s wide freedom to gauge on a case-by-
case basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law. 
Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training 
and familiarity with Connecticut law. Apart from such 
tests of competence, it requires a new lawyer to take both 
the court," is to further the interests of his clients by all lawful 
means, even when those interests are in conflict with the interests 
of the United States or of a State. But this representation involves 
no conflict of interest in the invidious sense. Rather, it casts the 
lawyer in his honored and traditional role as an authorized but 
independent agent acting to vindicate the legal rights of a client, 
whoever it may be. It is conceivable that an alien licensed to prac-
tice law in this country could · find himself in a position in which he 
might be called upon to represent his country of citizenship against 
the United States in circumstances in which there may be a conflict 
between his obligations to the two countries. In such rare situations, 
an honorable person, whether an alien or not, would decline the 
representation. 
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an "attorney's oath" to perform 'his functions faithfully 
and honestly 15 and a "commissioner's oath" to "support 
the Constitution of the Un!ted States, and the Constitu-
tion of Connecticut." to Appellant has indicated her will-
ingness and ability to subscribe to the substance of both 
oaths,17 and Connecticut may quite properly conduct a 
character investigation to insure in any given case "that 
an applicant is not one who 'swears to an oath pro forma 
while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or 
indifference to the oath.' Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116, 
132." Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 
supra, 401 U. S., at 164.18 Moreover, once admitted to 
15 The text of the attorney's oaths is as follows: 
"You solemnly swear that you will do no falsehood, nor consent to 
any to be done in court, and, if you know of any to be done, you 
will give information thereof to the judges, or one of them, that it 
may be reformed; you will not wittingly, or willingly promote, sue 
or cause to be sued, any false or unlawful suit, or give aid, or con-
sent, to the same; you will delay no man for lucre or malice; but 
will exercise the office of attorney, within the court wherein you may 
·practice, according to the best of your learning and discretion, and 
with fidelity, as well to the court as to your client, so help you God." 
J. S. App., p. 44. 
16 There is no qu~stion liS to the validity of requiring an applicant, 
as a precondition to admission to the bar, to take such an oath. 
Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra, at 161-164. 
17 Because the commissioner's o11th is an oath to "support the 
constitution of the United States, and the constitution of Con-
necticut, so long as you continue to be a citizen thereof" . (emphasis 
added), appell11nt could not of course t11ke the oath as prescribed. 
To the extent that the oath reiterates Rule 8 ( 1) 's citizenship re-
quirement, it shares the same constitution11l defects when required of 
prospective members of the bar: 
18 We find no merit in the contention that only citizens can in 
good conscience take an oath to support the Constitution. We note 
that all persons inducted into the armed services, including resident 
aliens, are required by 10 U. S.C. § 502. to t11ke the following oath: 
"I, , do solemnly swear (or affirm) th11t I will 
·support and defend the Constitution of the United States against 
·all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and 
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the bar, lawyers are subject to continuing scrutiny by 
the organized bar and the courts. In addition to dis-
cipline for unprofessional conduct, the range of post-
admission sanctions extends from judgments for con-
tempt to criminal prosecutions and disbarment.10 In 
sum, the Committee simply has not established that it 
must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order 
to. vindicate its undoubted interest in high professional 
standards. 20 
III 
In its brief, the Examining Committee makes another, 
somewhat different argument in support of Rule 8 (1). 
Its thrust is not that resident aliens lack the attributes 
allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the Presi-
dent of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed 
over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military 
.Justice. So help me God.'~ 
If aliens can take this oath when the Nation is making use of their 
services in the national defense, resident alien applicants for admis-
sion to the bar surely cannot be precluded, as a class, from taking 
an oath to support the Constitution on the theory that they are 
unable to take the oath in good faith . 
10 See, e. g .. Doolittle v. Clark, 47 Conn. 316 (1879). Apart from 
the courts, the profession itself has long subjected its members to 
discipline under codes or canons of professional ethics. As early as 
1908 the American Bar Association adopted 32 Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics. In 1970, following several years of stud~· and re~ 
examination, the House of Delegates of the American Bar . Associa~ 
tion approved a new Code of Professional Responsibility, which pro-
vides detailed ethical prescriptions as well as a comprehensive code of 
disciplinary rules. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility has 
since been approved and adopted in the District of Columbia and in 
46 States, including Connecticut. 
20 Nothing in our rules prohibits from admission t.o practice in 
this Court resident aliens who have been admitted to practice "for 
three years past in the highest court of a State, Territory, District, 
Commonwealth, or Possession" and whose "private and professional 
characters shall appear to be good." Rule .5, Rules of the Supreme . 
Court of the United States (1970). . · 
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necessary to maintain high standards in the legal profes-
sion, but rather that lawyers must be citizens almost as a 
matter of definition. The implication of this analysis is 
that exclusion of aliens from the legal profession is not 
subject to any scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
The argument builds upon the exclusion of aliens from 
the franchise in all 50 States and their disqualification 
under the Constitution from holding office as President, 
Art. 2, § 1, cl. 4, or as a member of the House of Rep-
resentatives, Art. 1, § 2, cl. 2, or of the Senate, Art. 1, § 3, 
cl. 3. These and numerous other federal and statutory 
and constitutional provisions reflect, the Committee con-
tends, a pervasive recognition that "participation in the 
government structure as voters and office holders" is 
inescapably an aspect of citizenship. Appellee's Brief, 
p. 11. Offered in support of the claim that the lawyer is 
an "office holder" in this sense is an enhanced version of 
the proposition, discussed above, that he is an "officer 
of the court." Specifically, the Committee states that 
the lawyer "is an officer of the court who acts by and 
with the authority of the state" and is entrusted with the 
"exercise of actual government power." Appellee's Brief, 
p. 5. 
We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond 
the opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which 
recognized that a lawyer is not an officer in the ordinary 
sense. 162 Conn., at 254; 294 A. 2d, at 283. This com-
ports with the view of the Court expressed by Mr. Jus-
tice Black in Cammer v. United States, 350 U. S. 399 
(1956): 
"It has been stated many times that lawyers are 
'officers of the court.' One of the most frequently 
repeated statements to this effect appears in Ex parte 
Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378. The Court pointed out 
there, however, that an attorney was not an 'officer' 
12 
71-1:336-0PINlON 
TN HE CUU.FFITHS 
within the ordinary meaning of that term. Cer-
tainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland or 
in any other case drcided by this Court places attor-
neys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs, court 
clerks or judges. Unlike these officials a lawyer is 
engaged in a private profession, important though 
it be to our system of justice. In general he makes 
his own decisions, follows his own best judgment, 
collects his own fees and runs his own business. The 
word 'officer' as it has always been applied to lawyers 
conveys a different meaning from the word 'officer' 
as applied to people serving as officers within the 
conventional meaning of that term." (Footnote 
omitted.) 350 U. S., at 405. 
Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions of 
responsibility and influence that impose on them duties 
correlative with their vital right of access to the courts. 
Moreover, by virtue of their professional aptitudes and 
natural interests. lawyers have been leaders in govern-
ment throughout the history of our country. Yet, they 
arc not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers. 
Nor does the status of holding a license to practice law 
place onr so close to the core of the political process as 
to make him a formulator of government policy.n 
We hold that ~ 8 ( 1) violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.~~ Tlw judgnwnt of the Connecticut Supreme 
Court is revers('cl, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
~ 1 Br('ali~P thr C'ornnutt<·<' hn~ fniiC'd to r~tnbli~h that the lawyer 
is an ·'ufliep holdrr," II'<' Mrd not and do not clreidP whPther there is 
merit in the p;eneral arp;unwnt and, if ::;o, to what office:; it would 
apply. 
22 In a thoughtful opmiOil. thr Califomia Ruprrme Court unani-
mou::;ly dPehtrl'd liiH'on~titut10nal a :;imilnr California rule. Raffaelli 
v. Committee of Bar R:wnnner8, - Cal. ;{d -, 496 P. 2d 1264, 
101 Cal. Hptr. 896 (1972) SrP also Application of Park, 484 P. 2d 
690 (Alaska 1971 ) . 
